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i 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a Doctoral Thesis of the International Executive Doctorate 
Programme (DBA) at the School of Management, Cranfield University, UK. The 
purpose of the study is to present the results of the research dedicated to the 
topic of Infrastructure Sharing, a common method to make use of the limited 
infrastructure resources of many stakeholders. The research aims to develop a 
decision support tool for a National Regulating Authority (NRA) on the basis of a 
software simulation representing infrastructure in use as complex systems 
consisting of agent and infrastructure networks. By applying a computational 
Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) approach to policy decisions, i.e. influence of 
Duct and Pole Access (DPA) to incumbent telecommunication infrastructures, 
the research investigates regulatory considerations that stimulate the 
development of alternative networks. The final deliverable of the research is a 
simulation tool that provides a solid foundation for simulating experiments, 
which allows analysis of demand for broadband services by different subgroups 
of users. The results of the study are of value for regulators, practitioners, 
representatives of telecommunication and other network industries, and 
scholars who deal with the topic of sustainable infrastructure development and 
recognise the value of a complex system perspective. 
 
Keywords: regulation, duct access, pole access, infrastructure sharing, agent-
based modelling, software simulation, facility based competition, service based 
competition 
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1 FOUNDATION 
1.1 Introduction 
The ignition point of this DBA research was a managerial task from the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of Kazakhtelecom (KT) in 2012 to explore the concept 
of Infrastructure Sharing (IS). At the beginning of the 2010s the shift of the 
traditional voice telecom industry from growth to maturity stage became 
apparent in most markets. The market reached saturation in providing Internet 
access over fixed and voice over mobile connections. Growth by geographical 
expansion slowed down. Due to competition and regulators’ pressure the 
Average Revenue per User (ARPU) fell drastically. On the other hand, 
increasing demand for digital data by converged networks and media 
applications provided new opportunities for industry growth but increased the 
problem of infrastructure shortages. Because of competition in no-growth 
markets, telecoms faced the problem of meeting revenue expectations under 
declining profitability and maintaining continuous infrastructure regeneration. 
IS in telecommunications is an innovative method for many entities to make use 
of limited infrastructure elements, i.e. ducts, towers, networks, spectrum bands, 
and others. A preliminary managerial research of IS methods was conducted at 
KT. The managerial research on IS revealed a great deal of ambiguity and gaps 
in knowledge. Firstly, the term “Infrastructure Sharing” in its current formulation 
received massive implementation in the 2000s. Prior to that, the “Sharing” 
concept was used either for non-profit arrangements between parties in similar 
premises or in relation to development of open access and competition. The 
concept of IS has its roots in the scarcity of limited resources, either natural or 
man-made. This scarcity became visible in the 21st century as a result of huge 
developments of converged telecommunications and media networks. 
Secondly, there is a lack of clear definition of the IS concept in 
telecommunications. Studies on this concept are fragmented and represent a 
set of separate topics, i.e. co-investment options, unbundling of fixed network 
elements, active and passive IS for mobile, spectrum sharing, Mobile Virtual 
Network Operator (MVNO), roaming, 3rd party infrastructure providers. Some 
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topics are well researched whereas others are in their early stages. Most 
publications on IS are generated in business or consulting areas with academic 
scholars catching up with empirical research. Not all studies explicitly cite the 
term “Infrastructure Sharing” but clearly follow its main principle: a common use 
of limited resources by many entities. 
Thirdly, since telecommunications are a regulated industry and recognised as 
part of the national economic infrastructure, the issue of regulating IS is diverse 
too. Certain countries prescribe mandatory sharing of selected infrastructure 
elements; others pursue voluntary arrangements between business entities. 
This lack of rules on IS constitutes a major bottleneck for promoting IS 
principles, as ambiguity on the regulatory side creates potential financial and 
litigation risks on the business side. Inconsistency among national regulators on 
IS was recognised by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which 
dedicated its Global Symposium for Regulators (GSR) in 2008 to the topic of IS 
(Foster, 2008; Lazauskaite, 2008; Lefѐvre, 2008; Schorr, 2008; Webb, 2008). 
Academic papers primarily focus on the scope and nature of regulatory 
decisions related to IS. In wireline and wireless telecommunications sharing, 
policies apply to network elements (local loop unbundling (LLU), duct and pole 
access (DPA), “bitstream” access) as well as the network as a whole (common 
carriage, open access, network neutrality). In analysing the mandatory versus 
voluntary sharing principles, the literature review discovered that various studies 
show controversial results on the effect of mandatory sharing. Various 
researchers argue that mandatory IS is not welfare enhancing (Crandall, 2005), 
does not enable broadband penetration (Crandall, Eisenach and Ingraham, 
2013), and does not lead to an increase of competition (Hazlett, 2006) and 
infrastructure investment (Cave, 2014). 
Academic papers agree that the pressure on tailoring balanced regulatory 
practices related to infrastructure development will increase as the demand for 
digital services and content continues to grow exponentially. The United Nations 
(UN) declared the Internet to be a basic human right (United Nations, 2011), 
which forces governments worldwide to connect their citizens to any place on 
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the world map. Commercial deployment of modern telecommunication networks 
is economically viable in urban geographical types, whereas in rural and other 
underserved areas, subsidies and licence obligations are the main regulatory 
remedies to provide network coverage. All these findings provide reinforcement 
that regulators need to simulate, model, test and analyse the potential 
outcomes of various IS decisions prior to implementation. 
 
1.2 Statement of Purpose 
The ambiguity and knowledge gaps noted in the preliminary observations on IS 
suggest that there is a need for businesses and regulators to determine the 
dimensions of decision support to implement the most effective types of IS in 
national telecommunications. Since the perspectives of businesses and policy 
makers are different in nature, the proposed DBA research takes the broader 
perspective of a National Regulating Authority (NRA) to formulate the business 
problem statement: 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in definition, exercising and regulating IS in 
telecommunications caused by heterogeneous and inconsistent business and 
regulatory approaches. There is a demand for a decision making approach to 
implement the most effective types of IS methods for a given set of a country’s 
economic, geographic, demographic, and other variables to maximise 
economic, environmental, political and social outcomes. 
A specific purpose of the research is to provide regulators with a decision 
support tool to enable NRAs to analyse the potential outcomes of regulatory 
initiatives related to the development of IS as a tool to promote competition in 
telecommunication markets. This study reports on the outcomes and findings, 
explains the contribution to academia and describes the limitations of the 
potential avenues for future research. 
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1.3 Research Question 
The research aims to investigate the potential for innovation and investment in 
network competition via IS. The study is designed from the perspective of an 
NRA, and looks at interrelations between various stakeholders, e.g. users, 
incumbent and alternative operators, and how these interrelations affect the 
development of alternative infrastructures. The research recognises 
infrastructures in general and IS concepts in particular as complex systems 
consisting of agents and networks. By applying a computational Agent-Based 
Modelling (ABM) approach to policy decisions as the main research vehicle, 
e.g. the influence of DPA to incumbent infrastructures on the development of 
alternative networks, the research aims to answer the following research 
question: 
 
“What regulatory considerations stimulate investments in Infrastructure 
Sharing?” 
This is an overarching research question that can be tailored to a specific 
national context (developed or developing country), regulatory culture 
(interventionist or liberal), geographic type (urban or urban), network type 
(wireless or wireline), network elements (communication towers or ducts and 
poles), and demand characteristics (types and behaviour of users). 
 
1.4 Stance of the Researcher 
 
In this research, modelling the development of a Next Generation Network 
(NGN) infrastructure for providing broadband access is viewed from a complex 
system perspective. In determining the philosophical position for the research, a 
two dimensional framework by Snowden and Stanbridge (2004) is used to 
position the modelling approach within “Order – Un-order” ontology and “Rules 
– Heuristics” epistemology.  
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Figure 1-1 The Landscape of Management (Snowden and Stanbridge, 2004) 
From the four quadrants (Snowden and Stanbridge, 2004) the proposed 
research falls into the Mathematical Complexity domain (Figure 1-1). In terms of 
ontology, the investigated phenomenon of developing an NGN infrastructure is 
viewed as an unordered system with a higher degree of inexplicit relationships 
between elements. From an epistemological perspective, the proposed model is 
an attempt to represent a system with a low level of ambiguity and clearly 
formulated set of actions from an NRA. 
One of the research’s objectives is to formulate behavioural rules of 
stakeholders (operators, users, regulators) on the basis of ABM to represent the 
characteristics of the system. These rules would help NRAs to articulate 
decisions related to IS and can be used for creating a framework where the 
external determinants of IS are viewed as objective external factors and where 
the reaction of stakeholders is considered within a social setting. With this view 
the proposed research inclines towards a realist ontology, which is also backed 
up with the following argumentation. 
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Firstly, the proposed context of development of alternative networks to facilitate 
infrastructure based competition is perceived as external to the decision support 
framework. Infrastructure Sharing is thus viewed as a reaction to external 
factors, such as growing demand on the one hand and scarcity of man-made 
resources on the other. Creating a decision support framework aims at the 
“formalization of underlying reality” (Mir and Watson, 2001). This also suggests 
the second reason for critical realism, with the external role of a researcher 
being more observer than participant. The observed phenomenon is already 
formulated in the business and regulatory environment which forces academic 
research to react and address the problem in a given format. 
Thirdly, critical realist epistemology assumes that the results of the research are 
replicable for a given set of initial data. The proposed decision support software 
tool suggests that a similar set of input data will generate similar output results. 
The final recommendations as the result of the decision support tool are meant 
to be replicable responses to contingencies without ideological actions of 
involved stakeholders and with contexts as the key to perspectives (Mir and 
Watson, 2001). Another reason in favour of critical realism is that a complex 
system perspective assumes that emerging interrelationships between agents 
in a system exist as a potential rather than direct causal correlation. 
The philosophical approach for the proposed research is believed to fit into the 
notion of “structured ontology” (Bhaskar, 2013). Among the three layers of 
critical realism the scarcity of resources which constitutes a causal power and 
has real consequences for users is taken as real, i.e. existing objectively. The 
increased competition for known natural and man-made resources among users 
and their reaction, forced or voluntary, to share available means, is viewed as 
actual and represents the domain of the events generated by causally operating 
structures (scarcity of resources). The empirical domain of critical realism 
constitutes perceptions of various stakeholders, i.e. users, businesses and 
regulators, towards the concept of IS which leads to individual responses 
(regulatory policies, business arrangements, formalised public demands). The 
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proposed research approach aligns with the three domains and can be justified 
on the grounds of critical realist epistemology.  
Another argument in favour of critical realism is the notion of causality and 
correlation. Critical realism assumes that causality exists as a potential rather 
than a direct correlation between phenomena. The complex system perspective 
applied in this research realises the power of emerging links between external 
and internal determinants of IS. The emerging nature of relationships between 
multiple factors constitutes a potential of multivariant scenarios with unique 
correlation outcomes in each case. This view distinguishes the current research 
from stronger forms of positivism and brings it closer to relativism. However, 
even though a complex system perspective does consider socially constructed 
relationships between actors, it also takes into account objective determinants. 
The mix of objective and socially constructed factors differentiates the research 
approach from constructivist epistemologies. 
 
1.5 Research Contributions 
The research investigated the potential for innovation in network competition via 
IS in the area of telecommunication systems.  The study uses a computational 
modelling approach and examines three methods of network competition 
through three scenarios: the Greenfield scenario is the creation of a new 
network infrastructure (ducts, poles, wires and cables); the Bitstream scenario is 
the introduction of service based competition using an existing network 
infrastructure; whereas the Brownfield scenario gives operators the ability to 
integrate new cables and wires into an existing physical infrastructure (ducts 
and poles).  The model runs these scenarios in a virtual landscape of supply 
and demand (an economy using the networked infrastructure) into which the 
regulator can intervene with policies that generate competition to improve 
service outcomes. 
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1.5.1 Contribution to Academia 
The outcomes of the research contribute to the academic domain as this study 
uses a unique approach, (i.e. a tailored agent-based simulation), using a 
complex system perspective on a regulatory field in a particular network 
industry. Simulation experiments provide an opportunity for other researchers to 
analyse the dynamic co-evolution of infrastructure networks and groups of users 
with individual and group behavioural characteristics. Infrastructure 
development scenarios contribute to academic debate on the theory of the 
“Ladder of Investments”. All three scenarios, i.e. Bitstream, Brownfield DPA and 
Greenfield, represent three distinct rungs of the ladder. Simulating the 
behaviour of operators using an ABM approach can provide a completely new 
bottom-up and spatial perspective on the validity of the theory of the “Ladder of 
Investments”. Based on outcomes of the Empirical Project (EP), a theory of IS 
can be developed which would test and describe a general process of 
alternative infrastructure development on the basis of existing ones. A more 
detailed description of theoretical contributions is summarised in Section 8.1 
Theoretical Contributions.  
 
1.5.2 Contribution to Practice 
Built on a concrete inquiry by the UK telecom regulator Ofcom, the decision 
support software tool offers an empirical contribution to regulatory practice. The 
purpose of the model is consistent with Broadband Delivery United Kingdom 
(BDUK) national and European (Digital Agenda) initiatives, and able to assist in 
establishing a regulatory framework for tailoring detailed implementation plans. 
The model provides a test bed for regulators who can run simulations, test 
assumptions under different conditions, and formulate strategies. The proposed 
model provides a significant empirical contribution as it offers an ABM 
framework realised in a software tool to represent IS in telecommunication. 
Bringing together the behaviour of different user subgroups on the demand side 
and infrastructure development scenarios on the supply side in one model 
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offers a methodological contribution to research practice. The novelty of the 
research is in the utilisation of different research methods (simulation, statistical, 
ABM) which widens the potential contribution effect for the research community. 
The software prototype is a hybrid method with ABM for user behaviour, 
simulation and visualisation techniques for infrastructure modelling, and 
statistical distributions for users’ classification and probability of actions, and 
economic framework for cost analysis. The model also offers a methodological 
contribution to regulatory and business practice as it reinvents and reviews 
traditional Greenfield, Brownfield and Bitstream scenarios in developing 
telecommunication networks. 
A more detailed description of methodological and empirical contributions is 
summarised in Sections 8.2 and 8.3. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
First, the thesis identifies the positioning of the research and establishes its 
scope, boundaries and the potential research gaps in academic domains. The 
positioning study (PS) maps this study against theories and academic concepts 
in the areas of regulation, decision making (DM), innovation, business models 
of IS and complex systems. 
The following section “Systematic Literature Review” further investigates the 
topic of IS in academic, business and regulatory literature domains with the 
intent to identify determinants of IS in relation to major stakeholders, i.e. users, 
businesses and regulators. 
Section 4 “Research Method and Data Description” provides a full description of 
the research design made up of the decision support software model. This 
section also contains a description of the impact plan for engagement, 
dissemination, exploitation and evaluation of the research outcomes. 
Next, the actual configuration and description of the decision support software 
prototype is given in Section 5. Results and outcomes derived from software 
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simulation are presented in Section 6, and further discussed in Section 7. 
Theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of the research 
outcomes are summarised in Section 8. Section 9 provides evidence of 
engagement with practice and evaluation of the impact of the research on 
organisations, economy, society and individuals within the “Impact 
Assessment”. These contributions and impact are formulated under a pre-
agreed construct, boundaries and assumptions, which subsequently reveal the 
limitations of the proposed research approach. These limitations are discussed 
in Section 10. 
Section 11 summarises the ten major lessons learnt over the course of the 
research. Section 12 discusses the implications. Conclusions and potential for 
further research are presented in Section 13 “Conclusions”. 
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2 POSITIONING OF THE RESEARCH 
This chapter represents a study of potential areas for further academic 
investigation and elaborates a proposed area for research. It reports on the 
results of an initial literature assessment which establishes a foundation for a 
decision support model for regulating IS in telecommunications. 
2.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of the Positioning Study (PS) is to discover potential areas 
for further academic research. Specifically, the PS aims to identify new research 
dimensions of traditional academic domains, find innovative approaches from 
an inter-disciplinary perspective, provide a rationale for the research and 
formulate review questions for a detailed literature review. 
The PS elaborates business problems and the research question articulated at 
the stage of Problem Formulation. The research question was decomposed into 
thematic areas to identify domains for the initial literature assessment. The 
relevance of existing theories and concepts in each literature domain are 
critically examined to define a potential academic contribution and prospective 
research path for a doctoral thesis to address specific gaps in knowledge. The 
PS lays foundations for successive research steps and transforms the initial 
research question into review questions for a detailed literature investigation. 
2.2 Scope 
Positioning of this research began with the analysis of a business phenomenon 
and deconstruction of the research question formulated for this PS to 
investigate regulation methods as part of the concept of National Innovation 
Systems (NIS) and their impact on IS: 
“What are the characteristics of a decision-making framework for 
INNOVATIVE regulation of Infrastructure Sharing in telecommunications 
using a complex systems’ perspective?” 
The scope of the revised research question formulated for PS is presented in 
Figure 2-1.  
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Figure 2-1 Scope of revised research question formulated for PS 
To formulate an initial list for the preliminary literature investigation, keywords 
and phrases for database search engines were defined. After a preliminary 
literature scanning, further reading lists were narrowed down by using key 
search words and phrases, such as names of researchers, schools and 
concepts. 
The scope of the initial literature assessment of the PS was defined using the 
following investigation approaches: 
 
i. Use of material which is directly related to the professional area of the 
author. This comprises consulting reports, non-confidential memos and 
analyses, and membership subscriptions from professional 
organisations. 
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ii. Intelligent surfing through scientific electronic databases, such as Google 
Scholar, ScienceDirect, Emerald, Scopus, Web of Science, by using key 
research words and phrases. 
iii. Advice and direct references from personal, professional and academic 
networking communities. 
iv. Narrowing down the literature focus by virtual ‘joining in with academic 
debates’ which are relevant to addressing the research question, e.g. a 
debate between theories of the “Stepping stone” and the “Ladder of 
Investments”. 
 
2.3 Literature 
A collection of 204 publications was selected for the initial literature 
investigation (see Appendix A). The primary goal was to decompose concepts 
and theories arising from the research question, trace their provenance, and sift 
through them from the perspective of research domains. 
Preliminary reading and identification of debate topics in five literature domains, 
i.e. (i) Regulation, (ii) Decision Making, (iii) Business Models of IS, (iv) 
Innovation, and (v) Complex Systems, introduced general theories and 
concepts. Further investigation of four overlapping themes, i.e. (1) Regulating 
Telecomms, (2) Multi Criteria Decision Making, (3) Infrastructure Sharing and 
(4) National Innovation Systems, revealed key debate areas and gaps in the 
academic literature providing a focus for this research topic. 
 
2.4 Mapping General Theories and Academic Concepts 
 
2.4.1 Regulation 
The first wave of regulatory transformations (1880s-1980s) represented 
telecommunication monopolies under centralised regulation (Noam, 2010; 
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Horne, 2013). The telecommunications industry was characterised by 
government controlled price regulation, infrastructure development, and 
universal service funding. Academic publications were dominated by the theory 
of natural monopoly (Hazlett, 1986) which viewed telecoms as monopolistic 
public utilities (Wenders, 1990). Regulation was based on the theory of public 
interest (Wenders, 1988), which assumed good intentions of regulators to avoid 
potential market failure and maximise economic and social outputs by natural 
monopolies. This theory was criticised and further developed by the economic 
theory of regulation of Stiegler, Peltzman and Posner (Wenders, 1988), who 
viewed regulators as politicians using the interests of stakeholders as a tool for 
their own re-election. The “capture” form of regulation theory further suggested 
that lobbying groups may hinder the independence of regulators by exercising 
election campaign incentives (Posner, 1974). 
Snow (1988) studied various pricing methods of natural monopolies and 
predicted the significant influence of telecommunications on other economic 
sectors. Joskow and Noll (1981) also studied price regulations of monopolies, 
i.e. the Averch and Johnson model, optimal cost-price sustainability and 
variable pricing model, and concluded that the research area of price 
regulations generated the most ‘progressive’ studies on regulated monopolies 
due to their practical relevance for NRAs. 
Garcia-Murillo and MacInnes (2001) applied the theory of bureaucracy, theories 
of organisations and theory of dependency to explain why the organisational 
structure of a regulator and historic ways of performing public services decrease 
their efficiency. Irwin and Ela (1981) analysed models of efficiency of 
government regulation and concluded that a model of static efficiency appeared 
to hinder innovation and development. The breakthrough in technology 
progress started to question the whole purpose of regulated monopolies (Irwin 
and Ela, 1981; Flacher and Jennequin, 2008). 
The second wave is an era of deregulation and liberalisation (Foreman-Peck, 
1985; Noam, 2010) which forced policy makers to respond and find new models 
of regulatory practices (Gillick, 1992). Regulation shifted from controlled to 
 15 
incentive practices to focus on the market performance indicators (Berg and 
Foreman, 1996). However, Egan (1988) claims that the concept of social 
welfare remained an important requirement under deregulation. The telecom 
infrastructure of monopolies was viewed as an ‘essential facility’, which is hard 
to replicate in terms of cost and regulatory policies (Renda, 2010). In 
liberalisation, the ‘essential facility’ doctrine was developed further in the 
theories of Stepping stone in the US and Ladder of Investments in Europe 
(Cave, 2006; Hazlett, 2006). 
The third wave of regulatory transformation, i.e. transition from policy 
formulation to policy implementation, considered three major policy trends: (i) 
no regulation, (ii) temporary regulation and (iii) tight regulation of the industry 
(Melody, 1999; Stern, 2004). The third trend, based on the theory of market 
failure (Gómez-Barroso and Feijóo, 2010), justified an NRA’s interventionist role 
to maximise public interest in situations when markets fail to do so. Dassler 
(2006) reviewed theories of regulatory interventions and regulatory governance 
to provide a theoretical foundation of governments’ interventions. Even in 
countries with a history of free market regulation, the idea of stronger regulation 
required critical attention (Kiessling and Blondeel, 1998; De Streel, 2008; 
Huigen and Cave, 2008). 
Certain studies analysed relationships between the deployment of new 
generation broadband networks, competition, access pricing and investments 
(Chang, Koski and Majumdar, 2003; Lebourges, 2010; Briglauer, Ecker and 
Gugler, 2012; Crandall et al., 2013). Valletti (2003) reviewed the literature on 
the theory of access pricing of incumbent infrastructures and its effect on 
investments in new networks. Similarly, Cambini and Jiang (2009) conducted a 
research examination of approximately 60 studies to understand the connection 
between regulatory measures and investments in telecommunication 
infrastructure. The problems of the digital divide and universal service are 
examined in Gabel (2007), Levin (2010); Gulati and Yates (2012); Holt and 
Galligan (2013). 
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In a transition to the third wave, traditional research topics tend to adjust to new 
market and regulatory conditions (universal service, infrastructure development, 
access policy). New research areas develop geographically and present more 
insight into new economies (Flacher and Jennequin, 2008; Onishi and Tsuna, 
2010; Waverman and Koutroumpis, 2011; Song, Zo and Lee, 2012). The topic 
of spectrum allocation re-emerges as the competition for scarce resources 
sharpens (Blackman, Forge and Horvitz, 2013). New concepts become evident 
with maturing cross-industry development and increased competition (Ypsilanti, 
D., Xavier, 1998; Economides and Tåg, 2012). 
 
2.4.2 Decision Making 
In their publication Buchanan and O'Connell (2006) trace back the general 
history of DM and development of managerial DM concepts, such as the 
economic theory of risk and uncertainty by Knight (1921) and organisational DM 
from the theory of cooperation by Barnard (1968). Köksalan, Wallenius and 
Zionts (2013) examine utility theory from the work of Edgeworth (1881), the 
contribution of Frisch (1926) with his theory of ordinal and cardinal utility, and 
the theory of subjective expected utility and probability by Ramsey (1931) and 
De Finetti (1937). 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) viewed maximisation of expected 
utility as a sign of rationality of decision makers. Simon and Barnard (1947) 
argued that this rationality was not perfect but ‘bounded’ to derive not ideal but 
tolerable decisions. The impossibility of aggregating utilities of individuals into 
the sum utility of a group of those individuals was stated in the impossibility 
theorem by Arrow (1951). Fishburn (1970) developed utility theory by 
considering DM with and without probabilities. Edwards (1954) viewed expected 
utility from a psychological perspective and laid the foundation of his 
behavioural decision theory. In the 1980s, decision analysis and behavioural 
research was enriched with a sensitivity analysis by Von Winterfield and 
Edwards (1986). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated, in their prospect 
theory, that human’s behaviour under risk and uncertainty does not follow a 
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rational model of economics. Decisions under uncertainty were also studied by 
Raiffa (1968) who developed the concept of decision trees. 
Raiffa also wrote a report on utilities with multi-attribute alternatives within the 
project RAND (Raiffa, 1969). The multi-attribute analysis was further elaborated 
by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) who formulated multi-attribute utility theory 
(MAUT). Prior to MAUT, significant contributions to Multi-Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM) include the Simplex method in 1947 (Dantzig, 2002), the 
efficient vectors and contributions to multiple objective mathematical 
programming (Koopmans, 1951), goal programming (Charnes, Cooper and 
Ferguson, 1955), the outranking methods within the ELECTRE-project (Roy, 
1968), and the concept of multiple objective optimisation (Cohon, 1978). 
Later developments include multiobjective decision analysis (Goicoechea, 
Hansen and Duckstein, 1982), interactive multiple objective DM (Aksoy, 1990), 
Evolutionary Multiobjective Optimisation (EMO) (Schaffer and Grefenstette, 
1985), computer aided decision support systems (Ginzberg and Stohr, 1982), 
and heuristics methods in DM (Zanakis, Evans and Vazacopoulos, 1989). The 
concepts of the Analytic Hierarchy Process and Analytic Network Process 
introduced by Thomas Saaty are reviewed in more detail in Section 2.5.2 as 
these methods appear to have practical applicability to address the research 
question. 
 
2.4.3 Business Models of Infrastructure Sharing 
 
Studies of IS in telecommunications have developed with increased competition 
for infrastructure elements with different life cycles. The oldest concept is 
spectrum allocation (Levin, 1982; McLauchlan and Westerberg, 1982). Various 
authors discuss topics of spectrum policies (Farquhar and Fitzgerald, 2003; 
Hazlett, 2003; Forge and Blackman, 2006), spectrum management (McMillan, 
1995; Cave, 2010a), spectrum rights (Ting, Wildman and Bauer, 2005; Cave 
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and Webb, 2012), and spectrum for mobile communications (Valletti and Cave, 
1998). 
The issue of spectrum sharing between land and satellite systems was raised in 
1987 (Almond, 1987). The majority of the literature on spectrum sharing 
appeared in the 2000s with the immense development of mobile 
communication. Foster (2008) prepared a publication on spectrum sharing for 
the GSR. Jorswieck et al. (2010) introduced the SAPHYRE initiative on 
infrastructure and spectrum sharing. Peha (2013) discussed simultaneous 
spectrum usage by many devices in occupied bandwidths. Daoud, Alanyali and 
Starobinski (2013) analysed the economic profitability of secondary spectrum 
access. Various researchers discussed cognitive radio technologies for 
spectrum sharing (Barrie et al., 2012; Baldini et al., 2013; Durantini and Martino, 
2013). Blackman et al. (2013) suggested addressing spectrum sharing on a 
technical level (cognitive radio, mesh networking), a regulators’ level (shift from 
exclusive allocation to flexible use) and a users’ level (shift to self-management 
of the radio spectrum). 
In fixed telecommunications, Criner (1977) defines sharing as a non-profit 
agreement on sharing the telecommunication costs between two users located 
in the same premises. Regli (1996) compares various infrastructure 
development theories ranging from state controlled cultural and technological 
protectionism, to more liberal notions of resource scarcity and the need for 
subsidisation, and to market driven concept of liberalisation. Liberalisation 
created the issue of LLU and other forms of IS (Meisel, 1992; Mudd and 
Starkey, 1992; Higham, 1993, 1994). Deregulation viewed IS as a major driver 
for infrastructure development and called for revision of an ‘essential facility’ 
doctrine (Renda, 2010). 
Currently, the general IS paradigm represents a set of fragmented concepts 
viewed from various technological or stakeholders’ angles. Each source offers a 
different approach to the classification of IS. The most recognised approach is 
given by the ITU (Best, 2008; Cohen and Southwood, 2008; Foster, 2008; 
Lazauskaite, 2008; Lefѐvre, 2008; Schorr, 2008; Webb, 2008). The work by 
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Wyman (2007) gives an alternative IS taxonomy classified by depth, extent, 
reach of sharing and number of participants. In contrast, Frisanco et al., (2008) 
present a taxonomy of mobile IS consisting of business, technology and 
geographic dimensions. 
The universal approach by Frisanco et al. (2008) allows the combining of 
separate IS studies into one model. It is flexible enough to accommodate 
studies on unbundling (Crandall et al., 2013; Deshpande, 2013), co-investment 
options (Egan, 1990; Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2012; Cambini and 
Silvestri, 2013; Schneir and Xiong, 2013), mobile infrastructure sharing (GSMA, 
2010), spectrum sharing (Quer et al., 2012), roaming (Fabrizi and Wertlen, 
2008; Infante and Vallejo, 2012), MVNO (Shin and Bartolacci, 2007; Banerjee 
and Dippon, 2009; Shin, 2010), and third party infrastructure providers such as 
Openreach in the UK (Cadman, 2010). 
 
2.4.4 Innovation 
The history of telecommunications is built upon continuous innovations since 
the invention of the telephone (Van Duijn, 1981) until the rise of the public 
Internet (Hart, Reed and Bar, 1992). Countries select their own innovation paths 
either as pioneering leaders or catching up imitators (Madden and Savage, 
1999). Innovations in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
became the major economy drivers from the 1980s and launched “the fifth long 
wave” of economic development (Castellacci, 2006). 
Kondratieff’s ‘long waves’ of economic development were researched in various 
studies (Wonglimpiyarat, 2005; Korotayev, Zinkina and Bogevolnov, 2011; 
Grinin, Devezas and Korotayev, 2012). Schumpeter further developed 
Kondratieff’s theory and formulated the theory of innovation (Hermens, 1941). 
Schumpeter’s theory explains “swarms” of innovations from a new ‘long-wave’, 
which abolish outdated products in ‘creative destruction’ (Wonglimpiyarat, 2005; 
Papenhausen, 2008) and initiate a shift towards a new economic cycle. 
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Nelson and Winter (1977) provide a summary of the most influential innovation 
theories from the perspective of economic theory of production and criticise the 
production function approach for neglecting uncertainty of innovation. They also 
review studies on the profit-maximising firm and the effect of Research and 
Development (R&D) on firms’ profits. Nelson and Winter (1977) view innovation 
from both macro and micro economic perspectives and claim that innovation 
has its internal logic and way of development caused by the natural progress of 
science. As for diffusion of novelties, they point out two ways for companies to 
adopt new products, i.e. by pioneering their own or imitating another company’s 
innovations. 
Certain studies are dedicated to competition and its influence on innovation. 
McDaniel (2000) illustrates how competition positively affects firms in adopting 
novelties to increase profitability. However, van Cuilenburg and Slaa (1994, 
1995) conclude that competition in a local loop positively affects innovation only 
during deregulation of a monopoly. With the increase of competition in a local 
loop, innovation may decrease. Stylianou (2011) confirms that an excessive 
level of competition in telecommunication can adversely influence innovation. 
Tang (2006) found that competition with a high probability of quick product 
substitution is negatively related to innovation. Teece (1992) mentions that 
under increased competition, integration within and between firms creates 
conditions when companies can be rivals in a retail market and partners in R&D 
(also Davidson, 1987). 
Various researchers have studied the regulation of industries and R&D to 
assure the competitiveness of national economies. Bourreau and Doǧan (2001) 
review the theory of economic efficiency and its static and dynamic forms. The 
authors consider the role of NRAs in regulating industry profits and entry 
conditions. Edquist and Hommen (1999) study complex interdependencies 
between stakeholders based on the theory of ‘interactive learning’, and the 
evolutionary and institutional theories of innovations. The ‘interactive learning’ 
theory considers interaction as a learning exchange between stakeholders. 
Evolutionary theory compares innovations to a process of natural selection in 
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biological ecosystems (Nelson and Winter, 1977). Castellacci (2006) 
distinguishes between techno-economic and socio-institutional systems of 
innovation and provides a detailed analysis of institutions and their influence on 
innovations. 
Sharif (2006) defines National Innovation Systems (NIS) as a composition of 
institutions and actors that participate in a country’s adoption of technological 
novelties and also compares different NIS approaches from a ‘social 
constructivist’ point of view. Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) studied innovation 
systems in 115 countries and confirmed a strong correlation between high 
income per capita and solid innovation systems. A more detailed literature 
review on NIS is presented in Section 2.5.4 as this concept appears to address 
the research question. 
Regulation of innovation in telecom is studied in Harris (1990); Zanfei (1993); 
Van Cuilenburg and Slaa (1994, 1995); Bourreau and Doǧan (2001); Stylianou 
(2011). Bourreau and Doǧan (2001) review studies on asymmetric and 
symmetric regulation and conclude that discriminatory regulation provides more 
innovation incentives for new companies, whereas incumbents benefit from 
regulated competition. The authors view standardisation policies as regulatory 
tools to constrain ‘predatory innovation’ and present evidence that price-cap 
regulation of both incumbent and new operators provides more incentives for 
innovation. 
 
2.4.5 Complex Systems 
Along with the history of complex systems (Sweeney and Griffiths, 2002), the 
proposed study is focused on the complexity theory (Dillon, 2001; Abraham, 
2011). Complex systems have their roots in the chaos theory (Waldrop, 1993), 
systems theory (Ashby, 1957; Forrester, 1961; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989), 
genetic algorithms (Holland, 1995; Mitchell, 1998), network theory (Newman, 
2010), and concepts of emergence (Holland, 1998). In this study, the complex 
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system’s literature is investigated from the DM, regulation, telecommunication 
and innovation perspectives. 
In DM, hybrid forms of MCDM and complexity, e.g. VIKOR, were developed 
(Opricovic, 1998; Yang, Shieh and Tzeng, 2009). Beck et al. (2008) applied a 
combined approach of dynamic multi-objective optimisation and ABM for 
planning energy networks. ABM and DM methods were considered in Zia and 
Koliba (2013) for formulating government transportation policy, in Nilsson and 
Darley (2006) for manufacturing and logistics operations, and in Rigopoulos et 
al. (2007) for payment systems. Milano and Lombardi (2014) analysed the 
hybrid techniques of Machine Learning, Game Theory and Complex Systems. 
Chappin and Dijkema (2010) use ABM to assist regulatory decision makers to 
assess transition alternatives in energy infrastructures. Grove and Baumann 
(2012)  apply a complex system perspective for comparing distinct service and 
integrated infrastructure/service providers. Brown et al. (2004) analyse 
interdependencies between infrastructures, decision makers, and individuals, to 
mitigate the risks of infrastructure failures. Dobson et al. (2007) use a 
complexity approach for analysing sequential failures in power generation and 
transmission systems on a global scale. Herder, Bouwmans and Dijkema 
(2008) apply complexity theory to review three case studies of infrastructure 
development using an integrated approach of physical and actor network 
design. 
In innovation, Silverberg (2005) tests the theory of long waves to explain the 
inconsistency of periodic patterns and their inability to predict. Applying a 
complex dynamics approach, the author concludes that Kondratieff’s waves do 
not exhibit a periodic relationship but can be explained by the power-law 
phenomenon. Ahrweiler (2010) views innovation as an emergent characteristic 
of complex regional networks of universities, businesses, research institutes 
and regulators. Katz (2006) uses a complex system approach to NIS of 
European and Canadian provinces to develop scale-independent innovation 
indicators for better DM. Russo and Rossi (2009) combined ethnographic 
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questionnaires and social networks analysis to review an innovation programme 
in an Italian region. 
 
2.5 Main Contributions and Debates 
The main debate in telecommunication policy is built around the question: What 
is the best regulatory model for the 21st century and to what extent should a 
government intervene? The summary of the debate is presented in Yang et al. 
(2013) who overview three current regulatory models in telecommunications: (i) 
an extensive deregulation and liberalisation model (US), (ii) a strong 
government participation model (Japan, South Korea, China), and (iii) a mixed 
model of deregulation and government interventions (Europe). The deregulation 
model focuses on competition and provides short-term regulatory results 
affecting static economic efficiency. The interventionist model focuses on 
dynamic efficiency and pursues long-term results from formulated market, 
industry, education, and innovation policies. Although the European mixed 
model may appear to be a consensus between the US and Asian regulatory 
models, the debate still remains on what regulatory model is preferable and 
what other factors (globalisation, new business models such as e-business) 
explain the differences in regulatory outcomes. 
Debate in the DM field is based upon applicability and trade-offs of each out of 
numerous MCDM methods. Velasquez and Hester (2013) summarise, review 
and debate over 11 MCDM methods. Critics and proponents of each method 
highlight issues of dealing with uncertainty, ease and convenience of use, 
amount and quality of data needed, scale and area of a problem, and the ability 
to generate outcomes as standalone or with other methods. In general, 
opponents agree that a combination of different MCDM methods for solving one 
problem can overcome the deficiencies of a single method. 
The concept of IS is still new in business and academic domains and consists 
of several topics. The common debate slogan for all the topics can be 
expressed as follows: “To Share or Not to Share”. In spectrum allocation there 
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is a growing debate on the revision of policies, i.e. spectrum as private versus 
public common, de-licensing of certain bandwidths, secondary and 
simultaneous use of spectrum (Blackman et al., 2013). Regarding mobile, the 
debate has emerged from cost efficiencies of sharing to IS agreements (joint 
ventures, strategic alliances, 3rd party providers) and regulating IS (GSMA, 
2010). For mobile operators the question remains whether to allow an MVNO 
on an own network (Shin and Bartolacci, 2007; Banerjee and Dippon, 2009; 
Shin, 2010). The biggest debate in building an NGN is the extent of co-
investment options and the interventionist role of government in infrastructure 
development Bourreau et al. (2012). The academic area discusses 
infrastructure-based versus service-based competition for infrastructure 
development and debates over the universal use of the “Stepping stone” theory 
(Hazlett, 2006) and issue of unbundling (Crandall et al., 2013; Deshpande, 
2013). 
In the area of NIS there are several debate topics. Carlsson et al. (2002) 
compare NIS to other approaches of innovation (“input/output analysis”, 
“development blocks”, “diamond”, “sectoral innovation systems”, “local industrial 
systems”, “technological systems”). The authors argue that the NIS approach 
focuses more on comparative static data and less on a system’s dynamics. 
Hekkert et al. (2007) also criticise the static approach of NIS and dispute their 
focusing on macroeconomic issues and neglecting the Schumpeterian ‘creative 
entrepreneur’. Weber and Rohracher (2012) argue that NIS concentrate only on 
the supply side and overlook the production and consumption sides. Generally, 
the NIS approach is not a universal concept and generates unique results for 
every country. Chaminade, Intarakumnerd and Sapprasert (2012) summarise 
that, unlike the neo-classical approach, the NIS approach does not generate 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers but looks for adaptive, ‘path dependent’ solutions. 
The following sections look at the overlapping themes in more detail. 
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2.5.1 Regulating Telecomms 
The “Stepping stone” theory (Hazlett, 2006) suggests that open access would 
be a starting point for entrants to build their own infrastructure. Hazlett proves 
that growth in new wirelines by new entrants after 1996 was less than 
estimated. The obligatory network sharing did not facilitate the development of 
new infrastructures, which led to the abandonment of the Telecommunication 
Act in 2004. From the “Stepping stone”, the US regulation shifted to “Access 
holidays”, which brought an immediate rise of investments in new infrastructure 
(Renda, 2010). 
The drawbacks of the “Stepping stone” theory were considered in the theory of 
the “Ladder of Investment”. Cave (2006) concludes that regulators can set 
appropriate access prices to replicate infrastructure both by incumbents and 
new entrants, and limit the time for entrants to generate enough revenue for 
constructing their own networks. Both conditions create necessary incentives 
for new operators to climb the “Ladder of Investment”. This theory has received 
wide practical implementation in the EU. Bourreau, Doǧan and Manant (2010) 
state that by 2005 the “Ladder of Investment” concept was used in most of the 
EU countries. Cave (2010b) also found that “Ladder of Investment” could be 
applied for fibre networks. 
However, there is strong criticism of this concept. Bourreau, Doǧan and Manant 
(2010) provided empirical evidence that the ‘Sunset Clause’ condition of limiting 
time for service-based competition showed controversial results. The theory 
seems to be valid for urban areas but needs further research for rural areas. 
Recent research on the “Ladder of Investment” by Bacache, Bourreau and 
Gaudin (2014) found no empirical evidence of the relationship between the 
number of unbundled lines and the number of lines built as a new infrastructure. 
 
2.5.2 MCDM 
Due to its universality the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) has been applied in 
regulation, resource allocation, and business strategy formulation (Giokas and 
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Pentzaropoulos, 2008; Ho, 2008; Subramanian and Ramanathan, 2012). As 
DM is required by many stakeholders, i.e. regulators, businesses, and users, 
AHP is suitable as a group DM tool (Saaty, 1977). Similarly to the proposed 
research, Toossi, Camci and Varga (2013) used AHP to assist decision makers 
with strategy selecting for energy transition policies. Nikou and Mezei (2013) 
apply AHP to identify customer decisive preferences in the successful adoption 
of new services in mobile telecommunications. 
While AHP focuses on a goal and independent hierarchies, Analytic Network 
Process (ANP) (Saaty, 1996) treats DM structures as networks with 
interdependencies and feedback. This is vital as the current research intends to 
represent stakeholders as networks of users, regulators and businesses that 
constantly affect each other. Saaty (2007) uses both AHP and ANP for the 
further development of the theory of time-dependent DM. ANP has applications 
in various fields (Gencer and Gürpinar, 2007; Sipahi and Timor, 2010). 
2.5.3 Infrastructure Sharing 
Whilst thematic analysis on other themes narrowed down the focus from 
broader to more detailed topics, the IS literature opened up the debate. One 
explanation is that the topic of IS in telecommunications is still new in the 
academic domain. Database searches give results for IS either from other 
utilities or limited information on certain IS options (network or spectrum 
sharing). The second reason is that the topics of regulation, DM and innovation 
are usually formulated at a higher level, viewing IS as a discrete business case. 
A complex system’s perspective of emerging interdependencies between 
various infrastructures in highlighted in Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001) 
who use the US 1997 report on Critical Infrastructure Protection as a foundation 
for their research. The authors present eight types of critical infrastructures, 
which directly affect the country's defence and economic performance, as 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). Rinaldi et al. introduce a six dimension 
model of interdependencies between critical infrastructures in which change 
occurs as a learning process between systems. The proposed approach is a 
good reference framework for addressing the research question as IS in 
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telecommunications exhibits clear interdependencies with other infrastructure 
systems. 
Tran et al. (2014) in the report issued by the Infrastructure Transition Research 
Consortium (ITRC) introduce NISMOD – a National Infrastructure System-of-
Systems Model for analysing, planning and executing infrastructural projects in 
the UK. Seventeen infrastructure development scenarios for five major 
economic infrastructures (energy, transport, water, waste and ICT) are 
developed in four strategy portfolios. 
Most IS concepts (unbundling, passive and active sharing, MVNO, 3rd party 
infrastructure providers) fit into the Increasing System Efficiency strategy. The 
co-investment sharing scheme falls under the Capacity Expansion pillar. The 
issue of spectrum sharing falls under the New Services and Planning 
perspective. Further to the ITRC project, the Transforming Utilities’ Conversion 
Points (TUCP) project developed a new ontology for the description of 
infrastructure systems connected directly to the services extracted from that 
infrastructure (Varga et al., 2014). The methodology used by TUCP was ABM. 
2.5.4 National Innovation Systems 
The performance of NIS was analysed in various studies. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development report (OECD, 1997) compares 
definitions of NIS and concludes that formalised and distributed knowledge 
comes from many sources, i.e. companies, universities, research institutions, 
and regulators. Lundvall (1992) views NIS from the perspective of theory of 
innovation and interactive learning. Nelson (1993) analyses differences in NIS 
among countries and concludes that failure to implement NIS in a country may 
lead to economic failure. Japan is benchmarked as having one of most 
successful NIS in the 1980s (Freeman, 1989). Patel and Pavitt (1994) analyse 
OECD countries and note significant differences in NIS performance due to 
scaled implementation or given regional specialisation. Metcalfe (1994) 
summarises that regulation policy is a core part of NIS, which keeps the 
continuous movement of “experimental variety” and “economic selection”. 
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In the 21st century the concept of NIS tends to grow beyond national borders 
due to the globalisation of Economies. Carlsson (2006) illustrates how 
internalisation of innovation gradually overcomes barriers caused by national 
laws and industrial policies. Freeman (2002) analyses the relationship between 
NIS and economic performance in Britain, the US and emerging economies in 
the 18th - 20th centuries. He concludes that in the 21st century innovation will 
develop on national, regional and international levels due to the global nature of 
production. Hemphill (2013), while studying the innovation strategy of the 
Obama administration, raises the question of the global competitiveness of the 
US innovation strategy. 
 
2.6 Research Gaps 
A universal classification of IS methods and therefore a general approach to 
researching the phenomenon is missing. Existing empirical studies concentrate 
on either mobile or fixed IS. The spectrum sharing is treated separately. A 
generally accepted taxonomy of active and passive IS seems to be applicable 
only for mobile telecommunications. Existing studies in IS are fragmented into 
topics of varying maturity (co-investments, unbundling, MVNO, spectrum 
sharing and 3rd party network providers). 
 
Existing studies on IS report results on the marginal effect of a certain method 
on a company's performance or economy but do not focus on synergetic and 
network effects of various IS types. The majority of studies take a business 
perspective and derive specific suggestions for CEOs and broad 
recommendations for regulators. However, there is a growing demand for 
studies that would utilise a regulator’s perspective on IS and consider the 
cumulative effect of combined strategies at the macro level. Current studies 
mostly concentrate on one industry infrastructure but do not factor 
interdependencies with other critical infrastructures. A complex system 
perspective to analysing emerging interrelationships of infrastructures with other 
actors is present in energy studies but not witnessed in telecommunications. 
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Traditional areas of telecommunication regulation are well researched and 
continue to attract academic attention. New telecommunication trends urge 
governments to move to 4th generation regulation (Horne, 2013), which should 
address policies on governing ‘digital ecosystems’. New academic research on 
regulating complex ecosystems, consisting of users, businesses and ‘things’, is 
required. New forms of regulations, such as consultations, partnerships, co- and 
self-regulations, open new research opportunities. The convergence of media, 
ICT and social networks raises new technological, security and regulatory 
issues and creates demand for new studies. Generally, the convergence of 
industries and increasing complexity of interrelationships between stakeholders 
creates a whole new area for cross-industry and multi-disciplinary research 
studies on telecommunication regulation. 
Unlike other fundamental disciplines, academic research on DM is still in a 
sharp growth stage of its life cycle. Keeping in mind the multiple dimensions of 
DM methods (e.g. MAUT, AHP, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), etc.), 
numerous versions within one method (e.g. Conventional AHP, Ideal Mode 
AHP, ANP, etc.), universal ability for cross-industry and multi-disciplinary 
applications, further opportunities lie in determining new areas for investigation. 
MCDM continues to develop both in theoretical and practical dimensions. 
Fundamental research extends existing knowledge by combining theories from 
within and outside of MCDM. Practical implementations are found in potentially 
any industry. A database search on AHP/ANP methods in telecommunications 
returns thousands of publications. However, there is a research gap in applying 
MCDM methods to the particular topic of IS in general (less than five 
publications found in electronic databases) and IS in telecommunication in 
particular. 
Out of the numerous research opportunities in the area of NIS, a particularly 
interesting research gap is found in Gallouj and Zanfei (2013). The author 
mentions that the topic of innovation in delivering public services is less 
researched. With regard to policy making, the NIS approach traditionally 
generates recommendations for the regulation of various aspects at a macro 
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level. However, the proposed research aims at creating a methodology for 
NRAs for making decisions on a country level and delivering public services on 
regional and municipal levels. For example, a central mandatory policy to allow 
shared use of ducts will require local authorities to process licences and 
permits. A potential research gap can be investigated with the goal of bridging 
innovative IS practices with corresponding innovative public services within one 
NIS. 
 
2.7 Key Academic Learning Points 
 
Research on government policies shows that there is no universal “one size fits 
all” model of regulation. Among three generally recognised models of regulation 
(free market regulation, interventionist role of government, mixed model of 
liberalism and interventionism) countries define their own level of government 
participation and formulate distinct models that are “fit for purpose”. These 
phenomena are explained by the theory of ‘regulatory interventions’ and its two 
schools of market-driven and non-market-driven approaches (Dassler, 2006). 
The theory of public interest and economic theory of regulation (Wenders, 1988) 
found major academic concepts in the area of regulation. However, the theory 
of market failure continues to be the dominant theoretical concept that justifies 
interventionist role of governments in maximising public interest (Gómez-
Barroso and Feijóo, 2010). 
The efficiency approach to analysing regulatory models suggests that the 
concept of dynamic efficiency of regulation (interventionism) prevails over static 
efficiency (liberalism) as global competition between countries and regional 
specialisation of national economies increases (Yang et al., 2013). 
New technological breakthroughs create opportunities and also new challenges, 
e.g. digital divide as it relates to Internet-based services. With the shift away 
from traditional voice services, fundamental theoretical concepts such as theory 
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of universal service do not become outdated and are successfully modelled to 
address new forms of digital inequalities (Holt and Galligan, 2013). 
Academic studies related to regulatory and public issues serve the interests of 
certain groups of scientists, policy makers and demographic groups, and in 
certain cases cannot be impartial. The “capture” form of regulation theory 
suggests that various objectives of different groups may hinder independence 
not only of regulators but also political scientists (Posner, 1974). 
In the area of MCDM applying one certain DM method to solving one particular 
research problem will not be enough as different DM methods may generate 
different outcomes due to known limitations. A more thorough approach would 
require applying a bundle of MCDM methods to offset the limitations of a single 
DM method (Velasquez and Hester, 2013). 
A distinct academic area of Infrastructure Sharing does not yet exist. The topic 
of IS is viewed in different infrastructure development theories and ‘essential 
facility’ doctrine as an implementation option or recommendation for regulation. 
Existing studies on IS are fragmented and generally accepted taxonomies of IS 
methods vary across different researchers (Wyman, 2007; Frisanco et al., 2008; 
Schorr, 2008). The academic terminology on the topic of IS varies across 
different sources, which is important for conducting an accurate systematic 
literature review. It is vital to use different search combinations, such as 
“Infrastructure sharing”, “Facilities sharing”, “Common use”, etc. 
Applying a complex system perspective to the topic of IS is an emerging area of 
research as interdependencies between infrastructures, businesses, users and 
regulators are increasing (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Tran et al., 2014). 
 
2.8 Review Questions 
The following revised review questions for systematic literature review (SLR) 
are formulated after incorporating recommendations from Review Panel 
members. 
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The main literature review question (MainQ) is: 
 What aspects of inter-dependent shared infrastructures and 
stakeholders, e.g. users, businesses and regulators, are required 
for the regulatory decision-making of infrastructure sharing? 
 
The first sub-question (SubQ1) for the SLR is: 
“What common sharing principles and sharing models are used in 
different infrastructure systems, i.e. water, energy, 
telecommunications and transport?”  
The second sub-question (SubQ2) is: 
“What influential factors (economic, geographic, demographic, 
environmental, social, political, etc.) are determinants of sharing 
models and sharing principles in infrastructure systems?”  
The third sub-question (SubQ3) is: 
“What common sharing principles and sharing models are relevant 
for regulatory decision-making in infrastructure systems?” 
 
2.9 Summary 
In this PS, theories and concepts in selected academic fields were analysed 
with the aim of identifying potential research gaps and opportunities for the topic 
of regulating IS in telecommunications. A multi-disciplinary approach of the 
analysis offers the following conclusions. 
As an academic concept, IS is still in the early stages of its formulation. Clear 
boundaries and definitions of IS in telecommunications are not precisely fixed in 
academic literature. Taxonomies from business and managerial papers are 
flexible and ambiguous. There is a research gap in the theorisation of IS. 
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The topic of IS is a fragmented academic field which consists of different sub-
concepts of various maturities. Traditional older sub-concepts, e.g. LLU, provide 
more academic evidence, whereas newer concepts, e.g. MVNO and roaming, 
offer wider research opportunities. There is a need to find a combined approach 
to normalise knowledge diversity. 
The field of IS is very heterogeneous due to the physical and conceptual nature 
of IS options. This suggests that academic works focusing on one particular 
sub-concept provide an incomplete picture and omit other options. This raises 
the need for a universal research approach which would map all available IS 
sub-concepts. 
The subject of IS falls under areas of regulating telecommunications and 
developing infrastructures. General theories on regulation and infrastructure 
development provide the initial foundation for approaching the research problem 
but do not directly apply to addressing the research question. 
MCDM methods for regulation are mostly focused on static interrelationships 
between alternatives and criteria. However, a complex system perspective to 
MCDM, which considers emerging and dynamic interdependencies between 
actors and observables, requires more academic attention. 
Although multi-disciplinary research approaches to building DM models with 
complex systems perspectives are witnessed in academic publications, this PS 
has found no evidence that there is a particular research on a DM model for 
regulating IS in telecommunication. 
The PS suggests that there is a gap between academic findings on regulation 
and delivery of corresponding public services as a result of these findings. 
After completing the PS, the Review Panel suggested excluding the NIS 
concept from further research and applying a multi-disciplinary approach of 
MCDM, IS, and Regulating telecommunications with the use of a complex 
systems perspective for further SLR.  
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3 SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Literature Domains and Themes 
This chapter represents the positioning of research within existing literature 
domains. Based on the review questions formulated in Section 2.8, the following 
literature domains and themes were identified for the SLR (see Figure 3-1 
Literature domains and themes for SLR). Although the DBA research aims at 
investigating the topic of IS in wireline and wireless telecommunications, the 
SLR will also look at industries with similar network characteristics, i.e. 
transportation, energy, and water (the Literature Domain “Infrastructure 
Industries”). The scope of the SLR will include man-made infrastructures. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Literature domains and themes for SLR 
The domain of Regulation represents the literature on formulating and 
exercising government policies in telecommunications and other infrastructure 
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utilities. The literature domain of Decision Making is important to trace the 
provenance of MCDM methods to be used in the proposed research. The 
literature domain Determinants provides information on quantitative and 
qualitative economic, demographic, geographic, business development, 
environmental, social, and technological variables relevant to a certain country, 
region or industry sector. 
The proposed four literature domains define the following areas for further 
thematic development: Sharing models and principles (S1), Infrastructure 
systems (S2), Regulatory decision making (S3), and Influential factors (S4) 
(Figure 3-1).  
The thematic area ‘Sharing models and principles’ (S1) deals with common 
sharing concepts, e.g. joint use of facilities, shared and collaborative use of 
premises, co-opetition, etc. The thematic area (S2) ‘Infrastructure systems’ 
defines the context of infrastructures and utilities, such as water, energy, 
telecommunications, and transportation. The theme (S3) ‘Influential factors’ 
defines the scope of the external and internal environment. The area of 
‘Regulatory Decision Making’ (S4) is defined by the literature domains of 
Regulation and Decision Making and by specifically looking at the nature of 
government interventions in certain sectors. 
The overlapping area of the themes ‘Sharing models and principles’ and 
‘Infrastructure systems’ (S1  S2) provides answers for SubQ1 and results in 
classification of IS methods used in water, energy, telecommunications, and 
transportation. The overlapping area of the themes ‘Sharing models and 
principles’, ‘Infrastructure systems’ and ‘Influential factors’ (S1  S2  S3) 
addresses SubQ2 and aims at determining economic, geographic, 
demographic, environmental and other determinants of IS methods. The 
interception of ‘Sharing models and principles’, ’Infrastructure systems’ and 
‘Regulatory decision making’ (S1  S2  S4) determines the literature on the 
subject of government policies for IS and addresses SubQ3. The answer to the 
main question (MainQ) is given by the literature defined by the overlapping 
areas of all four thematic areas (S1  S2  S3  S4). 
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The following section explains the methodology of the SLR. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The main subject of the proposed doctoral research is a methodological 
decision support framework for NRAs to implement the most effective types of 
IS in wireline and wireless telecommunications. On the way to formulating the 
decision support framework it is important to synthesise and systematise 
existing academic and professional knowledge on sharing concepts in related 
industries. The starting point for knowledge synthesis is conducting an SLR of 
the existing body of knowledge. 
3.2.1 Why SLR? 
The SLR is preferable for several reasons. Firstly, the main objective of the 
proposed model is to provide methodological assistance in the area of decision 
support which requires 'best evidence’ from diverse theoretical and practical 
sources. Secondly, building a model requires a multi-disciplinary approach of 
‘Infrastructure industries’, ‘Regulatory DM’ and ‘Influential determinants’ with the 
use of heterogeneous sources of quantitative and qualitative data. Thirdly, an 
SLR is necessary as the proposed model must have strong theoretical and 
practical applicability. Fourthly, the area of IS, due to its relative novelty, may 
not have enough sources of academic origin in solely the telecoms sector. 
3.2.2 Systematic Review Panel 
To ensure the quality and objectiveness of the SLR, it is important to form a 
Review Panel consisting of recognised specialists in respective professional 
areas, methodology experts and academics.  The following table represents the 
Review Panel members and their roles. 
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Table 3-1 Review Panel members 
Person Organisation Involvement 
Prof Liz Varga Principal Research 
Fellow; Director of 
Complex Systems 
Research Centre, 
Cranfield University, UK 
Lead Supervisor: 
Assisted in defining the 
literature review 
approach and provided 
feedback on draft of the 
review 
Dr Palie Smart Director PhD 
Programme; Reader in 
Corporate Responsibility, 
Cranfield University, UK 
Advisor: to provide 
feedback on Systematic 
Literature review strategy 
Prof Mark Jenkins Director of Community for 
Strategy, People & 
Leadership, Cranfield 
University, UK 
Advisor: to provide 
feedback on Systematic 
Literature review strategy 
Prof Martin Cave Deputy Chair of the 
Competition Commission, 
UK; Visiting Professor at 
Imperial College 
Business School, UK 
Expert: to provide 
feedback on 
infrastructure systems 
and regulatory aspects 
from UK perspective 
Prof Chris Kilsby Professor of Hydrology 
and Climate Change, 
School of Civil 
Engineering and 
Geosciences, Newcastle 
University, UK 
Expert: to provide 
feedback on the topic of 
infrastructure 
development and sharing 
practices in various 
infrastructure systems 
Prof Tim Brady Principal Research 
Fellow, Centre for 
Research in Innovation 
Management, University 
of Brighton, UK 
Expert: to provide 
feedback on the topic of 
infrastructure 
development and sharing 
practices in various 
infrastructure systems 
Ms Mary Betts-Gray Business Information 
Specialist, MIRC, 
Cranfield University 
Expert on literature 
search: supported the 
literature search strategy 
 
 39 
3.2.3 Search Strategy 
The overall process of identifying the relevant literature for the SLR is defined 
through selecting key search words and applying them to relevant electronic 
databases. Then the final set of literature is narrowed down through iterative 
processes of modifying search strings, applying inclusion and exclusion criteria 
for titles of the articles, abstracts and full texts, conducting a quality assessment 
and performing knowledge synthesis. Figure 3-2 represents the overall 
schematic process of the search strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Schematic process of SLR 
 
 
A set of keywords for each thematic area was formed for constructing relevant 
search strings and applying them to various databases with appropriate 
syntaxes. As different keywords produce results with different degree of 
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No 
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relevance, the list of most relevant keywords for each thematic area was 
experimentally determined after several iterative searches. Table 3-2 represents 
a list and syntax of search strings which were used for the final selection of 
articles and papers for final SLR. 
 
Table 3-2 List of the most productive search strings (experimentally determined) 
Area Search String 
(S1) Sharing models 
and principles 
"joint use of facilit*" OR "infrastructure sharing" OR "common carriage" OR 
"infrastructure collaboration" OR “common pool of resources” OR 
unbundling OR “open access” OR sharrows OR “rights of way” OR MVNO OR 
roaming OR "shared resource pool" OR co?opetition OR "lane sharing" OR 
"sharing agreement" OR "network sharing" OR "RAN sharing" OR "tower 
sharing" OR "mast sharing" OR "site sharing" OR “spectrum sharing” OR 
“sharing models” OR “sharing principle*” OR "shared use" OR "joint use" OR 
"mutual use" OR "shared usage" OR "joint usage" OR "mutual usage" 
(S2) Infrastructure 
Systems 
“water transfer” OR “water treatment” OR “reservoir system” OR 
(infrastructure NOT econom*) OR “public utilit*” OR “private utilit*” OR 
energy OR “power transmission” OR “power distribution” OR “gas 
transmission” OR “gas distribution” OR electricity OR transport* OR grid 
OR network OR waste OR sewage OR sewerage OR telecom* OR wireline 
OR wireless OR mobile OR pipeline* 
(S3) Influential 
factors 
(business OR econom* OR demograph*OR  geograph* OR politic* OR 
environment* OR social OR technolog* OR stakeholder*)  AND (variable* OR 
indicator* OR statistic* OR factor* OR determinant* OR performance OR data 
OR aspect* OR condition* OR barrier* OR facilitator*) 
(S4) Regulatory 
decision making 
regulat* OR polic* OR “decision making” OR govern* OR interven* OR 
authori* OR mandat* OR de?regulat* OR liberali* OR licens* 
 
 
The final set of literature to address the SubQ1 is a combination of search 
strings from S1 and S2. A schematic search query can be represented as 
follows: 
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SubQ1:  ALL (“Search string S1” AND “Search string S2”) 
Using a similar approach, the schematic search queries to address the SLR 
sub-questions and main question are  
SubQ2:  ALL (“Search string S1” AND “Search string S2” AND 
“Search string S3”) 
SubQ3:  ALL (“Search string S1” AND “Search string S2” AND 
“Search string S4”) 
SLR MainQ: ALL (“Keywords from S1” AND “Keywords from S2” 
AND “Keywords from S3” AND “Keywords from S4”) 
 
3.2.4 Databases and Additional Sources 
The following databases were used in the SLR: ABI/Inform, EBSCO, Scopus 
and Web of Science. The selection of these databases is explained by the 
nature of my research topic. The topic of IS has its roots in the cross-roads of 
technical, business and regulation areas. ABI/Inform and EBSCO are 
comprehensive sources for business and economic topics, whereas Scopus 
and Web of Science include articles covering more technical subjects. 
After the intermediate results were summarised in the SLR protocol and 
submitted to Review Panel members, additional articles were included in the list 
of final literature as direct recommendations from industry and academic 
experts. 
 
3.2.5 Selection Criteria 
The electronic search for articles on the basis of titles resulted in a total of 2044 
articles for the three sub-questions, i.e. 920 for SubQ1, 613 for SubQ2 and 511 
for SubQ3. Duplicates were removed within each sub-question but not between 
sub-questions as one article could potentially contribute to several sub-
questions at the same time. The most important criteria for onward inclusion of 
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papers were those providing answers to the literature review’s main and sub-
questions (i.e. the relevance criterion), language, scientific field and type of 
publication. As the first step the predefined selection criteria were applied to 
Titles, Abstracts and Keywords of each included paper and a shortlist of these 
articles was created. At the next stage the quality appraisal criteria were applied 
to the full text of articles from this shortlist (see Table 3-4 Quality Appraisal 
Criteria). Table 3-3 represents a summary of the SLR selection criteria for 
Titles, Abstracts and Keywords. 
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Table 3-3 SLR Selection criteria based on Titles, Abstracts and Keywords 
Criterion Inclusion Exclusion Rationale 
Relevance for 
SLR 
questions 
Title, Abstracts and 
Keywords address sharing 
models in infrastructures 
(energy, transport, telecom, 
water, waste); discuss 
regulatory perspectives for 
infrastructure development 
and sharing; reviews 
enablers and barriers to 
sharing in infrastructures; 
compares differences and 
similarities between network 
industries. 
Irrelevant 
studies or 
studies which 
refer only to 
broad general 
concepts of 
public utilities; 
studies on 
commons 
(fisheries, 
forests, rivers, 
etc.) 
Studies address review 
questions and contribute 
to the research topic of 
analysing sharing 
methods and models in 
man-made 
infrastructures and 
network industries. 
Language English. Non English. Universal and generally 
accepted language of 
international academic 
community. 
Scientific 
Field 
Infrastructure development 
studies, regulatory and 
government policy science, 
studies on decision making. 
Natural 
science, civil 
and 
mechanical 
engineering. 
Research topic and 
review questions are 
positioned in these 
areas. 
Type of 
Publication 
Academic, policy and 
practitioners’ papers, 
conference papers, theses. 
General press 
articles, 
working 
papers, 
reports. 
Topic is driven by 
practitioners, regulators 
and academicians; 
general press articles do 
not meet requirements 
of academic research; 
conference papers may 
present concepts which 
will be researched later; 
working papers turn into 
article after peer review. 
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At the initial step of selecting articles based on Titles, Abstracts and Keywords, 
academic, practitioners’ and conference papers were considered for review. 
The reason for the inclusion of practitioners, regulatory and conference papers 
lies in the fact that traditional IS methods are substantially researched in the 
academic domain (e.g. unbundling, spectrum sharing), whereas new sharing 
forms (e.g. virtualisation in telecoms) are nascent areas. The inclusion of non-
scholarly articles imposes certain quality limitations on the proposed SLR but 
ensures coverage of emerging academic concepts and provides unique 
research opportunities. Books and book chapters were excluded from the SLR 
as electronic databases do not provide access to these materials. 
After applying selection criteria to Titles, 250 papers were shortlisted. Based on 
the selection criteria applied to Abstracts, this list was further reduced to 84 
articles. Before conducting the quality appraisal the shortlist of 84 articles was 
distributed to all Review Panel members. Dr. Martin Cave suggested including 
the works of Inderst and Peitz (2012), Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012), 
and Wright and Cave (2011). Dr. Palie Smart recommended broadening the 
SLR with additional material on DM in a public and government sector. To 
address that suggestion, a separate search on DM in regulating energy, 
transport, telecommunication and water infrastructures was conducted; several 
relevant articles were identified and the works of Karvetski, Lambert and Linkov 
(2009), Boggia and Rocchi (2010), and Walker (2000) were included for quality 
appraisal. Four articles from the original list were excluded as their full texts 
were not available for download. Two additional Master’s theses were included 
in the SLR from references of conference proceedings papers. As a result, the 
list of 88 articles was prepared for quality appraisal. 
 
3.2.6 Quality Appraisal for Shortlisted Articles 
The full texts of shortlisted articles selected on the basis of relevance criteria 
were further assessed in accordance with predefined quality criteria. At the 
stage of quality appraisal the selected articles were included in or excluded from 
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the SLR based on their quality of contribution to the research topic. Table 3-4 
represents the list of criteria with appropriate quality ranks for each article: 
Table 3-4 Quality Appraisal Criteria for SLR 
Quality Criteria Quality score 
(1 lowest to 5 
highest) 
1. Is the objective of the article rightly aligned with the 
objectives of my SLR?  
Specifically, does the article address regulatory decision 
making in respect of IS and joint use of public facilities? 
 
2. Is the research question of the article clearly 
formulated? 
3. Is it aligned with any of this SLR questions (SubQ1, 
SubQ2, SubQ3 or MainQ) 
 
4. Is the review of relevant literature presented in the 
article?  
5. Does the paper present a clear methodology of 
research, data collection, sampling and analysis?  
6. Are the findings explicitly formulated? 
 
7. Does the discussion answer the research question and 
objectives of the paper?  
8. What is the overall quality of the paper and its 
contribution to knowledge?  
9. What is the impact factor of the Journal? 
10. What is ranking of the Journal? 
 
Total Score (the range is from 8 to 40+)  
Was the paper selected (if total score more than 28)  
Comments 
 
 
1=completely irrelevant, 2=relevant to a limited extent, 3=acceptable but with 
limitations, 4=significantly relevant, 5=completely relevant  
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Based on the quality appraisal, 27 articles were further excluded from the scope 
of SLR as their overall quality mark was below the pre-agreed minimum score 
of 28. The list of 61 articles selected after the quality appraisal for review is 
presented in Appendix B. An example of the quality appraisal form and rationale 
for rejected articles is presented in Appendix C. The full list of rejected 27 
articles is summarised in the complete version of the SLR. 
 
3.2.7 Selected Articles and Data Extraction 
The total number of articles generated for all SLR sub-questions from the 
keyword search was 2044. These articles were subject to stepwise screening, 
selection criteria applied to Titles and Abstracts, and quality appraisal. Input of 
Review Panel members was also considered and the final list was further 
broadened. Table 3-5 represents the results at each selection stage of the SLR. 
Table 3-5 Number of Articles at Each Stage of the SLR 
Selection Stage of SLR Number of articles selected 
Title and Abstract screening for 
 SubQ1 
 SubQ2 
 SubQ3 
Total for Title and Abstract screening 
 
920 
613 
511 
2,044 
After applying selection criteria to Titles 250 
After applying selection criteria to Abstracts 84 
After Review Panel members’ recommendations 90 
Selected for final quality appraisal 88 
After conducting quality appraisal of Full Texts 61 
Total articles reviewed 61 
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The shortlisted articles were analysed with the purpose of extracting key data. 
The data extraction form is presented in Table 3-6. 
Table 3-6 Data Extraction Form for SLR 
Ref No 
Citation 
Title: 
Author(s): 
Journal/Source: 
Year: 
Keywords: 
Study Background 
Research Question / Purpose of paper: 
Primary Research Focus: 
Grounding Literature: 
Methodology 
Method: 
Data Description: 
Data Collection Instrument: 
Sector: 
Unit of Analysis: 
Analytical approach: 
Type of Infrastructure Sharing: 
Contribution 
Key findings: 
Key prepositions and arguments: 
Limitations and Scope for further research: 
Synthesis/Key contribution to review question(s): 
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An example of a data extraction form for a particular article is presented in 
Appendix D. The full list of data extraction forms of the 61 articles is 
summarised in the SLR. 
3.2.8 Descriptive Account of the Literature 
Descriptive analysis of the final 61 SLR articles was conducted in terms of 
publication year, characteristics of journals, the country of origin, the key 
authors, the research focus and unit analysis, the sector investigated, and 
information on geographical locations. The complete version of the analysis with 
the statistics in absolute numbers and percentages is summarised in the SLR. 
This section contains key descriptive points of the conducted analysis.  
 The overall time span comprises a 20 year period with the earliest identified 
article published in 1994 and the latest in 2014. 
 The total number of unique sources is 43. The ranking analysis shows that 
the majority of journals have an impact factor of less than 1 (28 Journals) 
and SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) rankings less than 1 (30 Journals). Only 
eight “high impact” sources with scores more 2 and five “high SJR ranking” 
sources with scores more than 2 were identified. The impact factor is a 
citation system produced by Thompson Scientific's Web of Knowledge 
database. The SCImago Journal Rank (SJR indicator) measures the 
scientific influence of academic journals from two perspectives: (i) the 
number of citations received by a journal and (ii) the importance of the 
journals where such citations come from. 
 The US authors contribute 30% of all articles selected for this SLR, while UK 
researchers contribute 25%. One explanation for these data is that a 
particular topic of mandatory network sharing was originated in the US and 
also implemented in the UK. Another explanation is that the regulatory 
bodies of the UK (Ofcom, Ofwat, etc.) are leading world agencies in initiating 
reforms in network industries. The UK reforms fertilise subsequent research 
and produce a body of academic studies. 
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 Most of the selected articles study the theoretical and practical frameworks 
of infrastructure unbundling and introduction of competition in former 
monopolistic structures. Next in frequency of occurrence are various studies 
on infrastructure development including concepts of IS. Cave (2010b, 2014) 
reviewed and further elaborated on the theory of the ladder of investments 
and its applicability for new infrastructure development. Hummer et al. 
(2006) developed a theory of traffic flow to analyse the use of shared paths. 
Bublin and Causevic (2008) and Offergelt (2011) used game theory to model 
the cooperative behaviour of operators in network sharing. 
 Examination of methodological approaches shows that 49% of all studies 
used an empirical approach, 30% involved modelling and simulation 
approaches, 11% of studies were based on literature reviews, 8% applied 
theoretical frameworks, but only 2%, i.e. one study, constructed a case 
study. This distribution with its particular focus on countries’ performance 
confirms that the topic of network sharing models focuses on regulatory and 
comparative industry effects of various IS methods. 
 The data show that 11% of all articles are dedicated to the topic of Water 
management, 13% of articles come from the Energy sector, the majority of 
59% reviews IS methods in Telecommunications, and 16% considers 
Transportation and Roads. The dominance of telecommunication literature 
confirms the most significant contribution of this sector to the research area. 
 
3.3 Findings 
This section represents the conceptual findings related to the topic of IS in 
Water, Energy, Telecommunication, Transport and Other infrastructure 
industries. 
 
3.3.1 Water Industry 
The water industry is a network industry similar to the telecommunications, 
electricity and gas network industries. However, unlike the electricity and energy 
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sectors, where countries have historically exercised a unified government 
approach to maintaining national grids, the water industry traditionally has been 
fragmented. The geographical fragmentation is due to the local nature of water 
supplies (Foellmi and Meister, 2012) and difficulties in transporting heavy liquid 
substances over long distances (Sawkins, 2001), which adversely affect the 
quality of water (Foellmi and Meister, 2012). The value chain fragmentation is 
explained by various approaches in different countries to public and private 
ownership of water utilities and integration of water and sewerage operations 
(Saal et al., 2013). Moreover, the European Union (EU) issued its Water 
Framework Directive, saying that “Water is not a commercial product like any 
other, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as 
such” (Foellmi and Meister, 2012). These differences explain why deregulation 
and liberalisation processes in the water industry historically take more time and 
require more careful regulatory approaches (Cave, 2008; Wright and Cave, 
2011). 
As with other network businesses, the water industry relies on a grid 
infrastructure which historically was built under a regulated monopoly regime. 
The monopolistic nature of water utilities and regulatory requirements to 
introduce competition in the water industry explains why the concept of 
Common Carriage is viewed as an IS regulatory approach. 
 
3.3.1.1 Common Carriage 
The origin of the Common Carriage notion comes from the legal obligations of 
ship-owners, inn- and stable keepers in the ancient Roman Empire to provide 
their services to all people without discrimination (Noam, 1994). In English 
common law, the term “common carrier” was first witnessed in the 1300s and in 
the 17th Century the concept of Common Carriage was stated in the law of 
businesses (Mogel and Gregg, 2004). According to this law, certain occupations 
such as innkeepers, smiths, taverners, etc. were viewed as “common callings” 
and obligated to provide their services or goods to all members of the public at 
reasonable rates (Mogel and Gregg, 2004). Since the late 1800s, when the 
 51 
Common Carriage concept was applied in the US to the railroad industry, the 
concept has become a traditional regulatory remedy for other network industries 
(Levinson, 2009). 
With regard to the water industry, Sawkins (2001) analyses the Competition Act 
1998 in England and Wales and defines Common Carriage as the “shared use 
of the supply pipes and other infrastructure of an existing statutory undertaker 
by a third party in order to enable the third party to provide services within the 
incumbent’s area”. Foellmi and Meister (2012) define Common Carriage as 
“shared use of networks, similar to telecommunication, electricity or gas: the 
incumbent company is required to grant its competitors access to the network, 
which is assumed to be an essential facility”. Foellmi and Meister (2012) also 
provide the rationale for Common Carriage as “it would be uneconomical for a 
competitor to duplicate the provision of large assets, such as the pipe network”. 
Under the Common Carriage framework, the monopolistic infrastructure 
provider is mandated to open its network and grant access to alternative 
providers to deliver water to end-users. 
Developing competition is the main driving factor for the Common Carriage 
concept to increase the efficiency and innovation potential of water companies. 
Cave (2008) mentions that the Common Carriage model, along with other 
initiatives (e.g. introduction of an independent water procurement entity), was 
stated in the UK Water Supply Licensing regime in 2005 with the main goal 
being to develop competition in the England and Wales water sectors. As of 
now, the Common Carriage model is not well developed in the UK water 
industry and should be implemented as an additional regulatory measure after 
imposing economic purchasing obligations and establishing a single 
independent procurement entity (Wright and Cave, 2011). 
Foellmi and Meister (2012) also view the efficiency aspect as an important 
factor for Common Carriage. They conducted a literature review on Common 
Carriage and summarise that Common Carriage is not the most effective tool 
for competition due to technical constraints, high barriers for new water 
providers and regulatory ambiguity. Also, such factors as the bad impact of 
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mixed water on pipe performance, higher costs associated with pumping 
requirements, and worsening water quality due to long distance transportation, 
all impose limitations on Common Carriage implementation at a national level. 
Incumbents can set access prices high to prevent new competitors from 
entering the market, while the regulators may not have enough leverage to 
enforce the co-operative behaviour of the dominant players. Moreover, there is 
evidence of strong political opposition to introducing competition in the water 
industry (Foellmi and Meister, 2012). 
The model of Common Carriage in the water industry is a phenomenon which is 
driven exclusively by policy makers and regulators. Unlike the 
telecommunication industry, where certain forms of IS are initiated by business, 
the success of implementing Common Carriage in water can be attributed to the 
need for effective targeted regulation. Countries and respective water industries 
are facing challenges of changing climates, increasing population and water 
consumption, rising consumer expectations of water supplies, and emerging 
environmental issues (Cave, 2008). These are the drivers that force regulators 
and water producers to increase the efficiency of water supply operations 
through increased competition and innovation (Wright and Cave, 2011). 
Common Carriage as an IS model is one remedy in a regulator’s portfolio that 
can bring a cumulative positive effect with other regulatory measures (inset 
appointments, cross-border water trade, etc.) after the consistent, continuous 
development of competition in an unbundled water industry. 
 
3.3.1.2 Unbundling 
Unbundling in the water industry is different from local loop unbundling (LLU) in 
the telecommunication industry. Rather, water industry unbundling is a process 
of vertical disintegration of water incumbents into services and infrastructure 
provision. It is a process of functional separation of monopolistic entities with 
the aim of introducing competition to the sector (Stern, 2012). Thus, unbundling 
is not an IS model per se but a regulatory driver for high level IS agreements 
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when separated network providers deliver infrastructure services to competitive 
retailers on a contract basis (Young, 2016). 
 
3.3.2 Energy industry 
Within the scope of the current SLR, the energy sector is represented by 
electricity and natural gas network industries. In their work Santa and Sikora 
(2004) compare gas and electric power industries with respect to regulation. 
Unlike the segmented natural gas industry, prior to liberalisation the electricity 
power sector was more vertically integrated (generation, transmission and retail 
distribution) and represented a higher degree of monopoly. Therefore, 
introduction of competition in the gas industry is more feasible from the 
regulatory point of view than in the electricity sector. The electricity industry in 
the form of public or private utilities is more regionally focused, whereas the 
natural gas industry often focuses on delivering its product on inter-regional and 
nationwide levels. The difference in the physical nature of gas and electricity 
defines the production type and network design, i.e. electricity is transmitted at 
the speed of light, cannot generally be stored and is generated to meet 
immediate demand. Higher seasonal demand fluctuations (daily or hourly 
demand variability in electricity, as opposed to annual seasonal variability in 
gas) define the business model of economic dispatch and pooling in the electric 
power sector (Santa and Sikora, 2004). However, as electricity and gas 
industries similarly represent network monopolies, the concepts of common 
carriage, open access, unbundling and rights-of-way are relevant for both 
industries from the infrastructure development perspective. 
 
3.3.2.1 Common Carriage 
As described in section 3.3.1.1, Common Carriage is a “shared use of networks, 
similar to telecommunication, electricity or gas” (Foellmi and Meister 2012). In 
the case of electricity, competitive power generation suppliers must be able to 
share transmission and distribution networks to deliver electricity to end-users. 
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Brunekreeft (1997) defines power transmission and distribution infrastructure 
networks as monopolies with the characteristics of essential facilities. The 
principle of Common Carriage applies if network providers are separated from 
the electricity producers and mandated by regulation to provide shared access 
to infrastructure to all third parties on a non-discriminatory basis. Noam (1994) 
describes the English common law requirement, in which under Common 
Carriage infrastructure, providers are “mandated the provision of service to 
willing customers, bringing common carriage close to a service obligation to all 
once it was offered to some.” 
The main driver for the Common Carriage framework is the need of government 
to regulate monopolies to maintain competition and increase welfare. In the 
natural gas industry, Mogel and Gregg (2004) review the evolution of Common 
Carriage in the US since the first effort to impose the common carrier status on 
interstate gas pipelines in the 1906 Interstate Commerce Act. The authors view 
Common Carriage as one of the regulatory tools to correct “market disorder” 
and “remove artificial barriers to competition in the marketplace”. Mogel and 
Gregg (2004) also mention enablers and barriers to introducing Common 
Carriage. Gas consumers generally favour Common Carriage as it secures a 
predictable gas supply at lower prices for many industries. However, high 
brokerage and additional transportation costs, different levels and seasonal 
fluctuations in demand among different types of consumers constitute barriers 
to the implementation of a Common Carriage model (Hocking, 2015). 
The concept of Common Carriage is closely related to the notion of Open 
Access to infrastructures. 
 
3.3.2.2 Open Access 
The concepts of Common Carriage and Open Access are often mixed with each 
other in various academic sources. Santa and Sikora (2004) in their study of 
open access in the electricity and natural gas industries suggest open access is 
“mitigating transportation market power by means of requiring open access 
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transportation, i.e., the ability of third parties to use transportation owners’ 
system on a non-discriminatory basis”. This definition is similar to Common 
Carriage. On the other hand, in his work dedicated to the comparison of the 
common carriage model to open access in the electricity industry, Brunekreeft 
(1997) defines Open Access as a condition when the “infrastructure monopolist 
is allowed to be active on the service market”. According to Brunekreeft (1997), 
if the Common Carriage model assumes that competitive service providers are 
allowed to use the infrastructure of network monopolists, the Open Access 
model in contrast allows incumbents to use the retail infrastructure of service 
competitors to reach the premises of end-users. Brunekreeft (1997) lists major 
factors for forward integration as double marginalisation, price discrimination, 
cost asymmetries and variable input proportions. 
In this SLR, Open Access is assumed to be access to the final consumer, i.e. 
an IS concept which allows one supplier to deliver their services to the final 
consumer through the infrastructure of another supplier of services (Hocking, 
2015). 
 
3.3.2.3 Unbundling 
Electric power and natural gas energy segments have gone through extensive 
liberalisation reforms in a number of nations (Newbery, 2005; Malmendier and 
Schendel, 2006; Growitsch and Stronzik, 2014; Barrett, 2016). The major focus 
of energy reforms is to increase industry transparency and efficiency through 
unbundling, i.e. a vertical separation of network system operations from energy 
production, trade, metering and sales (Lassila et al., 2009). In this SLR 
unbundling in the energy context is not an IS method per se. Rather, unbundling 
is an organisational disintegration of networks from services (Barrett, 2016) 
which raises the issue of IS of newly formed entities through the Common 
Carriage or Open Access models. 
Lassila et al. (2009) view four levels of unbundling in the energy sector, i.e. 
administrative, management, legal and ownership unbundling. Administrative 
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unbundling assumes only separation of accounts within one organisation. 
Management unbundling represents further separation of network and service 
operations into different business units but still within one organisation. Legal 
unbundling requires the creation of separate legal entities within one holding 
company. Ownership unbundling is an outsourcing model where infrastructure 
and service providers are independent companies. Lassila et al. (2009) mention 
that the key drivers for unbundling are regulatory intentions to maintain 
competition, tightening customer demands, infrastructure owners’ policies to 
increase efficiency of operations, business challenges to regenerate 
infrastructure capacity, and the need to address climate change. However, 
Growitsch and Stronzik (2014) argue that unbundling may lead to a decrease of 
operational efficiency and overall welfare, as unbundling leads to a loss of 
economies of scale. 
 
3.3.2.4 Rights-of-Way 
One particular type of sharing between network infrastructures and public 
authorities is the concept of Rights-of-Way (Mayfield, 2017). The Rights-of-Way 
is a permission by regional or national state authorities to a network provider to 
erect infrastructure on public and private land. Mogel and Gregg (2004) in their 
research on the Common Carriage model in the US natural gas industry, review 
provisions of the US Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 where “rights-of-way through 
public lands would be granted to natural gas pipelines by the Secretary of 
Interior only upon the express condition that such pipelines shall be 
constructed, operated and maintained as common carriers”. 
 
3.3.3 Telecommunications 
The telecommunications industry is the main locomotive of the IS topic within all 
network industries. One explanation is that wireline telecom has the traditional 
characteristics of monopolistic utilities and therefore classic concepts, e.g. 
Common Carriage (Hazlett and Wright, 2017), Open Access, Unbundling, 
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Rights-of-Way (Cramer, 2016), are also relevant in telecommunications. On the 
other hand, unlike the water and energy industries, fast grown wireless 
telecoms along with the development of computer technologies and Internet 
boom have brought a multi-dimensional variety of telecommunications 
infrastructure solutions. IS in telecommunications is far more complex as it 
deals not only with tangible assets (site and mast sharing, network sharing, 
local loop unbundling) but also considers intangible assets, e.g. spectrum 
sharing (Mustonen et al., 2017), establishes new types of shared co-operation 
between operators, e.g. roaming, MVNO (Shin and Bartolacci, 2007; Basso and 
Crocioni, 2016), and creates new forms of logical networks, e.g. virtualised 
networks (Costa-Perez et al., 2013). 
Due to the diversity of particular infrastructure topics in telecommunications, 
existing research studies and publications on IS are fragmented with various 
researchers offering their own taxonomies of IS methods. Bartlett and Jackson 
(2002) distinguish (i) site sharing, (ii) active sharing (Node B, Transmission, 
Radio network controller, Core Network), (iii) Roaming and (iv) MVNO. Berkers 
et al. (2010) provide a solid comparison of various taxonomies of IS methods in 
wireless communications and utilise the classification approach by Forge and 
Blackman (2006), i.e. (i) site sharing, (ii) mast or tower sharing, (iii) Radio 
Access Network (RAN) sharing, (iv) Core Network sharing, and (v) roaming. A 
more comprehensive approach to IS taxonomy is given by Frisanco et al. 
(2008) who present a three dimensional taxonomy of IS methods differentiated 
by business, technology and geographic threads. The main advantage of the 
three dimensional classification is that it allows several IS studies to be 
combined into one model. 
Various aspects determine IS development. Berkers et al. (2010) mention that 
the main drivers of IS are cost reductions, a potential extra revenue stream for 
operators, compliance with regulatory requirements, faster deployment and 
network coverage, and mitigation of investment risks. On the other hand, factors 
such as higher exposure of operators to each other’s data and operations, 
potential loss of competitive advantage by a dominating operator in a long run, 
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competition with Internet providers on service delivery site and possible 
cooperation with competitors, all constitute barriers to IS. Chatzicharistou 
(2010) synthesises the various literature on IS and defines 32 drivers for IS 
classified by financial, regulatory, services, and network dimensions. In addition 
to these dimensions, Offergelt (2011) mentions reduced environmental, health 
and aesthetic concerns as important drivers of IS.  
The following sections review IS methods in wireline and wireless 
telecommunications in more detail. 
 
3.3.3.1 Mobile Network Sharing 
Mobile Network Sharing (MNS) methods consist of passive and active sharing 
alternatives (Bartlett and Jackson, 2002; Frisanco et al., 2008; Berkers et al., 
2010; Onishi and Tsuna, 2010). Passive IS is a business model to share 
passive, i.e. non-electronic elements of operators’ networks (e.g. sites, masts, 
poles, towers, diesel generators, ventilation and air conditioning). Active IS 
includes sharing of active elements of operators’ networks and network control, 
i.e. RAN sharing (Malanchini, Valentin and Aydin, 2016). To harmonise the 
variety of approaches and definitions of IS, the 3GPP organisation standardised 
network sharing solutions (Costa-Perez et al., 2013). 
Passive sharing does not require significant coordination between operators. 
Various studies on the economic effects of IS methods report positive savings 
effects from implementing passive IS methods. Bartlett and Jackson (2002) 
report that site sharing can contribute up to 16% of overall costs savings. 
Frisanco et al. (2008) analyse the effect of IS on savings of operational (OPEX) 
and capital (CAPEX) expenditures and report a positive effect of passive IS of 
20% in OPEX savings and up to 17% in CAPEX savings. Various combinations 
of active IS methods can contribute up to 37% in OPEX and 40% CAPEX 
savings (Frisanco et al., 2008; Meddour, Rasheed and Gourhant, 2011). The 
study by Song et al. (2012) quantifies the economic effect of various MNS 
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methods on the Korean economy and concludes that the more IS methods are 
implemented, the more significant the economic effect. 
The impact of MNS methods is determined by three major external factors, i.e. 
(i) size of national land area, (ii) number of mobile network operators, and (iii) 
pressure to reduce costs (Onishi and Tsuna, 2010). The third factor influencing 
IS rollout also considers the impact of increasing consumer needs and the 
objectives of national regulation on cost reduction pressures. 
 
3.3.3.2 Spectrum sharing 
In their work Berkers et al. (2010) analyse different studies on spectrum sharing 
and provide a definition of spectrum sharing as “the use of the same frequency 
band by different RANs or services, either with coordination or possibly without 
any coordination between the systems, with emphasis on the spectrum access 
schemes and methods”. They also provide a taxonomy of spectrum sharing 
arrangements based on coexistence (no interference and no communication 
between devices) and cooperation (devices communicate to avoid interference), 
and sharing among equals (no priority given to any device) and based on 
primary-secondary agreements (priority is given to primary users). The issue of 
spectrum sharing is emerging due to existing outdated regulatory policies on 
spectrum allocation (Mustonen et al., 2017), exponential growth in mobile 
communication, converged media streaming via wireless, and the rise of cloud 
computing (Blackman et al., 2013). The problem of spectrum congestion 
imposes pressure on regulators to tailor modern forms for spectrum 
management, e.g. light spectrum licensing, de-licensing, authorised shared 
access and licensed shared access, which allows the implementation of market 
instruments in spectrum management and technological advances, such as 
cognitive radio and mesh networking. 
 
 60 
3.3.3.3 Roaming 
Roaming is the most feasible and cost efficient mode of IS at the initial stages of 
network development for a new operator (Song et al., 2012). Under roaming 
agreements, one operator can virtually extend its geographical coverage and 
enable own subscribers to use the network of another operator (Frisanco et al., 
2008). Roaming agreements can be national when operators share networks 
within one country and international between operators from different countries. 
Driving factors and the regulatory rationale for national and international 
roaming differ. Bartlett and Jackson (2002) state that “with the minimum of 
operator co-operation national roaming allows maximization of coverage subject 
to regulatory permission”. Regulators often force incumbent operators into 
mandatory national roaming agreements with new entrants to facilitate 
competition (Frisanco et al., 2008). The issue of international roaming is more 
complicated as it is driven by operators and international travellers with less 
influential power on roaming regulation. Since international roaming agreements 
are signed on a one-by-one basis, cooperation between regulatory authorities 
and transaction costs become complicated. The importance of regulating 
international roaming tariffs is witnessed in EU countries where the market for 
roaming services represents 4% of all mobile revenues (compared to 1-2% in 
other countries) (Infante and Vallejo, 2012). Aiming to decrease roaming tariffs 
within the EU area and facilitate market competition, the European Commission 
issued several recommendations to member countries to review national 
roaming regulations towards lowering prices for voice and data services (Falch, 
Henten and Tadayoni, 2009; Infante and Vallejo, 2012). 
 
3.3.3.4 Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) 
Shin and Bartolacci (2007) provide a comprehensive literature review on MVNO 
diffusion in the US, EU and Asian countries and compare various definitions of 
MVNO by the ITU, the UK regulator Ofcom, and a telecom research provider 
OVUM. The authors summarise that “MVNO refers to an organization that does 
not have an assignment of 3G spectrum, but is capable of providing public 
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cellular services to end users by accessing radio networks of one or more 3G 
spectrum holders”. MVNO is a type of organisation that provides voice and data 
services but does not have its own telecommunication network (Bartlett and 
Jackson, 2002; Song et al., 2012). In the case of MVNO, one (hosting) operator 
shares its physical infrastructure with a virtual (hosted) operator by selling 
network capacity and services to a new entrant for resale. The network control 
remains under the ownership (hosting operator) of the infrastructure. 
Analysing MVNO diffusion in the US, UK and selected Asian countries (Hong 
Kong and Singapore) Shin and Bartolacci (2007) suggest that general market 
conditions and telecom industry structure are the major determinants of MVNO 
start-ups. Average revenue per user (ARPU), number of mobile network 
operators, market saturation, presence and market potential of underserved 
user segments, and regulatory certainty, are the major factors that influence a 
decision to establish an MVNO. However, the business success of an MVNO is 
more feasible in those markets with a higher degree of horizontal integration 
and where clear regulation on MVNO is witnessed. Shin and Bartolacci (2007) 
conclude that “the MVNO is an example that is independent from its underlying 
infrastructure.” 
 
3.3.3.5 Network Virtualisation 
Costa-Perez et al. (2013) view network virtualisation as one particular type of 
MNS method. They define network virtualisation as a combination of several 
virtual networks, i.e. “slices”, residing on the same physical infrastructure 
(“network virtualization substrate”). Virtual “slices” representing different 
operators are isolated from each other on a logical level, customised for the 
distinct needs of each operator and optimised for the most effective use of 
shared physical infrastructure resources. Unlike Costa-Perez et al. (2013) who 
consider network virtualisation as an additional IS method to enable operators 
reduce OPEX and CAPEX and address a “mobile data apocalypse”, Khan et al. 
(2011) view network virtualisation as a new paradigm for Next Mobile Networks 
(NMN) with the traffic speed of 5Gb/sec. Panchal, Yates and Buddhikot. (2013) 
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confirm that network virtualisation techniques generate less cost reductions as 
compared to conventional passive and active IS methods but are preferable for 
more complicated scenarios (e.g. dynamic spectrum sharing). 
Zaki et al. (2011) summarise motivational factors to implement network 
virtualisation for infrastructure providers, mobile operators and end-users. 
Network virtualisation enables infrastructure providers to concentrate on their 
core competences of maintaining and increasing the efficiency of physical 
networks and to save on system integration functions. Existing mobile operators 
can significantly reduce OPEX and CAPEX, whereas new entrants can save on 
initial investments for network deployment. As a result, end-users benefit from 
the overall increased number of competitors, and the variety of new services 
with reasonable prices and innovation. However, even though researchers of 
network virtualisation underline its promising potential, this new paradigm 
requires additional research to address open issues (Khan et al., 2011). 
 
3.3.3.6 Network Neutrality and Open Access 
This section reviews the concepts of Network Neutrality and Open Access, 
which are closely related and often mixed in various sources. As for Network 
Neutrality, Song, Zo and Ciganek, (2014) describe the phenomenon as “the 
belief that mobile operators should treat all data equally … for transparent traffic 
management and prohibitions against service”. Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) 
define Network Neutrality as “another type of mandatory network sharing” which 
is non-discriminatory to traffic. Hogendorn (2007) provides a definition of 
Network Neutrality as follows: “broadband services charge consumers only 
once for Internet access, do not favour one content provider over another, and 
do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to 
end users”. Hogendorn (2007) concludes that Network Neutrality is openness to 
content, whereas Open Access is openness of an infrastructure owner for other 
operators to provide services. 
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As opposed to closed access, i.e. when a provider delivers a certain service 
(cable, phone, Internet, etc.), Open Access means only Internet connectivity 
through which any content can be delivered. Hogendorn (2007) claims that in 
the case of Open Access, a provider has an incentive to discriminate traffic in 
an effort to maximise profits. Thus, Open Access is an IS method which allows 
operators and content providers to reach end-users but does not necessarily 
guarantee that all traffic from all providers will be treated equally. The main 
driver for Open Access is regulation, which is aimed at developing competition, 
innovation and increasing investments in infrastructure development. Regulated 
pricing and types of agreements between incumbents and new entrants (ex 
post versus ex ante) are the main determinants of Open Access outcomes 
(Bourreau et al., 2012; Inderst and Peitz, 2012). 
The underlined debates and motivational factors for Network Neutrality and 
Open Access are similar, as both concepts are concerned with the risk of 
discrimination. However, if the Open Access debate is more focused on the 
development of competition and limitation of monopolies, the Network Neutrality 
debate also contains political aspects of content censorship and freedom of 
speech. This explains why the issue of Open Access is often resolved by 
regulators (Katz, 2017), whereas the debate over Network Neutrality is often 
escalated to government and parliament level (Wallsten and Hausladen, 2009; 
Weisman, 2015). 
 
3.3.3.7 Common Carriage and Rights-of-Way 
The concept of Common Carriage is driven by regulators and applied to wireline 
incumbent telecommunication companies. Former telecom monopolies were 
mandated by law to deliver their services to the public on a non-discriminatory 
basis in respect of service providers. In this SLR, the Common Carriage 
concept can be considered as an IS concept when users, e.g. people, 
companies or competitors, are mandated to share the infrastructure of an 
incumbent to receive services under regulated pricing. The concept of Common 
Carriage is closely related to Network Neutrality. In the context of 
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telecommunications, if Network Neutrality is openness to content (Hogendorn, 
2007) then Common Carriage can be considered as openness to users. Noam 
(1994) rightly predicted that with the development of alternative operators, e.g. 
Cable and Wireless, the concept of Common Carriage would erode and be 
replaced by “neutral interconnection”, a term which later became Network 
Neutrality. In 2002 and 2005, the US Federal Communications Commission 
eliminated Common Carriage provision from the US wholesale and retail 
broadband services respectively (Cherry, 2008). 
Noam (1994) also mentions that if a private carrier connects to a common 
carrier and utilises the status of the latter to deliver its own signals, then the 
private carrier is bound to accept common carriage obligations for the signals 
coming from the common carrier’s network. This is the concept of Rights-of-
Way, an infrastructure concept often witnessed in transportation when a private 
or public network (road, highway, communication grid) resides on public land. 
Day (2002) defines Rights-of-Way access as “the process of negotiating 
agreements with local governments to install and utilize fibre-optic cable or 
other transmission equipment on or below public streets”. The concept is 
primarily driven by regulation, usually on the local and regional level, and often 
perceived by telecom operators as a barrier (Day, 2002). 
 
3.3.3.8 Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) 
As described in section 3.3.1 for the Water industry and section 3.3.2 for the 
Energy industry, the concept of vertical separation through organisational 
unbundling is also present in the Telecommunication industry. In order to 
introduce competition in monopolistic incumbent networks, regulators can 
introduce various forms of organisational unbundling, i.e. accounting, functional, 
legal, and ownership unbundling (Soares and Sarmento, 2012). Organisational 
unbundling, which is not an IS method, is often mixed with the closely related 
notion of LLU (Hausman and Sidak, 1999). The purpose of LLU is to provide 
new operators with access to the local loop of monopoly infrastructure holders 
to deliver services under regulated prices without building their own 
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infrastructure (Bourreau and Doǧan, 2005). By mandating LLU, regulators aim 
to develop competition, enabling innovation, and benefitting end-users with 
broader services and lower prices (Crandall et al., 2013). 
In terms of IS, there are three types of LLU, i.e. full unbundling, line sharing and 
bitstream access (Gabelmann, 2001). Under full unbundling, the incumbent 
loses control over its physical last mile media (e.g. copper or fibre) which is fully 
transferred to be under the new entrant’s management. The line sharing 
agreement assumes that both incumbent and new entrant simultaneously 
deliver their services over shared communication media (e.g. voice by 
incumbent and Internet by new entrant). The bitstream access grants the new 
entrant a certain bandwidth to deliver data over last mile media, whereas the 
local loop remains under the incumbent’s control.  
The regulatory requirement to mandate LLU was intended to pursue the 
following benefits. Firstly, mandatory LLU was assumed to stimulate network 
upgrade by the incumbent. Secondly, LLU was meant to quickly allow the new 
entrant to establish operations without duplicating infrastructure and prevent 
ineffective investments. Thirdly, LLU was believed to enable innovation through 
increased innovation among competitors (Biggar, 2003). However, the 
outcomes of LLU as a way of mandatory network sharing stated in the US 
Telecommunication Act 1996 were questionable (Crandall, 2005) and the 
regime of mandatory network sharing was subsequently abandoned in the US 
in 2004 (Hazlett, 2006). In Europe, LLU was actively used by regulators as the 
tool to promote broadband penetration and an initial step for new entrants to 
build new, own infrastructure (Cave, 2010b, 2014). 
 
3.3.3.9 Crowdsourced Infrastructure 
An interesting IS concept of resource pooling is given by Doyle et al. (2014). 
The authors call the concept NwoB, i.e. Network Without Borders. The NwoB 
model assumes that a particular network is organised on demand, e.g. 
crowdsourced, using public or private resources. The basis for the NwoB model 
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is the “bring your own” concept for organising infrastructures. According to 
Doyle et al. (2014), known concepts of “bringing your own technology” (BYOT), 
“bringing your own phone” (BYOP), and “bringing your own PC” (BYOPC) can 
be further developed to “bringing your own spectrum” (BYOS), “bringing your 
own base station” (BYOBS), “bringing your own processing power” (BYOPP), 
etc. 
The crowdsourcing IS model is similar to the Network Virtualisation (see 
3.3.3.5) concept where, on the basis of one physical infrastructure, several 
logical networks are organised. However, the crowdsourcing model is different 
as it is larger in scale, requires the coordination of numerous resource providers 
(Navarro et al., 2016), and calls for new regulatory considerations (Doyle et al., 
2014).  
 
3.3.4 Transportation 
 
The evolution of the transportation industry from railroads to motor and air 
industries is a benchmarking example of infrastructure industries’ development. 
From the 19th century railroad companies were not just locomotives of economic 
development but also drivers of regulatory reforms related to governing 
infrastructure monopolies, imposing deregulation regimes (e.g. the US Staggers 
Act in 1980 and the Air Cargo Deregulation Act in 1977) and promoting 
liberalisation and competition. The concept of Common Carriage in relation to 
the infrastructure industry was firstly applied in rail transportation and later 
spread to other essential facilities (Cherry, 2008). Deregulation of the 
transportation industry was used as a blueprint for similar reforms in the energy 
and telecommunication network industries. 
The invention of the internal combustion engine sparked the development of the 
motor industry, which in turn enabled extensive road and highway development. 
Roads became a strategic economic resource but also corridors and conduit 
systems for other utilities, i.e. electricity, gas, water, sewage, and 
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telecommunications. Infrastructure sharing models are actively used in the 
transportation segment above and below the road surface (Marvin and Slater, 
1997). 
 
3.3.4.1 Common Carriage, Open Access and Rights-of-Way 
The concept of Common Carriage in transportation is similar to those described 
in sections 3.3.1 for Water, 3.3.2 for Energy and 3.3.3 for Telecommunication 
industries. Common Carriage in transportation means the obligation of a 
monopolistic carrier to provide services to the public under regulated prices. 
Incumbents are mandated to transfer freight or passengers on a non-
discriminatory basis but can charge different prices for different user categories 
(e.g. couch classes). It is a form of mandatory sharing of transportation facilities 
between a carrier and a passenger or another (private) carrier (Cherry, 2008). 
The concept of Common Carriage is applied not only to carriers but also 
physical networks. For example, toll roads in the US do not have the right to 
discriminate between the vehicles and their content, providing the vehicles meet 
safety and regulatory requirements (Levinson, 2009). By removing 
discriminatory barriers, the concept of Common Carriage is driven by regulators 
to ensure public welfare and the development of competition. 
Drew (2009) analyses Open Access in the railroad industry in different 
countries. The key enabler of Open Access, in this context it is granting access 
to rail infrastructure to competitors, is a regulatory intention to introduce 
competition among rail carriers. Drew (2009) shows that countries express 
different views on the vertical separation of the rail industry and the introduction 
of Open Access. North America and Japan rejected the idea of Open Access, 
arguing that there is competition from road truck companies. Sweden, Germany 
and the UK implemented reforms in the railroad industry with different degrees 
of vertical separation and showed growth in rail traffic after liberalisation (17%, 
44% and 62% respectively in the time period 1993-2005) (Drew, 2009). 
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As mentioned earlier, Rights-of-Way is a permission issued by government 
authorities, which allows network providers to reside on public land. The Rights-
of-Way concept is important for the transportation industry as railways roads, 
bridges, turnpikes are all ground facilities which share space and land with 
public property. The concept of Rights-of-Way is also relevant for general public 
shared paths, a lane which is jointly used by pedestrians and cyclists for 
recreational purposes (Hummer et al., 2006; Morris et al., 2009; Parsons et al., 
2014). 
 
3.3.4.2 Shared rail corridors 
Resor, Hickey and Trb (2005) study light rail transit (LRT) systems in the US 
and shared-use rail corridors. Shared-use corridors are an IS method when LRT 
trains use the same infrastructure as heavy freight rail carriers. According to 
Resor et al. (2005) there are three types of shared-use corridors. The first type 
is shared track when both LRT and heavy freight train use the same track. The 
second type is a shared right-of-way when freight and passenger use different 
tracks with the distance between track centre lines of less than 25 ft (7.62 
metres). The third type is shared corridor, when rail operators share a 
transportation corridor for parallel line routes when the distance between tracks 
ranges between 25 ft and 200 ft (7.62m and 61m). In addition to tracks, the 
shared-use corridors also include the sharing of minor facilities, e.g. crossings 
and movable bridges (i.e. by passengers and freight operators). 
Resor et al. (2005) report that the major driver of shared-use corridors is a 
growing demand for additional transportation capacity in densely populated 
areas where the introduction of additional highways and roadways is not 
possible or economically not feasible. Shared-use corridors offer flexibility of 
LRT systems mixing with city traffic and carrying passengers at a relatively high 
speed. The issue is driven by public demand, municipal transportation 
regulators and rail authorities. 
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3.3.4.3 Underground Sharing Methods 
Marvin and Slater (1997) mention several IS methods that are used in 
underground facilities. Service tunnels are shared spaces under the road for 
network elements of all utilities, i.e. gas, water, electricity, and telecoms. 
Service tunnels bring advantages of improved access, reduced risk of 
accidental impairment, improved service coordination between cable and pipe 
elements, improved work safety, and elimination of open pit civil works and 
damage to the road surface. On the other hand, while using service tunnels, 
difficulties arise from different layering and isolation requirements for cables and 
pipes, increased risk of damage for all utilities from one network element, high 
installation costs in busy city districts, and problems of ownership of service 
tunnels. 
Marvin and Slater (1997) also offer a method of reusing existing or 
decommissioned networks. For example, new cables can be installed inside old 
or redundant water or gas mains. London Underground offers its network to 
electricity companies to lay power cables. New underground ducting networks 
can be installed with a certain degree of redundancy to be sold later to telecom 
or cable companies. Even though reusing existing networks can significantly 
decrease installation and maintenance costs, there are safety concerns 
regarding the co-existence of critical infrastructures, e.g. power and gas, 
electricity and water, etc. Another organisational method for underground IS is 
common trenching when all utilities install their network elements at the same 
time once a trench is opened. This method brings advantages of significant 
savings on civil works and reduced road and life disruption but is difficult to 
implement due to complicated coordination among utilities and lack of skilled 
multi-utility subcontractors. 
 
3.3.5 Convergence and Superimposing with Other Utilities 
In their intent to increase profits, utilities are seeking new business opportunities 
and possibilities to utilise their economies of scale and scope. Water utilities 
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merge with electricity or gas utilities and enjoy savings from shared centres of 
competence in billing, maintenance planning, service delivery, etc. on shared 
infrastructures. Mergers and acquisitions concluded on national and 
international levels broaden market opportunities and establish quick access to 
essential facilities, rights-of way and new clientele. Light forms of industry 
diversification push energy and rail companies to install telecommunication 
cables over existing core infrastructures and either sell communication transport 
capacity or establish their own telecommunication companies (Marvin and 
Slater, 1997). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The main purpose of this SLR was to identify determinants of various forms of 
IS in infrastructure industries, i.e. water, energy, telecommunication and 
transportation. A main SLR question and three sub-questions were formulated 
and further deconstructed into literature domains for further search. The review 
was primarily aimed at exposing the evolution of IS models with the focus on 
regulatory drivers and DM. The literature in the research domains revealed a 
number of IS concepts with various degrees of maturity. On the one hand, the 
topic of IS in monopolistic incumbents’ infrastructures is well researched in the 
academic domain and consistent among different utilities. On the other hand, 
the research on IS methods in a fast growing converged industry, e.g. 
telecommunication, is fragmented, primarily driven by practitioners and needs 
further academic investigation. Telecommunication, including converged 
Internet and media segments, are the major drivers of IS concepts, business 
models and regulation. The following sections analyse SLR findings in relation 
to the doctoral research. Section 3.4.1 discusses the thematic findings with the 
objective of addressing the review questions. Section 3.4.2 presents the key 
points derived from the review. 
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3.4.1 Answer to Review Questions 
 
Using SLR methodology, literature domains and corresponding search vehicles 
were determined to address the research objectives. Thematic analysis of 
selected articles from Section 3.3 provides findings to answer the main research 
question and three sub-questions. 
The main literature review question is  
What aspects of inter-dependent shared infrastructures and stakeholders, e.g. 
users, businesses and regulators, are required for the regulatory decision-
making of infrastructure sharing? 
The main SLR question can be answered by constructing answers to the three 
review sub-questions. 
 
3.4.1.1 Addressing Sub-Question 1 
The first sub-question for systematic literature review is: 
“What common sharing principles and sharing models are used in different 
infrastructure systems, i.e. water, energy, telecommunications and transport?” 
Section 3.3 presents a comprehensive discussion of IS models and principles 
revealed from the SLR. Table 3-7 provides a summary of IS approaches in 
water, energy, telecommunication and transportation. 
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Table 3-7 Infrastructure Sharing Models and Principles Identified in the SLR 
 Water Energy Telecoms Transport 
Common Carriage X X X X 
Unbundling (administrative and 
management) 
X X X  
Open Access  X X X 
Rights-of-Way  X X X 
Mobile Network Sharing   X  
Spectrum Sharing   X  
Roaming   X  
MVNO   X  
Network Virtualisation   X  
Network Neutrality   X  
Local Loop unbundling   X  
Crowdsourced Infrastructure   X  
Shared rail corridors (track 
sharing) 
   X 
Underground Sharing (service 
tunnels, re-using decommissioned 
networks) 
   X 
Convergence and Superimposing 
with other utilities 
X X X X 
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Table 3-7 summarises only those IS methods discovered in the 61 articles. The 
topics of Open Access and Rights-of-way in the Water industry and 
Organisational Unbundling in Transport (particularly railroad) were not identified 
in the set of shortlisted articles. 
 
3.4.1.2 Addressing Sub-Question 2 
The second sub-question (SubQ2) is: 
“What influential factors (economic, geographic, demographic, environmental, 
social, political, etc.) are determinants of sharing models and sharing principles 
in infrastructure systems?”  
Table 3-8 summarises determinants (e.g. barriers, enablers, regulatory 
requirements, public expectations, etc.) which influence IS models in selected 
infrastructure industries. Table 3-8 contains only those factors which were 
directly identified from selected articles in relation to respective industries.  
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Table 3-8 Determinants of IS Models in Selected Network Industries 
 Determinants Water Energy Telecommunications Transportation 
Economic Need for increased efficiency; 
Essential facility public good: hard to 
replicate; Increased water 
consumption/ demand growth 
Seasonal demand fluctuations; 
Essential facility: hard to duplicate; 
Need for increased efficiency; 
Growing customer demand 
Need for increased efficiency; 
Impact on overall industry investments; 
More services at better prices; 
Increased economic surplus 
Need for increased efficiency; 
Growing demand and infrastructure 
limitations 
Business Public vs. private ownership; 
Investment barriers for new entrants 
 
Large consumers secure predictable 
prices; 
High brokerage and transportation 
costs; 
Need to increase capacity 
Cost reduction and Extra revenue stream; 
Compliance with regulation; 
Quick market access; 
Less investment risks; 
Industry and market structure 
Roads are conduits to other utilities; 
Cost reduction and extra revenue 
stream; 
Economies of scale and scope with 
other utilities 
Regulatory Introduction of competition; 
Enabling innovation; 
Sound regulatory regime; 
Control of mergers 
Introduction of competition; 
Mitigating market dominance; 
Mitigating economic discrimination; 
Control of mergers 
Facilitating competition and enabling 
innovation; 
Attracting investments; 
Control of mergers and acquisitions 
Facilitating competition and enabling 
innovation; 
Attracting investments; 
Control of national and international 
mergers 
Political Opposition to water reforms;  
Water quality is essential 
 
Increasing industry transparency; 
Legal issues on Rights-of-Way; 
EU: Gas is on political agenda 
Need to bridge digital divide; 
Revenue from spectrum licensing; 
EU: Roaming is a political agenda; 
Freedom of speech and network neutrality 
Roads are a country’s strategic 
resource; 
Removing discriminatory barriers on 
transport and roads;  
Legal issues on Rights-of-Way 
Geographic Local nature of water supply; 
Difficulties in transferring liquids 
Electricity is more regionally focused, 
Gas is nationally focused 
Size of land influences network deployment Land characteristics influence roads 
deployment 
Demographic Population growth; 
Rising consumer expectations 
Urbanisation High population density increases 
congestion and saturation 
High population density increases road 
congestions 
Environmental Changing climate; 
Environmental concerns 
Changing climate Environmental, health and aesthetic 
concerns 
Environmental, health and aesthetic 
concerns from road constructions and 
civil works 
Social EU: water is not a product but 
‘heritage’ 
Need to increase welfare; Energy as 
human right 
Need to increase welfare; Expectations of 
connectivity for everyone and everywhere; 
Internet is a human right; 
Public expectations of lower tariffs 
Need to increase welfare; Need to 
reduced life disruptions from road 
issues 
Technological Technical constraints for water 
transfer (due to physical nature); 
Network interconnection 
Nature of electricity and gas defines 
network design; 
Need to upgrade networks 
Faster and simpler network deployment; 
Various technological platforms and 
constraints (spectrum);  
Network interconnection is vital 
A need to cooperate with other 
utilities for joint network deployments 
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The IS methods were also analysed against their major stakeholders. Figure 
3-3 represents the key determinants of IS methods by key stakeholders, i.e. 
regulators, businesses and end-users. 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Key determinants of IS models and principles by major stakeholders 
 
3.4.1.3 Addressing Sub-Question 3 
The third sub-question (SubQ3) is: 
“What common sharing principles and sharing models are relevant for 
regulatory decision-making in infrastructure systems?” 
Findings of the review show that regulation is present in all models of 
infrastructure sharing, either mandatory or voluntary. One type of regulation of 
mandatory IS is linked to the de-monopolisation of incumbent infrastructure 
providers, introduction of competition and control of market power (common 
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carriage, unbundling, open access, network neutrality). Another form of 
mandatory IS regulation is dealing with the coordination of scarce public 
resources (spectrum licensing, rights-of-way, phone number resource 
allocation). Regulation of voluntary IS forms is aimed at achieving economic 
and business objectives, such as promoting investments in infrastructure 
development (LLU), increasing efficiency and reducing costs (MNS, MVNO, 
shared corridors), improving network coverage and bridging the digital divide 
(roaming). Depending on the objectives of governments, certain voluntary forms 
of IS in one country can be mandatory in another. Regulation is closely tied to 
the coordination of multi-utility activities (underground sharing, convergence and 
superimposing infrastructures). New forms of IS (crowdsourced infrastructure, 
network virtualisation) require standardisation and technical regulation. 
Based on the review findings for the three SLR sub-questions, the main review 
question can be answered: 
What aspects of inter-dependent shared infrastructures and stakeholders, e.g. 
users, businesses and regulators, are required for the regulatory decision-
making of infrastructure sharing? 
Increasing a country’s economic output, facilitating market efficiencies and 
effectiveness, addressing environmental and climate issues, empowering users 
with better infrastructure capacity by means of promoting competition, 
facilitating innovation, attracting investments in infrastructure development and 
coordinating scarce resources, are the major determinants of regulatory 
decision-making for IS. 
 
3.4.2 Insights from the Literature 
 
3.4.2.1 Modern “Infrastructure Sharing” is a telecom term 
The findings of the review show that various sharing principles and models 
related to infrastructure industries exist. The term ‘Infrastructure sharing’ in its 
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modern sense is naturalised in the wireless telecommunications and relates to 
roaming arrangements, MVNO models, spectrum sharing, sharing of mobile 
networks’ passive facilities (sites, towers, power supply), and active elements 
(network access and core network sharing) (Bartlett and Jackson, 2002; Shin 
and Bartolacci, 2007; Bublin and Causevic, 2008; Frisanco et al., 2008; Berkers 
et al., 2010; Onishi and Tsuna, 2010; Song et al., 2012; Blackman et al., 2013). 
Academic papers on wireline telecommunications do not provide explicit sharing 
taxonomies but rather focus on the mandatory or voluntary nature of sharing 
principles (Hazlett, 2006) and scope of sharing (Hausman and Sidak, 1999; 
Crandall, 2005; Cave, 2010b; Crandall et al., 2013). Unlike wireless 
telecommunications where sharing of specific network elements is clearly 
witnessed, in wireline telecommunication sharing concepts apply both to 
network elements (local loop full unbundling, shared line, bitstream access) and 
network as a whole (common carriage, organisational unbundling, open access, 
and recently network neutrality). The former concepts are relevant primarily for 
the telecom industry (Gabelmann, 2001; Biggar, 2003; Bourreau and Doǧan, 
2005; Cave, 2014) while the latter models, as well as relevance to single/all 
infrastructure sectors/industries, are witnessed in all utilities (Noam, 1994; 
Sawkins, 2001; Mogel and Gregg, 2004; Santa and Sikora, 2004; Newbery, 
2005; Levinson, 2009; Foellmi and Meister, 2012). 
 
3.4.2.2 Extant IS models reflect sector determinants and maturity 
The differences and similarities in IS models in infrastructure industries are 
explained by different drivers and determinants. Infrastructure sharing in 
wireless telecommunications is primarily business driven (Berkers et al., 2010; 
Chatzicharistou, 2010; Offergelt, 2011). Common sharing concepts in all 
infrastructure industries are determined by government interventions dealing 
with the issues of regulating monopolies, enabling competition, promoting 
innovation, and ensuring public good and equal access (Sawkins, 2001; 
Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, 2002; Day, 2002; Santa and Sikora, 2004; 
Hogendorn, 2007; Drew, 2009). Since traditional monopoly-like industries 
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(railroads, pipelines, electricity grids, incumbent phone companies) have a 
century long history of regulation, academic studies on common network 
sharing concepts are mature and well established. In contrast, studies on 
modern IS methods related to wireless and virtualised telecommunications are 
driven by practitioners (Onishi and Tsuna, 2010; Khan et al., 2011; Costa-Perez 
et al., 2013; Panchal et al., 2013), fragmented and narrow focused (Shin and 
Bartolacci, 2007; Falch et al., 2009; Infante and Vallejo, 2012), and flexible in IS 
classification and taxonomies (Frisanco et al., 2008; Meddour et al., 2011). 
 
3.4.2.3 Physical nature of good determines IS method 
The variety of IS methods and their evolution is significantly determined by the 
physical nature of goods delivered over networks. Water, being a liquid good 
with low delivery speed and quality dependent on transportation distances, 
determines the local nature of production and supply, significance of local 
regulation, and modest implementation of common sharing concepts (Sawkins, 
2001; Cave, 2008; Wright and Cave, 2011; Stern, 2012). Gas and Electricity 
networks carry single product over large distances and affect multiple regional 
and legal jurisdictions. Sharing concepts, such as common carriage, open 
access, and organisational unbundling, play a significant role in regulating 
energy networks (Brunekreeft, 1997; Mogel and Gregg, 2004; Pollitt, 2008; 
Growitsch and Stronzik, 2014). Telecommunication in its modern, converged 
voice and data form delivers a variety of services, requires joint use of physical 
resources to assuage digital hunger and enables shared virtual resources 
(Khan et al., 2011; Zaki et al., 2011; Panchal et al., 2013). Transportation 
represented by railways and roads is often viewed as a supplier of corridors and 
conduits for other utilities and a basis for such sharing concepts as converged 
and superimposed infrastructures (Marvin and Slater, 1997). 
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3.4.2.4 IS drives industry integration 
Convergence of network providers and sharing agreements lead to potential 
industry consolidation. Even though regulators force network industries to 
unbundle and encourage competition, IS creates vertical (value chain) and 
horizontal (cross-industry) integration. Newly formed entities may constitute 
significant market powers with monopolistic characteristics, which will again 
become subjects for regulatory interventions and monopoly constraints. This 
implies the cyclical and spiral development of certain IS concepts. Concepts 
such as common carriage, open access, unbundling and network neutrality 
remain traditional regulatory remedies in network industries. A century ago 
common carriage status from railway industries was imposed on the 
telecommunication industry (Cherry, 2008). Today, it is discussed as part of the 
regulatory reform in the water industry of England and Wales (Cave, 2008; 
Wright and Cave, 2011). Noam (1994) predicted that, with the development of 
alternative conduits to end-user premises and system integration, the common 
carriage concept in telecommunications would erode and evolve into “neural 
interconnection” (a concept presently known as network neutrality). 
 
3.4.2.5 Digital demand drives IS in telecoms 
The majority of SLR papers on telecommunication agree that huge digital 
demand is the key driving force for IS as network operators have to constantly 
increase infrastructure capacity under declining industry profitability (Bartlett 
and Jackson, 2002; Frisanco et al., 2008; Khan et al., 2011). However, not a 
single SLR paper mentioned that with the UN declaring that the Internet was a 
human right in 2011 (United Nations, 2011), the pressure on world governments 
to connect people at virtually any point of the globe will rise. This will reinforce 
IS concepts from the regulatory point of view. Commercial deployment of 
networks is economically viable in highly dense territories. In underserved areas 
operators have to cooperate and share facilities to meet network coverage 
obligations prescribed by the government in licence agreements. 
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3.4.2.6 Scope of SLR studies 
Only one SLR paper, an academic study, was identified which was relevant to 
all three SLR sub-questions. Song et al. (2014) proposed a DM tool for policy 
makers, based on the MCDM method, to regulate IS methods in mobile 
telecommunications. The majority of SLR articles contribute to two sub-
questions, mainly to types of IS and their driving factors (Frisanco et al., 2008; 
Berkers et al., 2010; Offergelt, 2011). Regulatory perspectives on sharing 
models are presented more in studies dedicated to unbundling monopolies. 
Moreover, no studies were identified where monopoly-related sharing concepts 
would be researched along with IS methods from mobile telecoms. Studies on 
DM frameworks are applied to infrastructure development in general but not to 
IS. This implies that a comprehensive academic field on all types of IS in 
infrastructure industries does not exist. Figure 3-4 represents SLR papers which 
are most relevant to the SLR main and sub-questions. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 SLR papers most relevant to review questions 
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3.4.2.7 Key stakeholders in IS 
Key stakeholders who determine IS models are regulators and businesses. By 
mandating IS in monopoly networks, regulators aim at introducing competition, 
enabling innovation and attracting investments in infrastructure development 
(Crandall, 2005; Malmendier and Schendel, 2006; Cave, 2010b). Voluntary 
sharing and MNS models have their roots in business models which pursue 
cost reductions, additional revenue stream, and faster network deployment 
(Khan et al., 2011). End-users of network services are mentioned as key 
stakeholders with the objective of receiving a better quality service at a lower 
price. However, no studies in the SLR explicitly mention end-user preferences 
on IS. Rather, end-users are concerned about general infrastructure availability 
and reliability, less disruption caused by infrastructure deployment (Marvin and 
Slater, 1997), and health, environmental and aesthetic issues (Offergelt, 2011). 
 
3.4.2.8 Determinants outside business vary by industry 
Major external determinants of IS in telecommunication are size of land area, 
number of mobile network operators and pressure to reduce costs (Onishi and 
Tsuna, 2010). In the electricity industry, external forces affecting network 
development are economic supervision through regulation, ageing 
infrastructure, labour and material resources, climate change and reliability 
(Lassila et al., 2009). Climate change as an external factor is also important in 
the water industry (Cave, 2008). In studying a particular topic of success and 
failures of MVNO, Shin and Bartolacci (2007) identify that industry structure, 
specifically a horizontal-layered structure, is the key to the successful 
implementation of a virtual operator. 
 
3.4.2.9 IS does not increase investment in infrastructure 
In prescribing mandatory network sharing, regulators aim at developing 
competition and increasing investments in new infrastructures. Studies show 
controversial results on the effect of mandatory sharing. Crandall (2005) states 
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that a regime of mandatory network sharing is not welfare enhancing. In their 
later work Crandall et al. (2013) show that mandatory network sharing does not 
enable broadband penetration. Cave (2014) reports that unbundling of a local 
loop did not cause an increase in infrastructure investment. Hazlett (2006) 
concludes that a regime of mandatory network sharing does not meet the 
objectives of the US Telecommunication Act of 1996, which led to the 
subsequent abandonment of the Act in 2004. Voluntary MNS does not lead to 
increasing investment in infrastructure, as the whole objective of network 
operators is to reduce capital and operation expenditures related to the network. 
A conclusion can be derived that IS does not increase investment in 
infrastructure. 
 
3.4.2.10 MCDM for infrastructure development 
Findings of the SLR show that MCDM analytic tools are used in formulating 
regulatory policies for infrastructure development. Song et al. (2014) specifically 
use the AHP for assessing IS methods in the mobile telecommunications 
industry of Korea. Other studies include works by Parsons et al. (2014) on 
public Rights-of-Way based on AHP, Karvetski et al. (2009) on assessing 
options for infrastructure development based on MCDM, and Boggia and 
Rocchi (2010) on multipurpose water use based on Stochastic Multi-Criteria 
Acceptability Analysis. The proposed literature on DM suggests that MCDM 
methods are well suited for policy formulation as they allow the incorporation of 
quantitative and qualitative data while selecting alternatives and also consider 
group DM by various stakeholders. 
3.5 Summary 
The conducted review identified findings from diverse sources of academic, 
practical, regulatory and legislative literature, which provided a basis for 
answering the three sub-questions and the main question of the SLR. The study 
of the first review sub-question revealed that infrastructure industries, i.e. water, 
energy, telecommunication and transportation, have common and unique IS 
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methods and principles. Common sharing principles are related to the 
monopolistic origin of utilities. Regulators debate regimes of common carriage, 
unbundling, open access, rights-of-way, and recently net neutrality, to prescribe 
mandatory network sharing to ensure market efficiencies. Unique forms of IS 
are witnessed in mobile telecommunications where businesses consider 
spectrum sharing, MNS, roaming, MVNO, and network virtualisation. Huge 
digital growth creates revolutionary forms of sharing paradigms, such as 
crowdsourced infrastructure. Infrastructure industries become inter-dependent 
and converge, which enables physical superimposing of utility infrastructures 
under, on and above the roads, corridors and ways. 
Review findings related to the second sub-question identified a set of economic, 
business, regulatory, political, geographic, demographic, environmental, social, 
and technological determinants of IS models (see Table 3-8). From a regulatory 
perspective, the major determinants of IS are objectives to develop competition, 
facilitate innovation, attract investments and increase public welfare. From a 
business perspective, achieving cost efficiencies, securing additional revenue 
streams, and expanding network coverage are major drivers of sharing 
initiatives. End-users are demanding omnipresent digital connectivity, expecting 
high quality at lower prices, and becoming more concerned with the 
environmental, health and aesthetic issues of public infrastructures. 
As for the third sub-question, the SLR analysis showed that implementation of 
IS methods in infrastructure industries requires various forms of regulatory 
prescriptions or interventions. Tight connections of utilities and regulations lie in 
the monopolistic nature of utilities, their influence on public good and social 
welfare, and economic importance for national economies. Regulators mandate 
network unbundling and open access to introduce competition, which is viewed 
as a prerequisite for innovation, market efficiency and economy drive. 
Infrastructure industries in general require extensive government licensing and 
network sharing approaches demand consents and technical approvals. New 
infrastructure development requires public rights-of-way. Maintaining existing 
infrastructures calls for coordinated policies to reduce expensive civil works and 
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mitigate public disruption. Spectrum sharing requires government involvement 
in frequency coordination between military, commercial and public use. With the 
increasing demand for network services, the pressure for scarce natural and 
man-made resources will further force regulators to look for synergies between 
interdependent network infrastructures. 
The synthesis of all SLR findings related to the three sub-questions gives the 
answer to the main question of the review. Regulatory decision-making of IS in 
inter-dependent network industries is determined by emerging needs of key 
stakeholders, i.e. businesses, end-users and regulators. Policy makers are 
concerned with increasing a country’s economic output, facilitating market 
efficiencies and effectiveness, promoting competition and innovation, allocating 
scarce resources, and empowering users with better infrastructure capacity. 
Businesses facing declining profitability are aiming to secure additional revenue 
streams, decreasing capital and operation expenditures, ensuring faster 
network deployment and infrastructure regeneration. End-users are interested 
in receiving better network services at lower prices, are concerned with health, 
and the environmental and aesthetic aspects of modern infrastructures, and are 
dependent on modern networks in transforming their professional, social and 
personal life styles. 
The findings of this SLR provide a solid foundation for the next step of the DBA 
studies, i.e. designing a piece of empirical research. 
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4 RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
The main purpose of the research design is to model and plan an empirical 
research with the aim of collecting data for answering the research question, 
developing a clear ontological and philosophical position of the research, 
defining sample selection and data collection forms, planning the execution of 
the empirical research, analysing collected data and disseminating the results. 
 
4.1 Initially Planned Research Methods and Scope 
4.1.1 Decomposition of Previous Version of Research Question 
The initial research design started with the decomposition of the research 
question which was formulated after the SLR phase1: 
“What are the characteristics of a decision-making framework for regulating 
Infrastructure Sharing using a complex systems perspective?” 
Decomposition of this version of the research question suggested that the final 
framework should consist of two research methods: (i) constructing an IS 
ecosystem of all involved stakeholders, e.g. businesses, regulators and users, 
with their corresponding environment using a complex systems approach, and 
(ii) formalising a DM aid for regulators using an MCDM technique. The former 
model was focused on ABM methods whereas the latter model was aimed at 
ANP research techniques. The final deliverable of the research process is a 
prototype of a decision support simulation software tool based on desktop 
research data.  
 
                                            
1
 After conducting the Empirical Project the research question was altered to reflect changes 
derived from communication with Ofcom, the UK telecom regulator. 
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4.1.2 Analysing the Regulatory Field for the Research Phase 
In order to formalise requirements for the proposed decision support software 
tool from potential beneficiaries, representatives of three NRAs were 
approached, i.e. from Kazakhstan, Nigeria and the UK.  
The Kazakhstani regulator confirmed that the topic of IS, particularly 
communication tower sharing and spectrum sharing, was of current interest in 
terms of introducing changes in local telecom legislation. However, the 
Kazakhstani regulator found it difficult to come up with an issue which would be 
solved with the help of the proposed decision support software tool. 
As for the Nigerian telecom regulator, an indirect contact was made and a 
verbal agreement was reached that the Nigerian NRA would consider the 
current research once the agenda for the potential meeting had been clearly 
formalised and officially presented by letter. 
In February 2016, the UK telecom regulator Office of Communications (Ofcom) 
issued a report ‘Making communications work for everyone. Initial conclusions 
from the Strategic Review of Digital Communications’ (Ofcom, 2016) where the 
UK NRA formulated its national strategy for developing Ultrafast broadband 
networks. One of the objectives of the strategy is to promote infrastructure 
based competition and incentivise alternative operators to build their own 
broadband networks by forcing IS related to Duct and Pole Access (DPA) by 
British Telecom/Openreach (BTOR). 
The current research was presented to representatives of Ofcom in May 2016 
who expressed their interest in seeing a software model which would simulate 
development of ultrafast alternative networks in a particular geographic type of 
the UK with the use of two IS methods, i.e. DPA and “bitstream access”. The 
DPA method allows alternative operators to build their own physical 
infrastructure by laying fibre optic cables in BTOR ducts and poles. The 
“bitstream access” does not require building a physical infrastructure by an 
alternative operator and involves wholesale agreement with BTOR to acquire 
digital access to customer premises. 
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4.2 Actual Scope of and Methods for the Empirical Project 
Based on the requirements of Ofcom representatives, the research path was 
designed to reflect the strategic objectives of the UK regulator and focus on two 
particular methods of IS: DPA and “bitstream access”. 
According to Ofcom (2016), one of the strategic objectives in this area of digital 
communications is the large scale deployment of ultrafast networks in the UK 
over the next decade. To facilitate the development of new networks, Ofcom is 
looking at stronger regulatory interventions to provide alternative operators 
access to BTOR underground ducts and overhead poles. By doing so Ofcom is 
concerned with deliberate pricing of BTOR DPA to ensure sufficient investments 
from operators and protection of end-users from excessive prices for new 
services. 
4.2.1 Model Question 
The purpose of the proposed model is to explore the development of the UK’s 
ultrafast next generation networks from a complex system’s perspective. This 
design describes an agent-based model that will examine: 
‘What does it take for a new operator to become competitive in the ultrafast 
services landscape assuming strategies are limited to building own 
infrastructure through BTOR duct and pole access or buying a “bitstream 
access” using existing BTOR networks?’ 
Based on a defined geographical case study, the model will answer the 
following questions: 
 How do Ofcom interventions to regulate BTOR DPA and overall physical 
availability of ducts and poles influence an operator’s decision to build its 
own ultrafast network or buy “bitstream access” from BTOR in a particular 
location in the UK? 
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 What is the optimal price range of broadband services delivered through 
new ultrafast networks which would enable sufficient investments from 
alternative operators and generate sufficient demand by end-users? 
Figure 4-1 represents three main aspects reflected in the model. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Major aspects of the model 
Three main domains are reflected in the model:  
I. Processes for constructing a particular UK city to reflect its demographics 
and demand characteristics of various groups of end-users (residential, 
businesses, telecom traffic). 
II. Processes which affect operators’ decisions to build new networks using 
ducts and poles or buy “bitstream access” from Openreach. The main 
processes are calculating trade-offs of two investment options using the 
classic financial models of NPV, IRR, and payback period. 
III. The third set of processes is related to the physical availability of ducts and 
poles that enable the construction of new ultrafast networks. Based on 
sample data of the availability of ducts and poles in selected cities of the UK, 
the processes of distributing the new infrastructures are modelled. 
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4.2.2 Research Design 
Schematic representation of the research design is exhibited in Figure 4-2.  
 
Figure 4-2 Schematic representation of research design 
After iterative communications with Ofcom representatives, the scope of the 
research was narrowed down to constructing an IS ecosystem only. The 
functionality of formalising a DM aid for regulators using ANP research 
techniques was abandoned as the UK regulator was specifically focusing on the 
modelling of infrastructure scenarios with a limited number of operators in a 
specific market type. The regulator was more interested in seeing the complex 
supply and demand behaviour of all scenarios that could support the DM of the 
regulator to mandate IS in order to create competition, rather than analysing 
decisions suggested by the software tool. That is why the nature of the software 
model changed from ‘decision making’ to ‘decision support’ and the ANP 
functionality was redundant. 
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4.2.3 Why Agent-Based Modelling? 
The ABM approach allows the simulation of individual and collective behaviour 
such as the market strategies of operators, e.g. BTOR and alternative 
infrastructure providers, types of end-user behaviour (early adopters, late 
majority, laggards, etc.), and characteristics of infrastructure/resource elements 
(duct and pole availability and continuity). The ABM approach has advantages 
over statistical methods of simulation as follows. ABM is preferable when there 
are no initially known patterns of behaviour of individual agents and an 
ecosystem as a whole. ABM allows capturing emergent behaviour due to 
interaction between agents and also modelling the outcomes of the ecosystem 
using the goals and objectives of its agents along with characteristics of objects. 
This is achieved as it allows the use of a more limited set of data concerning 
agents’ behaviour and characteristics of objects (e.g. as in Analysys Mason 
ducts research (Analysys Mason, 2009) where the overall sample is less than 
1% of all Openreach infrastructure). 
 
4.2.4 Data Requirements and Data Sources 
The types of data necessary for designing the decision support software tool 
are internal, or desk-based, research data that are used for constructing the IS 
model based on ABM. The majority of internal research data is readily available 
from the SLR.  
During the design phase the research is focused on obtaining data that define 
the structure, functionality and outcomes of the model in accordance with 
Ofcom requirements. The main approach to structuring the model is to construct 
the demand and supply side for broadband services. The data sources used for 
the design are secondary data sources, which describe aspects of broadband 
network topologies, economics, availability of infrastructure elements and actual 
price characteristics from the market.  
The approach and structure of the model was done using the study of Hoernig 
et al. (2010). The data on the economic framework of NGA networks were taken 
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from Analysys Mason (2008) and CSMG (2010). The data on duct and pole 
availability in the UK were derived from studies by Analysys Mason (2009) and 
Analysys Mason (2010) which were used as empirical data from the Ofcom 
website. The exact data for BTOR rates for alternative operators was taken 
from BTOR price lists (British Telecom, 2016). 
4.2.5 Processes Simulated 
The main processes which are simulated in the model under different scenarios 
are: 
i. a construction of ultrafast network by laying fibre cables through existing 
ducts and/or poles of BTOR or 
ii. buying “bitstream access” by alternative operators from BTOR. 
In the model, a new network is built when fibre cable is laid all the way from a 
metro node to customer premises through local exchange and street cabinet. 
Figure 4-3 represents the types of infrastructure links that are used to build 
ultrafast networks. 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Types of ultrafast infrastructure links 
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In this simulation, ultrafast networks are assumed as fibre optic connections 
between operators’ (BTOR or alternative) metro nodes (which are entry points 
to the main backhaul network) and customer premises. From an operator’s 
metro node to a customer’s premises a fibre cable passes the following routes 
(see Table 4-1): 
Table 4-1 Types of Ducts and Poles Routes 
Type 1 Underground duct from a Metro Node to Local Telecom 
Exchange 
Type 2 Underground duct from a Local Telecom Exchange to a 
Street Cabinet (also called Primary Connection Point) 
Type 3 Underground duct from a Metro Node to a Street Cabinet. It 
is sometimes an alternative route to Type1 + Type 2 
connections 
Type 4 Underground final drop from a Street Cabinet to a 
Customer’s Premises 
Type 5 Overhead final drop from a Street Cabinet to a Customer’s 
Premises using Poles 
 
 
In this simulation, a particular ultrafast network connection is complete if at least 
one fibre cable is inserted via existing ducts and poles or through newly built 
ducts and poles using the following combinations of connection types: 
i. Type 1+Type 2+Type 4 (all duct connections) 
ii. Type 1+Type 2+Type 5 (ducts and poles) 
iii. Type 3+Type 4 (all duct connections) 
iv. Type 3+Type 5 (ducts and poles) 
Each combination provides a continuous path connection from a particular user 
to the Metro Node. 
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In terms of buying “bitstream access”, an alternative operator buys from BTOR 
a certain resource (bandwidth) under an agreed price and delivers own services 
using this resource. The price of the service includes price of the infrastructure 
resource. It is assumed in this case that BTOR offers 100% continuous 
availability of infrastructure resources under this scenario. 
 
4.2.6 Design Principles and Assumptions 
While developing the decision support software tool, the design followed 
principles and assumptions that are focused on certain selected aspects of a 
telecommunication market segment and purposely avoided constructing “the 
entire world”. The main concepts of the research design are the following: 
 Since the main focus of the research is on IS, among the wide variety of IS 
methods in telecommunication the current research specifically focused only 
on DPA and “bitstream” access methods in relation to broadband networks 
development. 
 The government sponsored Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK) plans for 
delivering superfast and recently ultrafast broadband are selected as the 
context and test ground. 
 On the demand side it is assumed that Internet subscribers can be users of 
Regular (2Mbps), Superfast (24Mbps or more) and Ultrafast (100Mbps or 
more) broadband. Although the quantitative characteristics for broadband 
speed can vary in telecom industry benchmarking, the proposed broadband 
speed measures are consistent with the BDUK plans. 
 User behaviour is implemented with State charts, a functionality option in 
simulation software that allows representing a certain status of a user. In the 
model it is assumed that a user can be a subscriber (be in a state) of either 
Regular or Superfast or Ultrafast broadband. Transitions between statuses 
are done from the effect of certain triggers (e.g. time, messages, actions, 
conditions, etc.). 
 To describe various consumptions behaviour, types of users are also 
represented as Early Adopters (10%), Advanced Users (20%), Majority 
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(55%) and Conservative (15%). Sensitivity to broadband price fluctuations 
and probability of transitions between states for each user type are different 
and set in the model. Users have contracts for delivering broadband with 
expiration dates. 
 On the supply side, it is assumed that two operators exist in the market. An 
incumbent operator (BTOR) which owns the existing infrastructure and an 
alternative operator that can consider establishing its presence by either 
building new or renting existing networks. 
 Two approaches are available to a potential operator to deliver broadband to 
users, i.e. build a brand new broadband network from scratch (Greenfield 
scenario) or use IS (Brownfield scenarios). Within Brownfield scenarios a 
potential operator can consider building its own physical infrastructure on the 
basis of an existing network using DPA or acquiring wholesale broadband 
capacity from a Greenfield operator. 
 Telecommunication networks consist of core networks, which connect 
operators to each other, and access networks, which link end-users to their 
immediate local operator. The scope of this model is an access network 
consisting of the following four cascading nodes: (1) a Metro Node, where 
backhaul network terminates and access network starts, (2) an Exchange 
Node where traffic from several districts is aggregated, (3) a Street Box 
node where broadband traffic is collected from customer premises, and (4) a 
User Node, a customer’s premises where broadband traffic terminates. 
 Links between nodes are represented as containers (ducts or poles) in the 
model which contain fibre cables. Availability of space for fibre cables inside 
containers is randomised with empirical distribution functions. 
 Infrastructure is built using a tree layout. Users are connected to the closest 
Street Box node, street boxes are connected to a closest Exchange. All 
exchanges are connected to the Metro Node. 
 In case of the Brownfield DPA scenario, only direct continuity from the Metro 
Node to a User is considered without alternative (reservation) paths. In case 
there is no technical possibility to provide an alternative cable to a user, the 
user remains a subscriber of the existing Greenfield (BTOR) infrastructure. 
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 Users can upgrade to Superfast or Ultrafast state only if an appropriate 
infrastructure is in place. It is assumed that the dynamics of demand for 
ultrafast broadband services copy the demand patterns of superfast 
broadband services. 
 Economic characteristics of Greenfield and Brownfield scenarios in the 
model are represented as capital expenditures (CAPEX) and operating 
expenditures (OPEX). 
 The CAPEX items for the Greenfield scenario are: 
 Costs of overlaying ducts (poles) with fibre inside including installation 
and civil works. 
 Costs of equipment in exchanges 
 Costs of street cabinets with inside elements included 
 Costs of indoor fibre cabling at customer premises and connecting 
fees for each user 
 Costs of customer premises equipment (CPE) 
 In the Brownfield DPA scenario it is assumed that an alternative operator 
builds own network and spends Capex on CPEs, equipment in exchanges, 
indoor cabling, and fibre cables. The difference in the Brownfield DPA 
scenario is that instead of building own ducts and poles, an alternative 
operator pays rent fees for layering own cable inside the ducts and over the 
poles. The same logic applies for placing own equipment inside Street Box, 
Exchange and Metro nodes. The alternative operator does not build nodes 
but rents space inside existing nodes and places own electronic equipment. 
 In the case of the Brownfield “Bitstream” scenario, an alternative operator 
incurs costs for placing own CPE equipment for own subscribers, wholesale 
rent costs and costs for placing own equipment at BTOR exchanges. The 
“Bitstream” scenario costs are calculated for 20 years to make it comparable 
with CAPEX models. 
 OPEX is calculated as a rate per user per year starting from the next year 
after the infrastructure is built in the case of Greenfield and Brownfield DPA 
scenarios. 
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4.2.7 Agent Types 
Agents in the model are entities which have individual and group behaviour, 
pursue certain goals and objectives, and make decisions. A class of agents are 
operators who compete in the market delivering ultrafast broadband services. In 
the context of ultrafast networks, in a particular city of UK a typical set of 
operators consists of the incumbent BTOR, major cable provider, existing 
providers of Fibre-To-The premises (FTTx) technology, and new alternative 
operators wishing to roll out their services. 
Openreach is an infrastructure arm of British Telecom. Since Openreach does 
not sell voice and broadband services directly to end-users, it is not considered 
as an operator by customers. However, Openreach is an operator for operators. 
In the case of incumbent telecommunication services, BT is the operator using 
Openreach’s infrastructure. In this model BT and Openreach are treated as one 
operator with incumbent infrastructure and presented as BTOR. 
Another group of agents are end-users who consume ultrafast broadband 
services. In this model types of end-users are residential users and business 
users. Other telecom operators being competitors on the retail broadband 
market can also be customers of each other. Operators use own and others’ 
new ultrafast networks for transmitting aggregated amounts of digital traffic 
through their backhaul networks. 
The following section describes each agent type in terms of its goals, strategies 
and interactions. 
 
4.2.7.1 Type 1: Operators 
Goals 
Operators as business entities have common goals to maximise their economic 
metrics, e.g. maximise revenues, profits, product portfolio, market share, etc. In 
terms of their infrastructure, operators with existing networks (BTOR with 
copper networks, existing Cable and FTTx providers) have goals to utilise 
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existing physical assets at their maximum and avoid expensive upgrades. New 
alternative operators have goals to establish a quick presence in the market by 
either building their own networks or renting infrastructure facilities from existing 
operators. 
Strategy 
Existing operators, i.e. BTOR, cable, FTTx providers, adopt strategies for 
maintaining and increasing their market positions using competitive pricing, 
preserving leading positions in the market, bundling broadband with other digital 
services, etc. BTOR is subject to regulatory compliance but has a strategy of 
maintaining its incumbent status using competitive or pseudo-competitive 
practices (for example, BTOR can exercise anti-competitive practices which are 
not explicitly regulated or stated in legislation). 
Other operators have strategies to pursue their business objectives (aggressive 
growth, conservative development, niche playing, etc.) using accumulation of 
customer base, offering unique services and flexible pricing. New alternative 
operators have strategies which allow them to establish quick geographical 
presence in the short run and earn quick and substantial returns on their initial 
investment, building new digital branding, aggressive marketing, targeting 
specific market segments and/or specific needs, etc. 
A decision by an operator to shift from service-based competition to 
infrastructure-based competition and thus to build its own physical network is 
done to maximise business objectives. This could not be demanded by 
regulatory objectives. In order to force a strategy to build their own networks, 
regulators must implement a combination of mandatory interventions and 
market incentives for alternative operators. 
Strategy of BTOR 
BTOR is an incumbent operator which provides broadband and voice services 
to 30 million customers in the UK. In terms of existing superfast broadband 
services, it has an objective to cover 95% of UK premises by the end of 2017. 
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Twenty five million homes and businesses are already covered by superfast 
services with 28,000 added each week. 
In terms of ultrafast networks, BTOR has an objective to cover 10 million 
premises by the end of 2020. Currently, BTOR works with several service 
providers in conducting trials of ultrafast technology in Bradford (Fibre-to-the 
Premises with 1Gb/sec), rural areas of Campton and Meppershall villages in 
Bedfordshire, and in Haydon Wick. In Swansea BTOR plans to offer free 
ultrafast services to its customers for 6 months. 
The rollout strategy is to use its existing infrastructure as much as possible. 
Fibre is laid to the closest street cabinet. New fibre cables are placed 
underground in ducts or on the poles. The final drop for fibre uses existing lines. 
In the case of a copper final drop, BTOR uses G.Fast technology. 
In general, the overall roll out strategy of ultrafast networks is a planned 
upgrade of its existing networks. With its objective to cover 10 million premises 
by the end of 2020 it is assumed that BTOR will upgrade 33% of its existing 
clientele in the time period 2016-2020. 
Strategy of cable and FTTx providers 
Cable providers in the UK are Virgin Media, BT, Sky, TalkTalk, Plusnet and 
John Lewis. Virgin Media offers TV, broadband and phone packages and 
bundles while the others offer cable broadband and calls but not TV. In terms of 
fibre broadband, Virgin Media can offer superfast broadband services (100 
MB/sec), whereas Sky, Plusnet, TalkTalk, and John Lewis offer standard 
broadband. 
In a particular UK city all or some cable providers can be present. 
As for the availability of fibre networks, BTOR and Virgin Media have the 
strategy of significant market presence nationwide. 
Cityfibre has a strategy to cover certain UK cities with local fibre infrastructure. 
TalkTalk is also fragmented and present in York. The city of Hull is served by 
KCOM which has significant market power over BTOR. 
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Sky has announced its strategy not to build its own ultrafast network. Sky 
continues its strategy to buy infrastructure capacity from BTOR. It will continue 
focusing on delivering TV content and premium sport. 
In general, there are two types of strategies for cable and FTTx providers in 
relation to ultrafast networks. Those operators that have their own physical 
cable and fibre infrastructure (i.e. Virgin Media, Cityfibre, TalkTalk, KCOM) will 
continue to gradually expand their network coverage. Virgin Media will grow 
nationwide. Cityfibre will use a strategy of fragmented presence. The second 
strategy of buying infrastructure capacity from BTOR will be undertaken by 
those operators that compete more on services (e.g. Sky). 
In the model, a typical ecosystem of operators available in a certain UK city 
consists of the incumbent BTOR, Virgin Media with smaller geographical 
presence but the strategy of catching up with own fibre infrastructure, and two-
three operators which deliver their own services through the networks of BTOR 
through local loop unbundling, bitstream access and line sharing. 
 
Strategy of new alternative operators 
New alternative operators in the model are those that decide to expand into 
ultrafast services. They are not necessarily completely new legal entities. These 
can be operators that are already present in the market and willing to grow. 
Operators that have their own physical infrastructure (Virgin Media, Cityfibre, 
TalkTalk) or specialise in delivering digital content (Sky) consider strategies of 
expanding their geographical presence using BTOR infrastructure. 
Although a combination of building own using DPA and using “bitstream” from 
BTOR can occur in reality, in this model a typical new operator can exercise two 
alternative strategies, either build its own infrastructure using DPA or deliver 
services while buying “bitstream access”. The decision about which strategy to 
implement is dependent on economic and strategic objectives. 
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Interaction 
All agents in this model, i.e. operators and end-users, interact with and among 
each other. 
 While competing for end-users, operators offer their services to all types of 
customers through advertising and direct contact. It is assumed that 80% of 
residential end-users are contacted via advertising and 20% by direct 
contact. In the case of business users, 50% are contacted via advertising 
and 50% by direct sales force. The differences in behaviour between 
residential and business users must be reflected in different state charts for 
each group of users. In the state chart for users, the transition from potential 
user of ultrafast services to consumer should be triggered by messages, 
either through advertising or direct contact. 
 Alternative operators interact with BTOR and other incumbents when they 
want to use an incumbent’s infrastructure to build their own network (DPA) 
or deliver their own services (“bitstream access”). 
 Operators interact with each other if one operator buys transit services from 
another operator. In the model, all alternative operators, i.e. cable, FTTx and 
new operators, negotiate with Openreach to use its infrastructure for transit 
services. Once a new broadband network is complete, its operator sells 
transit services to others. 
 Agents also interact with infrastructure. Operators build and use 
infrastructure to deliver their digital services. End-users subscribe to these 
services by establishing a physical connection to the infrastructure using 
terminal equipment. 
 
4.2.7.2 Type 2: End-users 
Goals 
End-users of ultrafast broadband networks want to receive better services at 
lower prices. With regard to new services, end-users are to decide if the value 
of ultrafast new services is worth paying a premium over existing services. In 
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this model types of end-users are residential, business and operators’ transit 
users. 
In this model, a better service is a faster broadband. The ability of ultrafast 
broadband to consistently deliver promised speed characteristics defines the 
quality of the service. For example, a goal of a particular end-user, either 
residential or business, can be to shift from 38 Mb/sec to 100 Mb/sec or 200 
Mb/sec to utilise more digital content. 
Different groups of users will make decisions to shift to ultrafast networks under 
the following assumptions: 
 5% of existing broadband users are considered “bandwidth hungry” and 
ready to shift immediately to ultrafast network paying a premium price over 
the existing broadband plan. 
 15% of existing users will shift to ultrafast under premium prices over a two 
year period. 
 60% of existing users will shift once the price of ultrafast services drops to 
the price level of superfast services or lower. 
 20% of users will remain under their current tariff plans. 
 
Strategy 
The strategy of all types of end-users is reflected in their intention to maximise 
utilitarian value of new services at lower prices. As for residential users using 
ultrafast networks, the assumed strategy for 60% of them is to pay the same 
tariff they paid for superfast networks if the scope of services is not changed 
(e.g. same content but at higher speed). The rationale for this assumption is to 
reflect the market situation when expectations of users drive service providers 
to offer more services for the same price to stimulate loyalty and preserve 
customer base. Twenty percent of residential users are considered to be 
bandwidth hungry users ready to pay premium rates at the beginning (e.g. 
gamers). Within 3-5 years end-users are expected to pay a premium for 
ultrafast networks once they receive new services (3D content, augmented 
reality). 
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The adoption rate of ultrafast services can be modelled using the adoption 
characteristics of superfast services presented in Figure 4-4 (Analysys Mason, 
2015). According to Analysys Mason (2015), superfast fixed broadband take-up 
was 30% in 2015 and 23.2% in 2014. Assuming that the massive roll out of 
ultrafast broadband started in 2017, the 30% coverage by ultrafast broadband 
can be achieved within 1-2 years. This projection is faster than in the case of 
superfast services due to several factors. Rate of adoption of ultrafast services 
can be higher as users are aware of superfast services. For infrastructure 
developers, upgrading from existing superfast to ultrafast networks can be 
faster than building a brand new infrastructure. Laggards of superfast services 
can jump directly to the ultrafast offering. 
 
Figure 4-4 Adoption of superfast services in 5 of the EU countries (Analysys 
Mason, 2015) 
Business users are gradually adopting new ultrafast services. Within 3-5 years 
after a new speed of network is available, all business users shift to new 
services. 
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Smaller operators with fragmented networks use the infrastructure of BTOR and 
other big operators to transit digital traffic. The contracts for transit between 
operators are signed separately under pre-agreed commercial agreements. 
 
Interaction 
Residential and business end-users interact with operators and among each 
other. To subscribe to new services or amend existing contracts, end-users 
communicate with operators via the Internet or directly at points of presence 
(e.g. retail stores). End-users also describe the services they use to each other 
via word of mouth or other channels, such as Facebook or email. In order for 
operators to sign a contract to deliver transit traffic of one operator through the 
infrastructure of another operator, both operators need to interact and negotiate 
directly. 
 
4.2.8 Resources 
Resources in this model are supplies of network infrastructure elements which 
are used by operators to deliver ultrafast services to end-users. In this model 
only the following infrastructure resources are considered  
 ducts – underground channels which contain one or several fibre cables 
 poles – overhead elements which deliver fibre or copper cables from a 
street cabinet to customer premises 
 fibre cables – a medium which delivers broadband services to end-users. 
 
4.2.8.1 Ducts and Poles 
Ducts are entities with characteristics which represent availability of space for 
inserting new fibre cables of a certain type, e.g. one cable of 25 mm. Various 
types may have different space availability (Type 1 may have space for two 25 
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mm cables whereas the Type 2 on the same path may not have available 
space).  
Poles are entities which have similar characteristic to ducts, e.g. available 
space and ability to carry fibre or copper cables of a certain type. Poles are 
used only from a street cabinet to customer premises. 
A combination of connection types, e.g. Type 1+Type 2+Type 5, have 
characteristics of path continuity, i.e. an ability to form a continuous cable path 
from a metro node to customer premises. For example, although each Type 1 
or Type 2 or Type 5 may have available space for at least one fibre cable of 25 
mm, it may not be possible to form a continuous cable link because of pinch 
points somewhere on the route. 
 
Duct availability on Exchange side (Type 1, Type 2, Type 3) 
In the duct analysis of Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 by Analysys Mason (2009) 
conducted for 11 cities in the UK the following ducts characteristics are 
mentioned: 
 22% of all duct ends (all Type 1-3) are full and do not have space for 
additional cables 
 78% of all duct ends have space for at least one 25 mm cable (14% 
space availability) 
 51% of all duct ends have space for three 25 mm cables (42% space 
availability) 
 26% of all duct ends are empty (100% space availability) 
However, duct space availability does not directly correspond to space usability, 
i.e. an opportunity to install new cables as it can be impossible due to pinch 
points along the routes, congestion in chambers and reservations by 
Openreach. In order to analyse the risk of potential pinch points or blockages 
along the routes from a metro node to a street cabinet, 14 Type 3 routes were 
also surveyed for route continuity.  
Of all 14 routes 
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 46.4% of route sections had two or more empty ducts in a chamber wall. 
 17.1% of route sections had one empty duct end and one duct end that 
can accommodate three or more sub-ducts, or three or more duct ends 
that can accommodate three or more sub-ducts. 
 36.4% of route sections had conditions which are not covered by the 
previous two descriptions. 
The route continuity suggests that usable space is not uniformly distributed 
along the routes and that civil works will be needed in certain sections to lay 
down cables. 
The above mentioned data will be used for modelling a base scenario of 
ultrafast networks development in a generic UK region. 
 
Duct availability on Distribution side (Type 4 and Type 5) 
In the duct and pole analysis of Type 4 and Type 5 by Analysys Mason (2010) 
conducted for seven cities in the UK, the following duct and pole characteristics 
are mentioned: 
 63% of the 90 mm duct ends surveyed have at least 42% of unoccupied 
space 
 97% of the 50 mm duct ends surveyed have at least 42% of unoccupied 
space 
 
In the analysis of spare capacity on poles, the unused capacity in the overhead 
infrastructure that delivers the last drop to end customers is as follows: 
 85% of the poles surveyed could accommodate at least one additional 
dropwire. 
 63% of the poles surveyed could accommodate at least double the 
amount of wires currently installed. 
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 58% of dwellings are served by a pole that can accommodate at least 
one additional dropwire for every dwelling served by the pole without 
modifying the existing pole infrastructure. 
 25% of the dwellings are served by a pole that can accommodate at least 
two additional dropwires for all dwellings served by the pole. 
 
DPA: Agents’ interaction 
In this model, if an alternative operator makes a decision to build its own 
network, the duct and pole availability has to be considered to simulate the 
process of building and costs of a newly erected infrastructure. BTOR has to 
provide DPA under regulated prices. New cables inserted in ducts and poles 
are resources which represent an output of the model, a section of the new 
ultrafast network. In this model it is assumed that new cables that are inserted 
in addition to existing cables do not alter, e.g. damage, replace, characteristics 
of the existing wiring. 
 
4.2.8.2 Fibre and Copper Cables 
Fibre and copper cables are resources which are used to deliver ultrafast 
services to customer premises. If an operator decides to build its own network, 
the operator is in full control of the cables (price, maintenance). If the operator 
decides to buy “bitstream access” from BTOR, i.e. to lease part of the capacity 
of existing cables, then the operator pays a certain amount for the access 
(which will be a premium compared to the build option) and includes this cost in 
the price of ultrafast services delivered to customer premises.  
 
4.2.9 Environment and Rules 
In this model, operators’ decisions to build their own ultrafast networks or to buy 
access are assumed to be rational business decisions, i.e. decisions to utilise 
demand, justify investments to cover the demand, minimise costs of building 
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infrastructure and maximise profit. Operators exist in a global environment 
which is represented by economic factors necessary to calculate Net Present 
Value (NPV), e.g. consumer demand, interest rates, etc. 
The model will represent a simulation of telecommunications in a certain 
geographical location. Prior to running the simulation, the model user must be 
able to set initial conditions for the model’s location. It is to be done by changing 
initial variables, i.e. size of population, density of population, territory occupied, 
number of residential users, and number of business users. Exogenous factors 
such as global recession are not taken into account in the model. 
 
4.2.9.1 Emergence 
The emergent behaviour in this model is observed in the global and UK trends 
of continuous shift to Next Generation Network broadband access. In the UK 
the transition from superfast to ultrafast networks has an objective to contribute 
to the country’s overall development and boost Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
On the level of a particular city, the availability of ultrafast networks decreases 
dependence on BTOR and increases competition, increases investments in 
infrastructure and overall city economy, and facilitates demand for “heavy” 
digital content.  
 
4.2.9.2 Adaptation 
Alternative operators in this model are able to adapt to changes while laying 
fibre cable in the virtual city. Prior to building its infrastructure, operators have 
general information on duct availability and route continuity. The exact 
information on whether there are additional spaces in the existing ducts or pinch 
points in the route appear on the spot, i.e. at the time of construction. In such 
situations, operators must be able to make a decision whether to use an 
alternative route or to build their own duct on a particular route type. This 
adaptation suggests the development of new skills for the operator which could 
 108 
lead to selling their own infrastructure leasing contracts, i.e. there is a new 
feedback loop which creates competition for BTOR. 
 
4.2.9.3 Objectives 
The main objective of an alternative operator is to make a rational investment 
decision while building a new ultrafast network. The alternative operator must 
undertake a strategic decision on whether a new network is economically 
viable. And if it is, what is the most rational way to implement it, i.e. to build its 
own infrastructure elements or buy access to those of BTOR? 
While laying fibre cable, an objective of an operator is to optimise cable routing 
in terms of minimising costs and distance. Technical information on duct 
availability and route continuity of existing BTOR ducts and poles are not fully 
available. Therefore, operators have to make agile decisions using very limited 
knowledge. 
The main objective of end-users is to receive broadband services over the new 
ultrafast networks at acceptable price levels. 
 
4.2.9.4 Learning 
While laying new cable and exploring actual technical availability of ducts and 
poles and routes continuity, operators can learn from previous experience. In 
the model, several iterations of the Brownfield scenario can provide estimates of 
DPA availability and contribute to operators’ decisions on infrastructure 
investments. 
 
4.2.9.5 Prediction 
A prediction about whether end-users adopt new ultrafast services is based on 
the assumption that end-users aim at maximising utility function, i.e. satisfy 
certain needs or receive better services. 
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4.2.9.6 Sensing 
Operators and end-users are sensitive to their environment. Both operators and 
end-users are sensitive to global economic factors which affect the income of 
end-users and investments of operators. End-users are also sensitive if other 
users have adopted new ultrafast broadband services. 
 
4.2.9.7 Interaction 
Residential users interact with each other directly as they gradually become 
aware of new public services via advertising and word of mouth. In relation to 
corporate services from the new ultrafast networks, business users gain most 
information from advertising and less from communicating with each other. 
In order to model/introduce the effect of social networks on the adoption of 
ultrafast services, a Word-Of-Mouth transition will be used in the State charts for 
end-users. This transition indicates sharing of information among users, i.e. 
experienced users send messages that are received by other. 
While building new networks, alternative operators interact with BTOR if they 
are to build infrastructure with BTOR DPA. Once services are sold using the 
new infrastructure, all operators interact with each other to cross sell transit 
services. 
 
4.2.9.8 Stochasticity 
Stochastic data on duct availability and route continuity should be entered 
manually at model run initiation. The demand for new services and the new 
services adoption rate can be parameterised at model set-up. 
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4.2.9.9 Collectives 
End-users of ultrafast network services can be aggregated as Early Adopters, 
Advanced Users, Majority and Conservative. Routes are aggregated according 
to their types (Table 4-1). Infrastructure supply is aggregated according to 
simulation scenarios, i.e. Greenfield, Brownfield DPA and Bitstream. 
 
4.2.9.10 Observation 
Visual representation of the model’s output can be shown in the run window 
with the following graphs and charts: 
 Network coverage by operator (scenario). 
 Infrastructure investments by network, by operator. 
 Revenue generated from newly built networks by residential, business, 
operators’ transit clients. 
 Comparison of options: cost of building own infrastructure elements 
versus renting those of Openreach. 
 
4.2.10 Scales 
Since Ofcom sets objectives for ultrafast broadband networks for the time 
period of 10 years starting from 2016-2017, the simulation should run for 10 
years with monthly time increments. Monthly time increments are the units of 
granularity taken to simulate and monitor observable dynamics of user take-up 
of broadband services and infrastructure development on a more detailed level. 
In order to compare the “bitstream model” (OPEX model) with Greenfield and 
Brownfield DPA scenarios (CAPEX model), a time span of 20 years was 
selected in the model. 
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4.2.11 Initialisation 
The initialisation of the model variables includes populating the virtual market 
with the given number of potential subscribers. All subscribers at the start-up 
are assumed to be users of Regular, i.e. neither Superfast nor Ultrafast, 
broadband. Users are also differentiated by different consumption behaviour. 
Also, the points for placing Street Boxes and Exchanges are defined prior to 
running infrastructure scenarios. 
 
4.3 Impact Plan 
The definition of the impact on economy and society is taken based on 
requirements by the Research Council United Kingdom (RCUK), i.e. impact 
aimed at improving economic performance, increasing effectiveness of public 
services, and enhancing quality of life and work of individuals. 
Types of impact from current research is viewed through the lenses of the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and differentiated as (i) 
instrumental, (ii) conceptual and (iii) capacity building effects. The instrumental 
dimension measures how research influences the provision of policy or 
execution of a practice, implementation of strategy or change in behaviour. The 
conceptual dimension is concerned with contributing to the understanding of 
policy or practice issues, rethinking a paradigm/debate, or questioning a notion. 
The capacity building thread evaluates the development of personal skills 
during research. 
The Impact Plan (IP) considers four main areas of the research, i.e. 
Engagement, Dissemination, Exploitation and Evaluation of impact. The 
‘Engagement’ area explains how the researcher identifies potential beneficiaries 
and users of the research, roles of those individuals in shaping the study, and 
means to approach and collect data from them. The area of ‘Dissemination’ is 
concerned with the approaches to distribute and popularise research ideas and 
outcomes among involved communities. ‘Exploitation’ is looking at converting 
research outcomes into practical instruments, e.g. software, tools, 
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methodologies and guidelines, etc. ‘Evaluation of impact’ specifies and 
measures the range of actual/potential impacts resulting from the research. The 
following sections explain each of the IP areas in more detail. 
 
4.3.1 Engagement 
The SLR identified major stakeholders affected by the phenomenon of IS, e.g. 
regulators, businesses and users. The primary beneficiaries of this research are 
global telecom regulators, as current research aims to address the needs of 
NRAs to implement IS policies for a particular country. Various stakeholders 
can play different roles in the current research process. Depending on the 
research phase, potential users and beneficiaries can act as (i) co-producers of 
intellectual content and ideas, (ii) implementers of the research outcomes in the 
practical field, (iii) evaluators of research results, and (iv) facilitators of 
dissemination and exploitation of research findings. 
 
4.3.1.1 Engagement with Regulators 
To reach the targeted audience of global regulators, the engagement strategy 
for this research will follow three main directions, i.e. (i) focused national, (ii) 
regional, and (iii) global. The focused national direction is the first engagement 
path where the research is focused on communication with the regulators from 
the UK and Kazakhstan. 
The regional engagement direction targets regulators from the former Soviet 
Union countries. The author of the research works for an incumbent operator in 
Kazakhstan which also presides on the Board of Operators (BO) of the 
Regional Commonwealth in the field of Communications (RCC) and takes part 
in the work of the Council of Regulating Authorities (CRA). The CRA consists of 
heads of telecommunication regulatory bodies from 12 member countries and 
four observer countries. A verbal agreement with the Chairman of the Executive 
Committee of the BO has been reached to introduce the current research 
objectives to the members of the RCC. 
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The global engagement direction targets individuals from the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), an information and communication arm of the 
UN which is in charge of standardisation of telecommunication technologies, 
global allocation of radio frequencies and satellite orbits, also for advising global 
telecom regulators by means of organising an annual Global Symposium for 
Regulators (GSR). A formal letter to the head of ITU, Mr. Zhao Houlin, is to be 
sent with the objective of introducing the research and to seek his assistance in 
promoting it within GSR. 
 
4.3.1.2 Businesses 
Another group of stakeholders potentially affected by this research is 
businesses. This group consists of various companies working in the area of 
developing, erecting, supplying and using telecommunication infrastructures. 
These are primarily mobile and wireline telecom operators but also 
infrastructure asset management companies (tower and mast companies, etc.), 
suppliers of active and passive telecommunication equipment, and other public 
utilities. The main sampling strategy to engage with individuals from this group 
is working through professional communities and organisations. 
 
4.3.1.3 Professional community 
Targeted individuals from the professional community are consultants and 
researchers who are involved in providing professional and academic services 
related to telecom infrastructures. Through personal and professional 
networking the author of the research has access to telecom consultants from 
the companies PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, Boston 
Consulting Group, and McKinsey&Company. The outcomes of the research will 
be introduced to academicians and researchers through participation in 
academic conferences. 
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4.3.1.4 Users 
The SLR findings revealed that end-users of telecommunication services are 
among the major determinants of modern infrastructure practices. In formulating 
IS policies, it is vital to receive input from the general public. The targeted 
audience of end-users of telecom services can be reached through social 
networks, user associations and user groups. 
 
4.3.1.5 Testimonies 
An effort will be made to collect three letters of testimonies from a diverse circle 
of evaluators, i.e. a policy maker/regulator, a telecom operator, and a 
representative of a user group or the general public, to obtain feedback on the 
DM framework for IS from different perspectives. The effort will pursue a global 
reach and, if possible, focus on internationally leading organisations and 
companies. 
 
4.3.2 Dissemination 
In order to distribute the project outcomes to a wider audience of professionals, 
the dissemination strategy for this research is formulated to follow three main 
delivery chains. The first chain is a direct communication with the end-users of 
this research, i.e. regulators and operators. Testing and obtaining feedback on 
the decision support framework from a world’s leading regulator, e.g. Ofcom, 
raises interest in the research from a wider community.  
The second delivery chain is working with the intermediaries that have the 
ability to spread out knowledge to a focused yet wider targeted audience. Based 
on the outcomes of the SLR an extended abstract on current research has been 
prepared with the plan to submit it to four and three star professional journals, 
e.g. IEEE Communications. The content of the publication will contain results of 
the conducted SLR and information on the further research design. The content 
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for the publication can be summarised in a presentation and tested at 
practitioners’ events, e.g. conferences, round tables, and seminars. 
The third knowledge delivery chain is working with the social networks. The 
subject of IS is likely to interest specialised professional communities. Over the 
course of the empirical project, specialised network groups will be identified on 
LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc. dedicated to the topic of telecom 
infrastructure development. 
 
4.3.3 Exploitation 
By sponsoring this doctoral study Kazakhtelecom is expecting to exploit 
outcomes of the research in its strategic and operational activities. One of the 
strategic objectives is to influence regulatory legislations and policies in 
Kazakhstan related to IS. At the moment policies on various forms of IS exist 
but do not provide clear rules and guides for telecom operators. The outcomes 
of the research can be presented to the NRA in Kazakhstan and used as the 
methodological basis for tailoring explicit regulatory rules and guides for IS. 
The outcomes of the research can be utilised as an educational tool for 
academic courses or short-term professional seminars. In this case, the 
research outcomes can be represented as a training course with appropriate 
syllabus, lecture materials and software practical tools on ABM. The course can 
be run on behalf of a university or a consulting firm. 
 
4.3.4 Evaluation of Impact 
The main approach in evaluating the impact from the Decision Support (DS) 
software framework is to assess IS policies undertaken with the help of the 
research outcomes. The assessment can be done on different levels, i.e. 
organisations, economy, society and individuals, with the use of metrics 
appropriate for each level and group of beneficiaries.  
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Table 4-2 summarises the evaluation metrics on different levels and groups of 
beneficiaries.  
Table 4-2 Metrics of Research Impact on Different Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries of 
the Research 
Evaluation Metrics of Impact from Implementation of the DS 
framework 
Organisations For NRAs 
 # of countries where NRA tested the DS framework 
 # of countries where DS framework was implemented 
 organisational undertakings caused by the research (# of 
working groups, internal projects, new organisational units, 
new regulatory documents) 
 avoidance of financial costs (savings on consultancy and 
research) 
For Businesses 
 # of new geographical markets and points of presence 
 # of users required through DS framework implementation 
 # of new services delivered through IS decisions 
 value of additional revenue streams  
 avoidance of CAPEX and OPEX regarding new telecoms 
components (cost savings) 
 % performance improvement due to new equipment designed 
for IS as a result of DS framework implementation 
Economy  businesses more efficient due to decrease in duplication of 
network investment, reducing CAPEX and OPEX 
 improved social inclusion as business is incentivised to roll out 
networks in underserved areas 
 more businesses making use of infrastructure’s improved 
quality of service 
 increased consumer choices and accessibility to 
telecommunications services 
 improved competition due to reduction in wholesale and retail 
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prices 
 optimisation of scarce national resources, such as land or 
spectrum 
 positive environmental impacts due to more effective resource 
utilisation 
 product and technological innovation, attracting international 
business  
Society Metrics of Internet Penetration and Digitalisation 
 increased Internet coverage caused by IS and DS framework 
 # of new Internet users 
 additional volume of traffic 
 changes in quality of services (# of failures) 
 changes in pricing the telecom services 
 environmental, health and aesthetic gains measured by 
infrastructure NOT installed (avoided) 
 savings on nation’s scarce sources (land, underground 
networks, spectrum) 
Individuals Satisfaction from Infrastructure measured by 
 availability, security, environmental friendliness, impact on 
health, aesthetic look 
Metrics of individual enriched lives 
 ability to work from home and avoided physical mobility costs 
and wasted time 
 increased use of infotainment and growth of knowledge  
 personal and family development potential 
 new career opportunities for users of the DS framework 
 further academic research for academicians 
 new skills acquired while testing the DS framework 
 entrepreneurial work from commercialised DS products 
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4.3.5 Barriers to Impact 
For the successful implementation of the Impact Plan it is vital to understand the 
potential barriers to engagement and dissemination of project outcomes. The 
first group of barriers relates to insufficient preparation of research material 
(descriptions, presentations, letters, questionnaires, interview protocols, etc.) to 
be distributed to recipients. Improper preparation may lead to lost opportunities 
to engage with the users. The second type of barriers is related to the selection 
of the correct channels to approach users of the research. Certain 
engagements may require personal recommendations from third parties 
whereas for others direct contacts will be appropriate. Thirdly, the topic of IS 
may not be on demand by certain target groups, which may create a risk of low 
response rate to research inquiries and the canvassing of others to further 
reduce. Another potential barrier is the DS framework itself, which, on the basis 
of ABM, may appear too complicated for the end-users. This may lead to low 
dissemination rate of research outcomes. Addressing these and other latent 
barriers is essential for successful research impact generation. 
 
4.3.6 Summary of Impact Plan 
This section presented the Research Impact Plan for targeted audiences and 
explained the approaches for engagement with practice. Potential beneficiaries 
and users of the research, i.e. regulators, businesses, professional community 
and users, were identified. For each group the following were determined: 
contributions of roles, e.g. co-producers of intellectual content, implementers of 
research outcomes, evaluators of research outcomes, and facilitators of 
dissemination and exploitation; engagement strategies, communication 
channels; and means to record the output of engagement. 
Three main delivery chains for dissemination strategy were formulated, i.e. 
direct communication with the end-users, working with the intermediaries and 
connecting with professional communities over social networks. Engagement 
and dissemination initiatives were formalised and structured on national 
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(country focused), regional (CIS focused) and global (ITU focused) levels. The 
exploitation strategy to convert research findings into potential software and 
consultancy products, tools and instruments, guides and rules was described. 
Impact evaluation of the DS framework as the final deliverable of the doctoral 
research on regulatory practices on IS was discussed as well as telecom 
operations for infrastructure development and profit maximisation, and the 
supply of telecom equipment and services. The section also considered the 
evaluation of the research impact on the economy, society and individuals. 
Metrics of research impact for each affected group were suggested. For 
successful impact generation, four groups of potential barriers to impact 
distribution were identified. 
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5 SOFTWARE MODEL: ACTUAL CONFIGURATION AND 
DESCRIPTION 
This chapter describes the actual configuration of the decision support software 
tool. The information on the electronic copy of the final model deliverable is 
presented in 13Appendix G, ‘Electronic Version of Simulation Model’. 
 
5.1 Demand 
Demand in the model is represented by ‘Users’ agents. The common 
characteristics of the Type of Agent ‘User’ are described in the tab ‘User’ where 
the state chart of User behaviour and its general parameters are summarised. 
Agent type ‘User’ also inherits certain parameters of the Agent Type ‘Network 
Node’ for simulation purposes as the agent ‘User’ is also viewed as part (node) 
of the infrastructure where the network terminates. The population of agent 
‘users’ and their graphical representation are given in the Tab ‘Main’ (Figure 
5-1) where simulation of the whole system is taking place.  
 
Figure 5-1 ‘Main’ Tab in AnyLogic 
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5.1.1 Agent User: State Chart 
Behaviour of agents in AnyLogic software package is defined by state charts. 
An agent can be in a certain state which represents a particular status or 
situation. In the model, the Agent User can be a subscriber of Regular, 
Superfast or Ultrafast broadband. Changes between statuses are executed by 
transition arrows. Figure 5-2 represents the State chart of the Agent ‘User’. 
 
Figure 5-2 State Chart of the Agent ‘User’ 
All User agents at the start-up of the model can be distributed between different 
states, meaning that users can become users of any broadband depending on 
their preferences and availability of appropriate infrastructure. These conditions 
are checked in the upper diamond block along with the expiration of the contract 
date. 
In the software model it is assumed that all users by default become 
subscribers of Regular broadband, i.e. they are forced along the dashed 
transition line to the state “Regular”. Since the major focus of this simulation is 
development of Superfast and Ultrafast broadband with the help of IS, the 
model assumes that users without Internet are not present in the market or their 
quantity is insignificant. 
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5.1.2 Transitions to Different States 
Agents can move to states ‘Superfast’ or ‘Ultrafast’ in two cases, which are 
represented by two transition arrows, (i) a transition with the ‘envelope’ sign 
means that user agents receive a message that broadband infrastructure is 
available, and (ii) a transition with ‘exponential’ sign means that certain 
subgroups within the major agent group users can upgrade to Superfast or 
Ultrafast broadband if infrastructure is available and certain price conditions for 
each user subgroup are in place. For example, Early Adopters can switch to 
Superfast broadband if price per month for Superfast is less than 40 GBP and a 
probability of transition meets the condition (5-1): 
 
          
             
   
        
      
 
where 
(5-1) 
          
             
 Probability of an Early Adopter agent moving to 
Superfast broadband follows uniform distribution 
       Price of Superfast broadband per user per month, 
GBP 
Table 5-1 summarises conditions of transitions from Regular to Superfast 
broadband for all types of users. 
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Table 5-1 Conditions of Transitions from Regular to Superfast Broadband 
Type of User Transition Conditions 
Early Adopter IF (            ) AND (             
        
      
) 
Advanced User IF (            ) AND (             
         
      
) 
Majority IF (            ) AND (             
        
      
) 
Conservative IF (            ) AND (             
         
      
) 
where          Price of Superfast broadband per user per month 
            Probability of transition from Regular to Superfast 
follows uniform distribution 
Similarly, the transition from Superfast to Ultrafast state for user agents can be 
controlled if the condition ‘Ultrafast Available’ is checked and price conditions 
for various subgroups of users are met. For example, the subgroup Majority can 
switch to Ultrafast broadband if price per month for Ultrafast is less than 30 
GBP and a probability of transition meets the condition (5-2): 
          
        
   
        
      
 
where 
(5-2) 
          
        
 Probability of moving to Ultrafast state for a Majority 
user follows uniform distribution 
       Price of Ultrafast broadband per user per month, 
GBP 
Table 5-2 summarises conditions of transitions from Superfast to Ultrafast 
broadband for all types of users. 
  
 124 
Table 5-2 Conditions of Transitions from Superfast to Ultrafast Broadband 
Type of User Transition Conditions 
Early Adopter IF (            ) AND (             
        
      
) 
Advanced User IF (            ) AND (             
        
      
) 
Majority IF (            ) AND (             
        
      
) 
Conservative IF (            ) AND (             
        
      
) 
where         Price of Ultrafast broadband per user per month 
            Probability of transition from Superfast to Ultrafast 
follows uniform distribution 
Prices in denominators in formulae are variables which can be changed in the 
model with sliders to reflect an inverse relationship between the price of a 
service and the probability of shifting to this service. 
 
5.1.3 List of Parameters for Agent Type ‘User’ 
In addition to its State Chart, behaviour and actions of the Agent Type ‘User’ is 
also defined by software settings. These are parameters, variables, functions, 
dimensions, distributions, and option lists. Table 5-3 contains a list of settings 
with descriptions for Agent Type ‘User’. 
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Table 5-3 Settings for Agent Type ‘User’ 
Own settings in the Tab ‘User’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
type Parameter / 
User 
Differentiate user agents according to 
option list UserBehavior (EarlyAdopter, 
AdvancedUser, Majority, Conservative) 
toState Parameter /User Integer value which represents an agent 
state (0 – Regular, 1 – Superfast, 2 – 
Ultrafast) 
contractExpires Parameter /User Contract expiration date 
cpe Variable / User Linked List which stores data on CPE 
installed by scenario (Greenfield vs. 
Brownfield) 
indoorFibreWired Variable / User A Boolean indicator to check if indoor fibre 
cabling is completed 
yearWhenConnected Variable / User Contains year when a user is connected to 
broadband 
connect Function / User Connects CPE to a user and stores the 
year of connection 
remove Function / User Removes CPE from a user 
noOfCpeByOwner Function / User Calculates number of CPEs by Greenfield 
or Brownfield scenario at user location 
noOfCpeByOwner Function / User Counts CPEs installed in or before the 
'year' and owned by 'owner' 
UserBehavior Option List Defines names of user subgroups 
UserType Dimensions Defines dimensions for user subgroups, 
i.e. 1 – Regular, 2 – Superfast, 3 - Ultrafast 
 
Settings inherited from Agent Type ‘Network Node’ 
Item Type /Tab Description 
location Parameter / 
NetworkNode 
Defines location of a User 
upstream Variable/ 
NetworkNode 
A Linked List with info on containers (duct 
or poles) to upstream (incoming) nodes 
downstream Variable/ 
NetworkNode 
A Linked List with info on containers (duct 
or poles) to downstream (outgoing) nodes 
addUpstream Function/ 
NetworkNode 
A function that adds info on upstream 
containers to upstream Linked List 
addDownstream Function/ 
NetworkNode 
A function that adds info on downstream 
containers to downstream Linked List 
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getNearestNode Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Gets nearest node to this node from the 
collection of nodes passed as an argument 
getPointLocation Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Returns gets location of a node (User) 
pathToNode Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Finds continuous path (in nodes) to the 
node provided. Only works in the upstream 
direction. 
edgePathToNode Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Finds continuous path (in containers) to the 
node provided. Only works in the upstream 
direction. 
 
Settings for Agent Type ‘User’ in the simulation Tab ‘Main’ 
userDistribution Custom 
Distribution / 
Main 
Defines custom distribution for types of 
User Behaviour 
users [ ] Population of 
agents / Main 
Population of agents of the agent type 
‘User’. Initially empty. 
userPopulation Variable / Main Contains total number of users 
plantUsers Function / Main Adds users to the model. Quantity is 
defined in userPopulation 
NUsers [ ] Parameter / 
Main 
A Hyper Array that contains number of 
users by their states (Regular, Superfast, 
Ultrafast) 
nUserTypes Parameter / 
Main 
Defines number of User Types. Initial value 
= 3 (Regular, Superfast, Ultrafast) 
 
The following chapter describes model functionality for the Supply side. 
 
5.2 Supply 
The supply side of the model is represented by Infrastructure and Operators. 
Infrastructure is a telecommunication network, which consists of network nodes 
connected by duct or pole routes. Network nodes in the model are Metro Node, 
an Exchange, a Street Box, and a User premises. In simulation these nodes are 
connected by containers which represent a duct or a pole with fibre cable 
inside. Depending on probability, containers have space availability for laying 
additional fibre cable. 
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Operators are agents that aim at developing a broadband network using three 
main scenarios: 
 Greenfield scenario when an incumbent operator builds a brand new 
infrastructure from scratch; 
 Brownfield DPA scenario when an alternative operator builds a new 
network on the basis of the Greenfield network using DPA; 
 Brownfield ‘bitstream’ scenario when an alternative operator 
purchases (rents) wholesale fibre capacity from the Greenfield 
operator to deliver own content. 
Figure 5-3 provides graphical representation of telecommunication network in 
AnyLogic. 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Broadband network representation in AnyLogic 
Section 5.2.1 describes implemented functionality in network nodes. Section 
5.2.2 provides description of links between nodes (containers with cables). 
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Section 5.2.3 explains representation of incumbent and alternative operators in 
the model. 
 
5.2.1 Network Nodes 
5.2.1.1 Agent Type ‘NetworkNode’ 
General parameters of telecommunication nodes are configured in Agent type 
‘NetworkNode’ from which other nodes inherit common characteristics. Table 
5-4 provides description of parameters for the Agent Type ‘NetworkNode’. 
Table 5-4 Settings for Agent Type ‘NetworkNode’ 
Item Type /Tab Description 
location Parameter / 
NetworkNode 
Defines location of a Node 
upstream Variable/ 
NetworkNode 
A Linked List with info on containers (duct 
or poles) to upstream (incoming) nodes 
downstream Variable/ 
NetworkNode 
A Linked List with info on containers (duct 
or poles) to downstream (outgoing) nodes 
addUpstream Function/ 
NetworkNode 
A function that adds info on upstream 
containers to upstream Linked List 
addDownstream Function/ 
NetworkNode 
A function that adds info on downstream 
containers to downstream Linked List 
getNearestNode Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Gets nearest node to this node from the 
collection of nodes passed as an argument 
getPointLocation Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Returns location of a node (User) 
pathToNode Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Finds continuous path (in nodes) to the 
node provided. Only works in the upstream 
direction. 
edgePathToNode Function/ 
NetworkNode 
Finds continuous path (in containers) to the 
node provided. Only works in the upstream 
direction. 
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5.2.1.2 Agent Type ‘MetroNode’ 
Metro Node is a point in telecommunication infrastructure where traffic from 
users is passed from the access network to the backhaul major network. In this 
simulation, the Metro Node is the starting node, which shares the general 
characteristics of the Agent Type ‘NetworkNode’. The Metro Node is described 
in the Tab ‘MetroNode” and represented as a single agent ‘metroNode’ in the 
presentation Tab ‘Main’. 
 
5.2.1.3 Agent Type ‘ExchangeNode’ 
Exchange Node is a point in telecommunication infrastructure where Internet 
traffic from several districts is aggregated. In this simulation, the Exchange 
Node is the second node on the way to User premises. The Tab 
‘ExchangeNode’ contains shared characteristics from the Agent Type 
‘NetworkNode’, whereas population of exchangeNodes[..] is presented in the 
Tab ‘Main’. The size of the population exchangeNodes[..] is defined by the 
number of nodes in the polygonal shape ‘home’ (blue dashed shape in Figure 
5-3) The purpose of the polygonal shape is to provide flexibility in changing the 
number of exchanges and their locations. 
 
5.2.1.4 Agent Type ‘StreetBox’ 
Street Box is a point in telecommunication infrastructure where broadband 
traffic is collected from customer premises. In this simulation, the ‘Street Box’ is 
the third node on the way to User premises. The Tab ‘StreetBox’ contains 
shared characteristics from the Agent Type ‘NetworkNode’ whereas population 
of streetBoxes[..] is presented in the Tab ‘Main’. The size of the population 
streetBoxes [..] is defined by number of nodes in the polygonal shape 
‘streetBoxesPoints’ (yellow dotted shape in Figure 5-3). The purpose of the 
polygonal shape is the same as in the case of exchanges, i.e. to provide 
flexibility in changing the size and locations of street boxes. 
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5.2.1.5 Agent Type ‘User’ 
In this section, the agent type ‘User’ is viewed as a network node. The complete 
description of the ‘User’ is presented in Section 5.1 ‘Demand’. 
 
5.2.2 Infrastructure Links 
Links are infrastructure routes between network nodes. In this simulation, 
infrastructure links are represented as containers (either duct or pole) which 
carry fibre cables inside. The common characteristics of infrastructure links are 
described in Tab ‘NetworkEdge’, whereas individual parameters of containers 
and cables are presented in Tabs ‘Container’ and ‘Cable’. 
5.2.2.1 Agent Type ‘NetworkEdge’ 
The common parameters of infrastructure links are presented for Agent Type 
‘NetworkEdge’ in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5 Settings for Agent Type ‘NetworkEdge’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
Source Parameter 
‘Network Node’ / 
NetworkEdge 
Source of a network edge (a link between 
nodes) 
Destination Parameter 
‘Network Node’ / 
NetworkEdge 
Destination of a network edge (a link 
between nodes) 
 
5.2.2.2 Agent Type ‘Container’ 
Agent Type ‘Container’ can be either a duct or a pole. Since Agent ‘Container’ 
carries fibre cables inside, population of agent cables[..] of the Agent Type 
‘Cable’ are defined in the Tab ‘Container’. Table 5-6 represents settings for 
Agent Type ‘Container’ 
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Table 5-6 Settings for Agent Type ‘Container’ 
Settings inherited from Agent Type ‘NetworkEdge’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
Source Parameter 
‘Network Node’ / 
NetworkEdge 
Source of a network edge (a link 
between nodes) 
Destination Parameter 
‘Network Node’ / 
NetworkEdge 
Destination of a network edge (a link 
between nodes) 
 
Own settings in the Tab ‘Container’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
type Parameter / 
Container 
Differentiates between poles and ducts 
agents according to option list 
‘ContainerType’ 
max_cables Parameter / 
Container 
Number of cables inside a container. 
Randomised by uniform discrete 
distribution (1, 2, 3) 
cables[..] Population / 
Container 
Population of agents ‘Cable’ 
length Variable / 
Container 
Length of a container in model units 
owner Variable / 
Container 
Type ‘Operator’, indicates owner of a 
cable (‘greenfield’ or ‘brownfield’)  
init Function / 
Container 
Connects container between two nodes, 
measures length in model units. 
add_cable Function / 
Container 
Adds cable inside container 
noOfCablesByOwner Function / 
Container 
Calculates and returns number of cables 
by certain owner (Greenfield or 
Brownfield) inside a container 
addSource Function / 
Container 
Adds Source of a container while 
defining continuity from a User to Metro 
Node 
addDestination Function / 
Container 
Adds Destination of a container while 
defining continuity from a User to Metro 
Node 
getCablesByOwner Function / 
Container 
Returns number of cables by a certain 
operator 
addCableIfNotPresent Function / 
Container 
Adds cable by operator (e.g. ‘brownfield’) 
inside container only if this cable is not 
present 
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Settings for Agent Type ‘Container’ in the simulation Tab ‘Main’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
containers[..] Population / 
Main 
Population of agents ‘Container’ 
addContainerAndCable Function / Main Adds container (duct or pole) between 
two nodes and adds cable inside 
belonging to either Greenfield or 
Brownfield operator. Changes colour of 
containers according to the number of 
cables in them. 
getContainersByOwner Function / Main Returns number of containers by owner 
 
5.2.2.3 Agent Type ‘Cable’ 
Agent Type ‘Cable’ is an agent with common characteristics of Agent Type 
‘Network Edge’. Agent ‘Cables’ goes inside Container. Therefore, population of 
agent cables[..] is defined in the Tab ‘Container’. Table 5-7 represents settings 
for Agent Type ‘Cable’. 
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Table 5-7 Settings for Agent Type ‘Cable’ 
Settings inherited from Agent Type ‘NetworkEdge’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
Source Parameter 
‘Network Node’ / 
NetworkEdge 
Source of a network edge (a link 
between nodes) 
Destination Parameter 
‘Network Node’ / 
NetworkEdge 
Destination of a network edge (a link 
between nodes) 
 
Own settings in the Tab ‘Cable’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
ownedBy Parameter / 
Cable 
Differentiates between owners of a cable 
(Greenfield or Brownfield) 
length Variable / Cable Length of a cable 
Settings from the Tab ‘Container’ 
cables[..] Population / 
Container 
Population of agents ‘Cable’ 
Settings from the Tab ‘Main’ 
addContainerAndCable Function / Main Adds container (duct or pole) between 
two nodes and adds cable inside 
belonging to either Greenfield or 
Brownfield operator. Changes colour of 
containers according to the number of 
cables in them. 
getCablesByOwner Function / Main Returns number of cables by owner 
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5.2.2.4 General Parameters for Infrastructure 
Table 5-8 explains the general settings for the infrastructure defined in the Tab 
‘Main’. 
Table 5-8 General Settings for Infrastructure 
Item Type / Tab Description 
greenField Function / Main Builds and calculates economics of 
Greenfield infrastructure 
brownDPA Function / Main Builds and calculates economics of 
Brownfield DPA infrastructure 
brownBitstream Function / Main Builds and calculates economics of 
Bitstream infrastructure 
PriceBB[..] Variable / Main Array List with Prices for Regular, 
Superfast and Ultrafast broadband 
SpeedBB[..] Variable / Main Array List with Speed for Regular, 
Superfast and Ultrafast broadband 
UltrafastAvailable Variable / Main A Boolean check mark if Ultrafast 
infrastructure is available 
costmodel Parameter / 
Main 
Initiates Java Class ‘CostModel’. 
 
5.2.3 Operators 
Unlike Agent Type ‘User’ whose behaviour is described by State Charts, in this 
simulation Agent Type ‘Operator’ is represented as owner of the infrastructure. 
 
5.2.3.1 Settings for Agent Type ‘Operator’ 
The Tab ‘Operator’ does not contain specific settings but refers to three 
populations of agents in the Tab ‘Main’, i.e. greenfield, brownfield, and 
bitstream (Table 5-9). Each population consists of one agent.  
  
 135 
Table 5-9 Settings for Agent Type ‘Operator’ 
Settings for Agent Type ‘Operator’ 
Item Type / Tab Description 
greenfield Single agent / 
Main 
Represents an operator who owns 
Greenfield infrastructure 
brownfield Single agent / 
Main 
Represents an operator who owns 
Brownfield DPA infrastructure 
bitstream Single agent / 
Main 
Represents an operator who owns 
Bitstream infrastructure 
General Settings for ‘Operator’ and general infrastructure 
addContainerAndCable Function / Main Adds container (duct or pole) between 
two nodes and adds cable inside 
belonging to either Greenfield or 
Brownfield operator. Changes colour of 
containers according to the number of 
cables in them. 
greenField Function / Main Builds and calculates economics of 
Greenfield infrastructure 
brownDPA Function / Main Builds and calculates economics of 
Brownfield DPA infrastructure 
brownBitstream Function / Main Builds and calculates economics of 
Bitstream infrastructure 
costmodel Parameter / 
Main 
Initiates Java Class ‘CostModel’. 
EndOfYear Periodic Event / 
Main 
Indicates end of year and initiates 
calculation of Opex for this year 
 
Customised Java Classes for Greenfield, Brownfield DPA, and Bitstream 
scenarios 
CostModel Java Class Contains library of customised Java 
methods to support calculation of 
economic model 
CPE Java Class Constructor initialising the fields to 
assign operator as an owner of CPE 
installed and Year of CPE installation 
 
The Java Class ‘CostModel’ contains customised Java Methods which were 
developed to construct economic models for Greenfield, Brownfield and 
Bitstream scenarios. The following section summarises the economic 
framework for the software tool. 
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5.2.4 Economic framework 
For constructing economic framework in all scenarios, “The cost of deploying 
fibre-based next-generation broadband infrastructure, the final report for the 
Broadband Stakeholder Group, Ref: 12726-371” by Analysys Mason (2008) 
was taken as a basis. The economic approach was also supplemented by 
CSMG (2010) and (Hoernig et al., 2010). Based on the data from these 
sources, the CostModel Java Class was developed in which all economic 
calculations and data are summarised.   
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Table 5-10 provides description of data constants used in calculations of the 
costs for all three scenarios. Table 5-11 provides the list of methods. 
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Table 5-10 Constants Used in Java Class ‘CostModel’ 
Constant Description 
distanceRate = 200 Adjusts model distance to "real" distance in metres for 
containers 
ductRate = 30 Cost for new build, fibre per metre (duct, fibre, and 
installation costs) 
fibreRateDPA = 16 Cost for Brownfield duct build, fibre per metre, GBP 8 fibre 
+ GBP 8 installation costs 
ductRent = 0.6 Cost of renting ducts, GBP per metre per year, from 
Openreach price list (BDUK terms) 
poleRent  = 0.22 Cost of renting poles, GBP 8.85 per pole divided by 40 
metres, i.e. distance between poles, per single user 
poleRate = 0.6 New build of poles, fibre per metre (pole, fibre, and 
installation costs), GBP 24 per pole divided by 40 metres, 
i.e. distance between poles 
poleRateDPA = 16 Costs of deploying fibre in DPA, fibre per metre, GBP 8 
fibre + GBP 8 installation costs 
userConnectFee = 100 One time fee to connect each user inside premises 
cpeRate = 80 CPE equipment costs, broadband only, no voice 
indoorsFibreRate = 
2000 
Costs of indoor fibre cabling, one time fee, multi premises 
dwelling 
exchangeOLT = 57600 Costs of Optical Line Termination equipment, 1 : 32 ports : 
32 lines 
exchangeODF = 5000 Costs of Optical Distribution Frame, 1 : 1440 fibres 
exchangeFibreCost = 
20 
Cost per connecting each fibre cable inside an Exchange 
exchangeRent = 40 Collocation rent at Exchange, per year 
splitterPrice = 70 Costs of a splitter 1:8 
streetBoxPrice = 
13500 
Costs of an empty Street Box 
streetBoxRent = 20 Costs of renting space in a Street Box 
opexRateGreen = 35 Annual Opex rate per User Greenfield 
opexRateDPA = 25 Annual Opex rate per User Brownfield DPA 
bitstreamRate = 30 Operator monthly rent for Bitstream per user 
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Table 5-11 Methods Used in Java Class ‘CostModel’ 
Method Description 
toRealDistance Converts model distance to real distance 
priceDuctPole Returns price of a stretch of duct or pole 
priceAllContainers Calculates all container costs for Greenfield scenario 
priceDuctPoleRent Returns price of a stretch for Brownfield scenario with 
DPA, i.e. duct or pole is rented 
priceContainersDPA Calculates all container costs for Brownfield scenario DPA 
priceAllCPE Calculates all CPE costs 
priceCpeGreen Calculates all CPE costs for Greenfield scenario 
priceCpeBrown Calculates all costs of CPEs for Brownfield scenario DPA 
priceCpe Calculates all CPE costs for any scenario 
rentAllBitstream Calculates all monthly Bitstream rent costs for all users 
priceIndoorFibre Calculates all indoor fibre wiring costs 
priceConnectUserGreen Calculates costs of connecting users inside a premises for 
Greenfield 
priceConnectUserBrown Calculates costs of connecting users inside a premises for 
Brownfield 
priceStreetCabinetDPA Calculates costs of Street Box Equipment with DPA 
priceStreetCabinet Calculates costs of Street Box Equipment 
priceExchangesGreen Calculates costs of Exchange Equipment for Greenfield 
scenario 
priceExchanges Calculates costs of Exchange Equipment for Brownfield 
scenario 
numOfSplitters Calculates number of Splitters (1:8) ratio equipment in 
Street Boxes and Distribution Points combined 
numOfODF Calculates number of Optical Distribution Frames (1:1440) 
equipment in Exchanges 
numOfOLT Calculates number of Optical Line Terminals (1:32:32) 
equipment in Exchanges 
priceExchangesDPA Calculates costs of Exchange Equipment for Brownfield 
DPA scenario 
priceExchangesBitstream Calculates costs of Exchange Equipment for Bitstream 
scenario. 
noOfConnectedUsers Calculates number of connected users in any scenario 
(Greenfield or Brownfield) 
annualOpexGreen Calculates all Opex costs per year for Greenfield scenario 
annualOpexDPA Calculates all Opex costs per year for Brownfield scenario 
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5.2.4.1 Economics of Greenfield scenario 
Using Java methods and constants from the Java Class ‘CostModel’ the 
following costs are calculated for the Greenfield scenario: 
Capex 
 Costs of building ducts and poles with fibre cables. Include installation and 
civil works 
 Costs of equipment at Exchanges (Optical Distribution Frames (ODFs) and 
Optical Line Terminals (OLTs)) 
 Costs of Street Boxes with equipment installed (splitters) 
 Costs of indoor fibre cabling 
 Costs of CPEs including connecting fees 
Opex 
Opex are calculated as a rate per user per year multiplied by number of users. 
Annual Opex costs are incurred starting from the next year after the 
infrastructure is complete. 
5.2.4.2 Economics of Brownfield DPA scenario 
Using Java methods and constants from the Java Class ‘CostModel’ the 
following costs are calculated for the Brownfield DPA scenario: 
Capex 
 Costs of renting ducts and poles from incumbent and costs of laying new 
fibre cables where possible. Include installation and civil works 
 Costs of renting place at Exchanges with equipment installed (ODFs and 
OLTs) 
 Costs of renting place at Street Boxes with equipment installed (splitters) 
 Costs of indoor fibre cabling 
 Costs of CPEs including connecting fees 
 
 141 
Opex 
Opex are calculated as a rate per user per year multiplied by number of users. 
Annual Opex costs are incurred starting from the next year after the 
infrastructure is complete. 
 
5.2.4.3 Economics of Bitstream scenario 
Using Java methods and constants from the Java Class ‘CostModel’ the 
following costs are calculated for the Bitstream scenario: 
 Costs of CPEs installed at customer premises. 
 Costs of Equipment installed at Exchange of an incumbent operator with 
rent costs. 
 Costs of renting fibre cable to customers’ premises (wholesale purchase 
from incumbent) calculated for 20 years. This model time of 20 years is 
selected as this span corresponds to an average life time of fibre and 
corresponding electronic equipment installed in network nodes. This is also 
selected to conduct a relative analysis of CAPEX and OPEX infrastructure 
scenarios. 
 
5.3 Outcomes: Visualisation 
The model outcomes are available in two forms. The first form is a graphical 
representation in the presentation window. In the software prototype, the 
following graphics are available: 
 Number of users of Regular broadband 
 Number of users of Superfast broadband 
 Number of users of Regular broadband 
 Total number of users in all states 
 Broadband speed 
 Capex items for Container costs  
 Capex items for CPE and Fibre Cabling 
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Figure 5-4 provides an example of the visual representation of model outcomes 
where changes in user dynamics are shown on three graphs, along with the 
infrastructure built by the model. Figure 5-5 demonstrates the dynamics of users 
in different states and infrastructure Capex and Opex costs over time. 
 
Figure 5-4 Model representation: infrastructure and user dynamics 
 
Figure 5-5 Model Representation: user dynamics and costs 
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5.4 Basis for Establishing Rigour, Reliability and Validity 
The overall research process in general and creating the decision support 
software tool in particular followed a number of standardised frameworks, 
methodologies and approaches to establish the rigorous, reliable and valid 
execution of the current research. 
The research outcomes are the logical extension of steps defined in the DBA 
Handbook by Cranfield University School of Management (SOM). The 
requirements for and methodology of the DBA deliverables stated in the DBA 
Handbook constitute the main rigour of the overall research path. 
The process of creating the decision support software tool followed the 
Overview, Design concepts and Details (ODD) protocol (Grimm et al., 2010), a 
specific methodology for creating ABM models. The main purpose of the ODD 
protocol is to provide the description of an ABM model to ensure rigorous and 
reproducible results. The ODD methodology was also summarised in a 
separate external document which was presented to representatives of Ofcom, 
a stakeholder that formulated the main requirements for the model. 
To ensure that the proposed model reflects a real life business problem and to 
minimise researcher bias and subjectivity, the decision support software tool 
was discussed with Ofcom on an iterative basis. From the Ofcom side three 
main individuals formulated specific requirements for the proposed ABM model: 
 Principal of Strategy and Policy, Ofcom 
 Competition Policy Director, Ofcom 
 Principal Economist, Ofcom 
Development of the model was undertaken using a commercial software 
package AnyLogic 7 University edition. The AnyLogic package is a Java 
programming language-based development software which utilises three main 
modelling approaches, i.e. ABM, System Dynamics and Discrete Event 
simulation. The main advantage of the package is the ability to use a multi 
method approach to modelling and extensive libraries of reusable Java 
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standard methods and procedures. The standardised yet flexible modelling 
approach in AnyLogic software ensures replicable results of the research. 
The process of creating the software tool on a day-to-day basis followed a 
SCRUM-like Agile methodology. This is an iterative and incremental framework 
that is used in software development and other areas to ensure a flexible 
approach to delivering results. The functionality of the model was summarised 
in a “wish list”. The main principle of the agile approach is to ensure that the 
model works within the given scope of functionality after implementation of 
every step from the “wish list”. 
A number of data sources were used in the software development. In addition to 
the literature which was reviewed over the course of the PS and SLR, the 
following sources provided quantitative data for duct and pole space availability 
and continuity, cost models and items for building infrastructures for Greenfield 
and Brownfield scenarios, and prices for infrastructure elements and works. 
 
 Analysys Mason (2008) 
 Analysys Mason (2009) 
 Analysys Mason (2010) 
 British Telecom (2016) 
 CSMG (2010) 
 Hoernig et al. (2010) 
These sources are primarily consulting reports prepared for Ofcom and other 
telecom companies with respect to IS and are available in the public domain. 
Since the EP focused primarily on the UK market, most of the data from the 
open sources sufficiently describe the UK infrastructure (BTOR). 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 Analysis Methods Embedded in the Prototype 
The empirical project is a quantitative research study which uses a combination 
of numerical and visual data analysis. All the numerical data on user demand, 
types of user subgroups and their take-up of broadband services, Capex and 
Opex cost characteristics on the infrastructure supply side, are visualised in 
graphical form for analysis (charts in presentation window). Also, the 
presentation window provides visualisation of network coverage using tree 
topology for Greenfield, Brownfield DPA and Bitstream scenarios (Figure 6-1). 
 
Figure 6-1 Visualisation Analysis for Three Scenarios 
Along with visualisation, numerical data analysis is available in the prototype. 
The numerical data produced by the model are parsed using programming tools 
into the AnyLogic console environment. The scope and format of output 
numerical results are customisable to enable aggregated and/or detailed data 
analysis of infrastructure costs, route availability and continuity, infrastructure 
elements, user characteristics, etc. Figure 6-2 provides an example of data 
analysis in the AnyLogic console. 
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Figure 6-2 Numerical Output Data in the AnyLogic Console 
Every model run generates two types of data for analysis: constant and random. 
The results for costs of equipment in Exchanges, Street Cabinets, Indoor 
Cabling and CPEs are the same every time the model is run as these 
calculations use exact number of users and known ratios with predefined 
constants. The fibre overbuild costs have embedded randomness as every 
model iteration distributes users randomly leading to different lengths between 
users and street boxes every time. Moreover, DPA availability and continuity is 
also randomly defined in the model iteration run, which leads to different 
outcomes in the Brownfield scenario. Running the model tens of times can 
generate sets of data on fibre overbuild costs, which can be used further for 
statistical analysis with a confidence level about the output variables. 
At the prototyping phase, comparative analysis of infrastructure scenarios is 
possible in terms of total costs of building each option (Greenfield, Brownfield, 
Bitstream). With further development of the demand side at the calibrating 
phase, e.g. revenue and profits generated by operators in different scenarios, a 
comparative analysis of relative economic performance of the operators can be 
conducted. 
Randomness is also included in the rates of transitions from Regular to 
Superfast and Superfast to Ultrafast states for different subgroups of Users 
which can be used for time analysis. The growth of Superfast and Ultrafast in 
relation to price changes can be analysed over time using multiple iterations. 
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6.2 Model Outcomes 
This section describes the results which are generated by the decision support 
software tool developed during the EP. 
6.2.1 Initialising Demand 
Before the model start-up, the size of the broadband market is set up in variable 
userPopulation. It is done by changing the field ‘Initial value’ in the Properties 
window of the variable userPopulation in the tab ‘Main’. Upon model start-up the 
market is populated with the users by pressing the check box 1. plant 
greenfield users. Iterations were run with different values for user population to 
evaluate performance of the model. A value of 500 users was selected for 
reporting as this population provides a good graphical representation of 
simulation scenarios (Figure 6-3). 
 
Figure 6-3 Model Results: Simulating Demand 
In this simulation, all users are distributed randomly over a rectangular territory 
and all initially assigned to the state user of ‘Regular’ broadband. Within the 
main population users are further distinguished by types (Majority, Early 
Adopters, Advanced and Conservative) in accordance with custom distribution 
defined in the program settings. 
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In the prototype, the demand for broadband services specifically means the 
demand for infrastructure availability. Users are viewed as customer premises 
where the broadband network terminates. The sum of users represents a fixed 
demand which is assumed to be static and not changing with the time. The 
functionality of delivering various bandwidths to users over different 
infrastructures is not realised in the prototype. 
6.2.2 Building Infrastructure: Greenfield 
The Greenfield scenario is initiated when the checkbox 2. greenFieldNew is 
pressed. Upon this action the following results are obtained: 
 Exchanges and Street Boxes are placed in given places (points of polygonal 
shapes) 
 Containers are built to connect Exchanges with the Metro Node 
 All Street Boxes check minimal distance to the closest Exchange and 
connect with a duct container 
 All Users check minimal distance to the closest Street Box and connect with 
a container. The type of a container in the final drop (either duct or pole) is 
defined by the formulae 7-1. If condition 7-1 is not satisfied then a duct 
container is built in the final drop. 
                    
where 
(6-1) 
              Probability of a pole container following uniform distribution 
to represent an assumption that poles are built in 20% of 
final drops. 
 When a container is built it is created with cables inside. The number of 
cables follows uniform discrete distribution (1, 3) to represent an assumption 
that it is equally likely to have 1, 2 or 3 cables inside a container (duct or 
pole) 
 Visual representation of the Greenfield infrastructure is created (Figure 6-4). 
In the final drop between a Street Box and a User duct containers are 
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represented by solid and pole containers by dotted lines. Different shades of 
grey represent the number of cables inside, i.e. darker colour corresponds to 
fewer cables. 
 
Figure 6-4 Greenfield Infrastructure: Superfast Available 
 
 By changing prices for Superfast broadband using the slider on the model 
interface, Users move from Regular to Superfast state. Various types of 
users transit to Superfast with different rates. 
 By pressing the checkbox 5. Rollout Ultrafast and changing prices for 
Ultrafast broadband using the slider, Users move from Superfast to Ultrafast 
state. Various users transit to Ultrafast with different rates (Figure 6-5). 
  
 150 
 
Figure 6-5 Greenfield Infrastructure: Ultrafast Available 
 
1. When the Greenfield scenario is run, the CAPEX and OPEX costs of the 
Greenfield infrastructure are displayed in the console (Figure 6-6) and 
graphics (Figure 6-7). 
 
Figure 6-6 Costs of Greenfield: Numeric Representation 
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Figure 6-7 Costs of Greenfield: Graphic Representation 
 
The charts in Figure 6-7 visually represent CAPEX and OPEX costs with flat 
values over time as the costs of building infrastructure are calculated in the 
model once, upon model start-up. OPEX costs are calculated starting in the 
following year after the main infrastructure is built. Graphics are interrupted in 
the 50th month of the simulation as this was the time the screen shot was taken 
(values remain flat over the length of the simulation). 
 
6.2.3 Building Infrastructure: Brownfield 
Building the Brownfield scenario is executed by checking the Checkbox 
3.brownFieldDPA during the model run. This action calls for methods which 
check the availability for additional cables insides containers, define path 
continuity from a user to Metro Node, install cables in case it is possible, 
calculate economics of the whole Brownfield infrastructure and visually 
represent the Brownfield infrastructure in brown colour (Figure 6-8). 
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Figure 6-8 Model Results: Brownfield Infrastructure 
6.2.3.1 Checking Availability in Ducts and Poles 
Availability in ducts and poles is defined by parameter max_cables which is an 
attribute of a container. In the model, when a container is built in the Greenfield 
scenario each container is created with cables inside. The number of cables 
follows uniform discrete distribution (1, 3). In other words, each container 
includes 1, 2 or 3 fibre cables inside. If the parameter max_cables = 1 then the 
appropriate container does not have free space for laying addition cable. In 
Figure 6-9 each container is shown with its own value of the parameter 
max_cables. The highlighted segment in Figure 6-9 indicates that:  
 User 2 is connected to Street Box 10 with Container 20 which has only 
one fibre cable inside. No more additional cable is possible. 
 Street Box 10 is connected to Exchange Node 1 with Container 16 which 
has two cables inside. Laying additional cable is possible. 
 Exchange Node 1 is connected to Metro Node with Container 1 which 
has three cables inside. Laying additional cable is possible. 
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 Since Containers 16 and 1 allow laying one more additional cable inside 
but Container 20 does not, the whole path continuity between User 2 and 
Metro Node does not exist (indicated with ‘false’). 
6.2.3.2 Checking Continuity 
During execution of the Brownfield DPA scenario, the model checks path 
continuity from any user to Metro Node and prints out the results for each user 
in the AnyLogic console screen. The path continuity is a list of all nodes and all 
containers between a user and Metro Node. The highlighted rows in Figure 6-9 
represent the results of continuity checking for User [2].  
 
Figure 6-9 Model Results: Checking Path Continuity 
Broadband by an incumbent operator is delivered to User [2] from the Metro 
Node through Exchange [1] and Street Box [10] using Containers [20], [16] and 
[1]. The results show that in Container [20] the maximum number of fibre cables 
is one (max_cables = 1) which indicates that this cable belongs to the 
incumbent and additional fibre cable from an alternative operator cannot be 
installed. This result is shown with the sign ‘false’ and in the graphical 
representation of Brownfield this path will retain a green colour. Based on these 
results the alternative operator can make an estimated decision on what 
clusters of users can be covered if a new Brownfield infrastructure is built. 
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6.2.3.3 Unsatisfied Demand for Alternative Operators 
Checking space availability and path continuity allows estimating clusters of 
monopolistic coverage within the Greenfield infrastructure by the incumbent 
operator. Figure 6-8 shows the results of a particular simulation when the 
Brownfield DPA scenario is imposed on the Greenfield infrastructure. 
The results shows that clusters belonging to Street Boxes [3], [4], [6], [8] and [9] 
can be covered by an alternative operator with the Brownfield infrastructure. 
However, the remaining clusters of users indicate monopolistic coverage by the 
incumbent due to space and path unavailability (no DPA possible). This 
information helps make a decision by an alternative operator on infrastructure 
development in areas with unsatisfied demand. It also enables the regulator to 
analyse the market situation in light of stimulating infrastructure-based or 
service-based competition. 
6.2.4 Renting Infrastructure: Bitstream 
The Bitstream scenario is imposed on the Greenfield scenario assuming that 
the incumbent operator built its own infrastructure and lends it to an alternative 
operator. The alternative operator expects to win a certain market share and 
digitally connect acquired subscribers under wholesale agreement with the 
incumbent. 
In the model, after populating users (checkbox ‘1. plant Greenfield users’) and 
building Greenfield (checkbox ‘2. greenFieldNew’) the Bitstream is initiated by 
pressing the checkbox ‘4. brownFieldBitstream’. This runs a function that 
installs Bitstream CPEs to a given percentage of subscribers. Figure 6-10, 
Figure 6-11 and Figure 6-12 represent the results of the Bitstream scenario 
under the assumption that the alternative operator expects to win a 20%, 50% 
and 70% market share respectively. 
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Figure 6-10 Model Results: Bitstream with 20% Market Share 
Bitstream users are connected with containers with the blue colour. The 
economics of Bitstream are displayed in the console. The annual Bitstream rent 
costs are taken from the BTOR price list and calculated for 20 years to make it 
comparable with CAPEX from the Greenfield and Brownfield scenarios. 
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Figure 6-11 Model Results: Bitstream with 50% Market Share 
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Figure 6-12 Model Results: Bitstream with 70% Market Share 
The results of all Bitstream scenarios show the major costs are those for rent of 
channels from the incumbent operator. 
 
6.2.5 Optional Results 
By running selected methods from the Java Class “CostModel”, various optional 
results can be obtained. For example, by calling a method 
numOfSplitters(users), the number of splitters to be installed in Street Boxes 
is calculated (Figure 6-13). 
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Figure 6-13 Optional Results: Number of Splitters in the Brownfield Scenario 
Similarly, results for the quantity of ODFs and OLTs, lengths of ducts and poles 
with appropriate cost characteristics, number of CPEs connected, etc. can be 
calculated. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
Formulated from the overarching research question, the aim of the empirical 
project is to further investigate the topic of IS in telecommunication, particularly 
duct and pole access (DPA) in wireline networks, and address the following 
problem: 
 
‘What does it take for a new operator to become competitive in the ultrafast 
services landscape assuming strategies are limited to building own 
infrastructure through BTOR duct and pole access or buying a “bitstream 
access” using existing BTOR networks?’ 
 
This study set out to design a decision support software tool on the basis of 
ABM which would help the UK telecom regulator Ofcom to answer the following 
model questions: 
1. How do Ofcom interventions to regulate BTOR DPA and overall physical 
availability of ducts and poles influence an operator’s decision to build its 
own ultrafast network or buy “bitstream access” from BTOR in a particular 
location in the UK? 
2. What is the optimal price range of broadband services delivered through 
new ultrafast networks which would enable sufficient investments from 
alternative operators and generate sufficient demand by end-users? 
This EP has shown that creating a decision support software tool is feasible and 
delivered the first design of the software prototype. The developed prototype 
fully meets the objectives of the research as it is able to recreate a generic 
telecommunication market with an incumbent and an alternative telecom 
operator on the supply side, and population of users with different behaviours 
on the demand side. 
The main result of this phase is that it is able to simulate three major 
infrastructure scenarios, i.e. Greenfield, Brownfield DPA and Bitstream in 
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connection with the market and changes in user behaviour. The current 
prototype functionality is able to examine various research aspects and provide 
the following insights. 
 
7.1 Insights from the Model Outcomes 
7.1.1 Network Topology is a Key to Precise Results 
Network design in the prototype follows a generic star topology, i.e. all 
exchanges are connected to one Metro Node, Street Boxes are connected to 
the closest Exchange, a number of Users are connected to one Street Box on a 
one-to-one basis (Figure 6-5). This topology results in a great number of 
containers between nodes with relative distances that are comparable with each 
other. This is not the case in reality. Unexpectedly, these assumptions have 
resulted in costs of laying fibre through ducts or poles of approximately 190 
Million GBP for only 500 User premises (Figure 6-6). In the same model set-up 
for 500 Users Exchange costs = 63,860 GBP, Street Boxes costs = 166,410 
GBP, Indoor wiring costs = 1,050,000 GBP and CPE costs = 40,000 GBP. 
The above analysis does not enable the determination of infrastructure costs at 
the prototyping stage accurately; however, the model outcomes confirm that 
civil and engineering works are the major cost elements of the building 
infrastructure, which is consistent with industry benchmarks. In order to obtain 
more precise results, it is recommended to follow real topology during the 
calibration phase and use different adjustment coefficients to arrive at more 
realistic distances and costs. In the real case scenario a set-up with exact 
locations for network elements can improve the accuracy of calculations. 
 
7.1.2 Civil and Engineering Works are the Major Costs 
As pointed out in Section 7.1.1, the major costs of building a physical 
infrastructure are costs of laying ducts with fibre. In the model set-up, after 
several iterations of Greenfield scenarios, the costs of containers are around 
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180-200 Million GBP. The costs of Brownfield DPA containers overbuild in 
different iterations are in the range of 20-50 Million GBP. The Bitstream 
scenario under 70% market share (CPEs, Exchange equipment, Rent of 
channels) for 20 years, results in costs less than 3 Million GBP under the same 
model set-up. Investments under the Bitstream scenario are significantly less 
than in the Capex scenarios. 
 
7.1.3 Results Contribute to Debate on “Ladder of Investments” 
The cost results under various scenarios are broadly consistent with the real 
business cases when alternative operators can enter telecommunication 
markets with fewer investments. This is also consistent with the theory of 
‘Ladder of Investments’ (Cave, 2006) when new entrants step onto the first rung 
of the LoI with service-based competition and then climb the ladder to move to 
infrastructure-based competition. This theory was debated by Bourreau et al. 
(2010). The decision support tool can contribute an interesting insight to this 
debate on the subject of the ‘Ladder of Investments’ after the calibration phase, 
once revenue streams from the market are simulated.  
 
7.1.4 Effect on Competition Needs Additional Investigation 
The revenue side would allow the projection of income for an alternative 
operator to simulate and check a potential decision of an alternative operator to 
move from service-based (Bitstream) to facility-based (Brownfield) competition. 
The previous analysis of mandatory versus voluntary sharing in the SLR 
revealed that various studies show controversial results on the effect of 
mandatory sharing. Various researchers argue that mandatory IS was not 
welfare enhancing (Crandall, 2005), did not enable broadband penetration 
(Crandall et al., 2013), and did not lead to an increase in competition (Hazlett, 
2006) and infrastructure investment (Cave, 2014). By enhancing functionality on 
operators’ behaviour in the calibrating stage, the model can contribute to the 
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above-mentioned academic debate and investigate the effect of DPA on 
competition. 
 
7.1.5 Monopoly Creates Uncovered Demand 
Figure 7-1 demonstrates the results of several iterations of the Brownfield 
scenario. 
 
Figure 7-1 Brownfield Scenario: Uncovered Demand in Several Iterations 
Depending on the availability of ducts, certain areas can be covered by an 
alternative operator infrastructure (brown clusters). Other areas remain under 
monopolistic coverage of the incumbent operator (grey clusters). Even with 
controlled parameters on duct availability, the results of iterations constantly 
demonstrate that 100% coverage by the Brownfield infrastructure is not possible 
using BTOR DPA access. 
This indicates to a potential decision maker (e.g. regulator or alternative 
operator) that decisions other than mandating DPA access can be 
supplemented; for example, a combination of DPA access with Bitstream, 
subsidising alternative infrastructure development in monopolistic clusters or 
creating incentives to share infrastructure elements with other utilities. 
 
7.1.6 DPA Availability is a Substantial Risk Factor 
Running several experiments of the Brownfield scenario also leads to a 
conclusion that DPA availability is hard to predict in areas where BTOR exact 
data are not available. Even if uncovered demand is estimated for a certain 
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area, the exact investment decisions on covering exact districts or areas can be 
difficult to estimate. Such uncertainties would prevent investors from building 
alternative infrastructures as they constitute substantial risk factors. Regulators 
can develop special programmes to cover the risks to further incentivise 
alternative operators. 
 
7.1.7 DPA Continuity Further Sharpens Uncertainty 
If DPA availability looks at possibility to lay alternative fibre cable in a particular 
link between nodes, the DPA continuity is checking combined probabilities of 
space availability in sequential routes from a User premise to the Metro Node. 
DPA continuity further sharpens uncertainty of successful implementation of 
alternative infrastructure and potentially increases amount of necessary 
investments. The significance of this finding is that the model can predict DPA 
availability for covering smaller areas whereas for larger metro areas the model 
functionality for checking DPA continuity plays a more important role. 
 
7.1.8 Limited Functionality of Transition to Ultrafast 
Current prototype functionality simulates that Users move to Ultrafast 
broadband under two assumptions: existing Superfast infrastructure allows the 
delivery of Ultrafast broadband (‘Ultrafast available’) and the price for Ultrafast 
for various subgroups satisfies subscribers’ needs. In relation to the EP 
objectives, this is the main limitation of the current model, which needs further 
development.  
 
7.2 Prototype-Based Answers to Model Questions 
On the one hand, the developed prototype functionality provides a limited basis 
for addressing the whole real life picture of broadband infrastructure 
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development in the UK. On the other hand, the model is able to contribute to 
model questions raised by Ofcom. 
In relation to model question 1 on Ofcom interventions to regulate BTOR DPA, 
results of prototyping validate that DPA availability and continuity are the major 
determinants of successful investments decisions by alternative operators. 
Even with controlled parameters of DPA, availability and continuity simulations 
provided results that are too general to make a justified investments decision. 
Simulations confirm that potential cluster demand for alternative infrastructures 
exist, which is currently covered by monopolistic BTOR. Simulations also 
confirm that Bitstream remains a relatively low risk scenario for entering the 
market. This confirms the views of Maxwell et al. (2007) who state duct access 
is not a regulatory ‘silver bullet’ but a regulatory remedy that must be used with 
other wholesale remedies. 
In relation to model question 2 on the optimal price of a broadband service to 
generate sufficient demand by subscribers and enable sufficient infrastructure 
investments, the software prototype is able to simulate basic demand for 
Ultrafast services but fully addressing model question 2 needs further 
development under a real case construct. 
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8 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The research described in this thesis has theoretical, methodological and 
empirical contributions. 
 
8.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The theory of the ladder of investments (LoI) (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; 
Cave, 2004, 2006) is extended to include hybrid network and platform-based 
competition and investment, i.e. between the service economy and the facility 
economy. The first contribution described is about hybrid network competition, 
which is represented in the model by the Brownfield scenario. It is a step on the 
LoI with the ability to add new wires and cables by sharing space within 
incumbents’ ducts and poles. The new operator is constrained by the location of 
the incumbents’ assets and so can serve only existing customers. This requires 
some investment in physical network assets and is a new level of competition 
and innovation. 
The next contribution is about a telecoms duct and pole case study and model. 
The majority of the literature and academic debate on the theory of LoI (Jorde, 
Sidak and Teece, 2000; Cambini and Jiang, 2009; Bourreau et al., 2010) 
focuses on LLU. The current study enriches the body of knowledge by focusing 
on another form of IS, i.e. ducts and pole access. 
The top most level of investment is required to build a new network (or facility) 
infrastructure. Typically this would arise in the event of a new housing estate.  
This is represented as the Greenfield Scenario in the model. There is IS but it is 
from the telecommunications exchange upward, i.e. new infrastructure is 
required to the exchange or at least to street cabinets. 
At the lowest step on the ladder of investments, the regulator might incentivise 
service-based competition, in which new operators are able to lease incumbent 
operators’ network assets. This is service economy competition. It requires the 
least level of investment for a new operator and allows the new operator to 
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develop a customer base from which it might invest in higher steps on the 
ladder of investment. This is represented in the model by the Bitstream 
scenario.  
The outcomes of the research consider the issue of interdependencies among 
incumbent and alternative operators in a telecommunication market. Brownfield 
and Bitstream scenarios specifically represent two-sided relationships where 
alternative operators act as input providers to broadband users and at the same 
time purchase infrastructure capacity from the incumbent. This provides a 
supportive contribution to the discussion on the theory of platform markets 
(Bauer, 2010) and its importance for modern regulatory practice. In comparison 
to traditional regulatory frameworks, e.g. theory of monopoly regulation (Kahn, 
1971), and essential facility doctrine (Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, 2002), the 
platform markets perspective provides benefits in recognising the hybrid nature 
of intermediary organisations in network industries (Bauer, 2014). The 
contribution extends platform markets to include not just facility and service 
economics but also hybrid economics via the Brownfield scenario.  
The study also demonstrates that the focal point for innovation and investment 
into IS, and therefore into telecommunications competition, is not in the 
telecommunications exchange network but in the customer access network. 
These are many in number, and are heterogeneous in spatial characteristics as 
well as population demand characteristics. 
The study considers investment over all time periods and relates these to the 
ability of consumers to access networks of increasingly fast speeds. There is a 
non-linear relationship between investment and access to superfast and 
ultrafast networks.  The simulations run with the help of a software model found 
that mandatory sharing imposed on an incumbent’s infrastructure does not 
necessarily lead to the development of alternative infrastructures and 
investments from new competitors. The volume and speed of new revenue 
streams generated by switched users towards an alternative operator does not 
guarantee significant return on investments. This contribution is consistent with 
the results from SLR and supports the academic critique of LoI theory. 
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The study uses the ABM approach to simulate complex relationships between 
users, operators and infrastructures. This approach supports the notion of 
telecommunication viewed as an ecosystem (Fransman, 2010). Fransman 
suggests that in a socio-economic ecosystem ongoing ‘symbiotic’ interactions 
between firms, suppliers, competitors and users can generate ‘new knowledge’. 
The software prototype analyses how ducts and poles availability on the supply 
side and various types of broadband users on the demand side affect 
innovation, investment and take-up of the broadband network. The study 
contributes to the theory that telecommunications provision is an ecosystem 
and a complex system that is continuously evolving and adapting. 
Bauer (2014) further develops the concept of ecosystems and applies a system-
theoretic approach to ICT regulation. He claims that the four aspects of dynamic 
systems are incompletely described in academic literature: (i) system 
interrelatedness, (ii) complex patterns of feedback and non-linearity, (iii) 
emergent properties of ICT systems, and (iv) existence of multiple dynamic 
equilibria in systems. The complex system perspective of current research and 
ABM in the software prototype takes the systemic perspective and contributes 
to the first three of these gaps. The study focuses on interrelatedness between 
and among agents, and addresses the issue of feedback on broadband 
subscription and non-linearity of broadband take-up by different groups. The 
model exposes the learning of users and emergent patterns of their behaviour 
rules. Further enhancement of the model post-viva will also address the 
different infrastructure decisions of operators, which can represent multiple 
equilibria points in the whole ecosystem. The contribution to theory will be the 
rules which generate multi-equilibria. 
 
8.2 Methodological Contributions 
The study is unique in utilising a Systematic Literature Review approach for 
investigating various concepts of IS in core network industries, i.e. water, 
energy, telecommunication and transportation.  
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There is also novelty of the research by adopting a SCRUM-like agile 
methodology for model development (Ard, Davidsen and Hurst, 2014). An 
informal “wish list” with the set of desired model functionalities was summarised 
and used for scoping the model. This approach contributes to the body of 
knowledge as it applies modern software development standards in the field of 
academic research and scientific simulation development. The study also 
contributes to a particular field of programming languages and methods of 
modelling as it uses simulation software AnyLogic with built-in Java 
programming functionality. 
This study uses as a basis the ABM framework for energy infrastructures by 
Chappin and Dijkema (2010) and Varga et al. (2014) for any infrastructures.  
Chappin and Dijkema (2010) suggested the five main components for building 
ABMs in energy infrastructure systems, i.e. (i) system representation, (ii) 
exogenous scenarios, (iii) design of transition assemblage, (iv) system evolution 
and (v) impact assessment. By simulating IS in telecommunication networks 
this research contributes to the field of complex systems applied to the 
regulation of infrastructure systems. However, the research also shares the 
limitations of this framework, as representation of the system largely depends 
on the individualistic focus of a researcher, and outcomes of the model do not 
necessarily show “what will happen but what may happen” (Chappin and 
Dijkema, 2010). 
Certain authors use complex systems research approaches aligned with the 
study  (Brown et al., 2004; Dobson et al., 2007; Herder et al., 2008; Grove and 
Baumann, 2012). Bauer (2010) states that in the area of regulation and 
investments in telecommunication networks, simulation models and 
experimental approaches have become a ‘promising avenue’ as they go further 
in investigating interdependencies, multi-equilibria systems, joint outcomes of 
supply and demand sides (de Bijl and Peitz, 2004; Beltrán and Sharkey, 2009; 
Demaagd and Bauer, 2011; Mirza and Beltrán, 2014). Methodologically, the 
agent-based model approach represented a system with interdependencies 
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between buying preferences of users, infrastructure scenarios by operators and 
regulatory actions for stimulating DPA.  
With its complex system perspective, the current study provides a 
methodological contribution to the existing body of knowledge as it enriches the 
research arsenal of applied simulation and modelling techniques, such as 
queuing theory (Choi and Kim, 2010), genetic programming method (Demaagd 
and Bauer, 2011), and ABM (Mirza and Beltrán, 2014). The model uses the 
ABM approach for the simulation of joint outcomes of supply and demand side 
and also utilises Brownfield and Bitstream scenarios as examples of the two-
sided economic framework (Beltrán, 2012; Economides and Tåg, 2012). 
The integration of demand and supply side in one ABM simulation constitutes 
the major methodological novelty of the study. This contribution is further 
strengthened as the supply and demand sides are also hybrid but integrated 
approaches. The demand side is represented by state charts for user behaviour 
whereas the supply side is modelled with network nodes connected by duct and 
pole routes. The supply is represented by access network modelling routes from 
a metro node over exchanges via street boxes to customer premises. Modelling 
network topology with separate nodes, simulating routes between nodes with 
real data describing continuity inside ducts, and factoring lengths of routes for 
calculation of civil and engineering costs, all constitute significant 
methodological contributions. 
The model uses a distinct approach of modelling changes in user behaviour as 
transitions between behavioural states, which are performed based on various 
factors, e.g. external messages from other agents, market price changes, 
contract expiry dates, and probabilities of user transitions. The model also 
differentiates among different users in terms of their adoption preferences. This 
is critical to why the ABM approach was adopted, i.e. to represent heterogeneity 
of consumers and their characteristics of behaviours. The supply side uses real 
data of a sample of the whole telecoms network on route continuity and 
availability of free space inside ducts to create a virtual probabilistic network. 
These data are taken from a real sample size of ducts representing less than 
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1% of Openreach infrastructure, which underlines the advantage of ABM over 
statistical methods for simulating nationwide infrastructure development. 
The software model is a hybrid method, which also uses visualisation 
techniques (Basole, Park and Barnett, 2015), statistical distributions for sub-
user groups and probability of outcomes, and an economic framework for cost 
analysis (Hoernig et al., 2012). In terms of visualisation, the model creates 
abstract spatial representations based on secondary data of 
telecommunications installations. This random but representative spatial display 
is an essential communication tool for regulators and decision makers. 
Visualisation is used both for representing the changes on the demand side 
when users transit from different states and on the supply side when different 
infrastructure scenarios are modelled. A particular advantage of the model is 
that visualisation is dynamic and reflects changes when certain controlled 
parameters are changes (e.g. price of broadband). 
A particular methodological contribution of the study is that it simulates 
infrastructure scenarios based on node topology and route continuity within 
ABM and at the same time applies a basic economic framework for each 
scenario using real life industry data. The study uses two distinct methods of 
building an alternative infrastructure on the basis of an existing one and also a 
scenario of renting an infrastructure. For both scenarios the model provides 
calculations of capital and operational expenditures.  
 
8.3 Empirical Contributions 
The general topic of the research is IS in telecommunications. The empirical 
work is related to the particular subject of Duct and Pole Access to British 
Telecom infrastructure regulated by Ofcom. The DPA example is vital as it is 
viewed by Ofcom as one of the key factors to stimulating competition in 
telecoms and developing alternative infrastructures (Ofcom, 2016). 
The DPA initiative represented in the decision support simulation model 
contributes to the discussion of successful implementation of the BDUK 
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programme. This study (the model and its implementation to demonstrate the 
DPA initiative) also contributes to the professional body of knowledge as it uses 
real data from various sources for academic purposes. The data on availability 
and continuity of DPA were taken from Analysys Mason (2009, 2010) performed 
for Ofcom. The economic framework was performed using Analysys Mason 
(2008) and CSMG (2010). The exact data on renting telecommunication 
equipment are taken from BTOR price lists (British Telecom, 2016). 
The conducted SLR analyses IS in the water, energy, telecommunication and 
transportation network industries, and specifically contributes to the topic of 
convergence and superimposing with other utilities. 
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9 IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
The Impact Assessment (IA) section provides evidence of the engagement with 
practitioners and policy makers in Kazakhstan and the UK and how this 
engagement has contributed to the evolution of research focus and design. The 
IA reports results of engagement with the UK regulator Ofcom and the 
Kazakhstani regulator to describe the potential and actual research impact on 
wider policy and practices.  
 
9.1 Evidence of Engagement 
According to the original impact plan, four major groups of beneficiaries of the 
research are Regulators, Businesses, Users and the Professional Community 
(Figure 9-1) 
 
 
 
Figure 9-1 Beneficiaries of the Research 
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The following sections provide descriptions of the evidence of engagement with 
each group of beneficiaries. 
9.1.1 Engagement with Regulators 
The engagement strategy with regulators was planned on three levels: (i) 
focused national, (ii) regional and (iii) global. The focused national engagement 
path considered interaction with NRAs from Kazakhstan and the UK. The 
regional engagement direction targeted regulators from the former Soviet Union 
countries through the Board of Operators (BO) of the Regional Commonwealth 
in the field of Communications (RCC) and Council of Regulating Authorities 
(CRA). The global engagement thread viewed the annual Global Symposium for 
Regulators (GSR) organised by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) as a main channel for communicating research outcomes to regulators 
worldwide. 
 
9.1.1.1 Communicating with NRA in Kazakhstan 
During the Empirical Project (EP) stage in 2016, a formal presentation of the 
research and software simulation model was given to the Deputy Chairman of 
the State Control Committee (SCC) in the Sphere of Communication, 
Informatization and Media under the Ministry of Information and 
Communication, which is responsible for regulation and policy making in 
Kazakhstan. During a second presentation the elaborated decision software tool 
was presented to Chairman of the SCC on April 17th, 2017 in Astana. The 
Chairman underlined the point that the SCC is consistently moving towards 
increasing IS practices in Kazakhstan and that this research can contribute to 
this process by providing external competence and expertise. The feedback 
after the presentation is presented in the official letter from the Kazakhstani 
regulator (see Appendix E ‘Testimony from Kazakhstani Regulator’). 
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9.1.1.2 Communicating with Ofcom in the UK 
Engagement with the UK regulator Office of Communications (Ofcom) has 
significantly defined the scope of the EP and functionality of the simulation 
model. It started with the publication of the Digital Communications Review 
(DCR) (Ofcom, 2016). According to Section 4 of the DCR, Ofcom is to promote 
competition and network investments based on improving access to 
Openreach’s underground ducts and telegraph poles (Duct and Pole Access or 
DPA) for alternative operators. Since DPA is a typical example of passive IS, a 
proposal from Cranfield research team to Ofcom was formulated to simulate 
infrastructure development scenarios in the EP. Ofcom became interested in 
Cranfield research and invited relevant staff to contribute to meetings and 
provide feedback. 
During the EP phase in the period May – December 2016, there were four 
communication events between Cranfield research team and Ofcom officials. 
The first version of the software model was presented to Ofcom on 10th 
November, 2016 at Ofcom’s offices in London. A full demonstration of the 
simulation model with infrastructure scenarios, economic framework and 
subscriber state charts was delivered. The prototype was presented to Ofcom in 
May 2017. 
The process of engagement with Ofcom and its DPA initiative for broadband 
infrastructure development has shaped the research process significantly. The 
scope of the software model, the type of IS (DPA), agents’ behaviour and 
infrastructure scenarios are defined by Ofcom requirements. Even though 
Ofcom was specifically interested in the effect of DPA on alternative 
infrastructure development and investments, the resulting model was set up 
with generic parameters (number of users, number of operators, generic 
incumbent and alternative infrastructure, etc.) and can be easily applied to the 
context of a different geographical area (e.g. town, county, region, country). 
With the current set-up, the model provides the capability to assess the effect of 
DPA introduction and is location-specific.  
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Ofcom presented a letter of testimony which is not attached to this thesis due to 
confidentiality requirements from the UK regulator. 
 
9.1.1.3 Engagement with NRAs on Regional Level 
On the regional level of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (former 
Soviet Union countries) the research was presented to the Chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the BO in March 2016. The software model was 
presented to the Chairman on April 17th 2017 in Minsk, Belarus where the next 
BO meeting took place. The feedback on the computation model is presented in 
Appendix F ‘Testimony from the BO of the RCC’. 
 
9.1.1.4 Communicating with Regulators on a Global Level 
Approaching the ITU and participation at the GSR is still on the agenda for 
creating the research impact, as engagement with the practice on such a level 
requires a thorough step-by-step approach. 
 
9.1.2 Engagement with Businesses 
Within the engagement strategy, two operators in Kazakhstan were 
approached. These are a joint stock company Kazakhtelecom and a telecom 
company Beeline. Kazakhtelecom is an incumbent operator in Kazakhstan that 
historically runs the national telecom grid and also has a mobile division 
providing Long-Term Evolution (LTE) services. Beeline is a Russian mobile 
company which has also established its fixed telecommunication division in 
Kazakhstan providing fibre optic digital services. 
Within Kazakhtelecom, the research and simulation model were introduced to a 
technical director responsible for planning and erecting mobile infrastructures. 
The technical director confirmed that the regulators’ perspective of the model is 
of significant interest for Kazakhtelecom as certain IS policies are unclear in 
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Kazakhstan, e.g. licensing of Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) for 
spectrum sharing. The model can help Kazakhtelecom Government Relations 
(GR) to lobby its IS activities. 
The model was also presented to a GR representative of Beeline. She 
confirmed that the particular issue of spectrum sharing is essential for Beeline 
and other mobile operators in Kazakhstan, as existing licensed frequency bands 
were not enough for organising LTE for any of the present players. She found 
the presentation on the model informative but could not come up with a practical 
application for Beeline operations. The issue of spectrum sharing was 
straightforward and did not require any additional ‘what if’ analysis. Local mobile 
operators bid for frequency bandwidths, pay additional licence fees to 
government and share resulting bands with others to organise LTE. However, 
this particular case with spectrum sharing provided significant evidence that 
various forms of IS are emerging. 
 
9.1.3 Communicating with Professional Community 
From the professional community, the current research was introduced to 
consulting companies McKinsey and Gartner in Astana. The objective of the 
presentations was to evaluate professional and commercial interest in IS 
consultancy projects. Consultants confirmed that the topic of IS is on the 
agenda of their clientele, i.e. regulators and telecom operators, and saw 
potential for future research in this area.  
 
9.1.4 Engagement with Users 
Over the course of the Empirical Project (EP) the Multi-Criteria Decision Making 
(MCDM) research framework was excluded from the model scope due to 
Ofcom’s interest in the three infrastructure scenarios with a limited number of 
operators. Therefore, direct engagement with the users did not take place at the 
stage of the EP. Nevertheless, the current research affects users and brings 
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positive effects for society and welfare by helping to eliminate the digital divide 
and transform to a networked society. 
 
9.2 Dissemination 
As part of the dissemination plan (see Section 4.3.2) an extended abstract on 
the current research has been submitted to IEEE Communications. The content 
of the publication will contain results of the conducted SLR and outcomes of the 
research. The proposed citation for the publication is 
Durmagambetov, Y., Varga, L. (2017) ‘Infrastructure sharing: business models, 
regulation and user needs in network industries’, IEEE Communications 
Magazine, submitted 2017. 
Current research was also presented at a UK – Kazakhstan joint “Resilient 
Structures and Infrastructure” workshop from March 14-17, 2016 in Astana, 
Kazakhstan. The workshop was sponsored by the British Council Newton – Al-
Farabi Partnership Programme and organised by Brunel University London and 
Nazarbayev University Astana. Thirty seven leading, established and early-
stage researchers from the UK and Kazakhstan delivered presentations on their 
research, discussed the emergent issues facing structures under extreme 
hazards and identified areas for future research. The IS research was placed in 
a workshop section dedicated to the mathematical modelling of infrastructure 
scenarios. 
Participating at a Symposium on Executive Doctoral Programmes organised in 
November 2015 by the British Academy of Management and Cranfield School 
of Management was part of the dissemination plan. The research was 
presented to representatives from various academic schools, e.g. Leeds 
University, Grenoble University, Aston University, Manchester Business School, 
Nottingham Business School, Henley Business School, and Huddersfield 
University. 
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9.3 Impact Evaluation 
9.3.1 Impact on Organisations 
The research was introduced in four countries (UK, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Nigeria), to three NRAs (Ofcom, SCC, Nigerian Regulator), about 20 operators 
(Kazakhtelecom, Beeline, members of the BO of RCC), two professional events 
with three universities (Cranfield, Brunel, Nazarbayev University), and two 
consulting companies (McKinsey, Gartner). Ofcom and the SCC provided 
iterative feedback on the model. Kazakhtelecom endorsed the creation of one 
IS working group. A verbal agreement was reached with the BO of RCC to form 
one working group on a former Soviet Union level. 
The initial engagement promotes further impact, which is evaluated using mid- 
and long-term metrics. In Kazakhtelecom at least one internal project on 
modern forms of IS is expected in 2018-2019. The software model and the 
implementation results can motivate the Kazakhstani regulator to incentivise IS 
policies. The impact will be measured against concrete IS regulatory initiatives 
undertaken as a result of Kazakhtelecom involvement. 
Communication with Ofcom has similar potential to create an impact on 
regulatory practices in the UK. It also creates an opportunity for Cranfield 
University to be involved in consultancy projects with Ofcom. The potential 
impact can be measured by the number and value of consultancy projects. 
The research will also produce indirect impacts on other organisations, e.g. 
suppliers of telecom equipment with IS functionality, service providers and 
consultancy companies. These stakeholders will benefit from overall increased 
demand for IS. Other infrastructure providers and utilities will also be impacted 
on, as IS is affecting other network industries. The overall quantitative impact 
from these activities will be measured as the monetary value of all signed 
contracts related to IS. 
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9.3.2 Impact on Economy 
In the IP, four major determinants of IS from the perspective of NRAs were 
determined, i.e. (i) developing competition, (ii) facilitating innovation, (iii) 
attracting investments and (iv) increasing welfare. This research contributes to 
all factors in any potential country where the current research is applied. The 
direct effect of the research on the Kazakhstani economy is the overall number 
and value of those IS projects that will be initiated by the SCC in 
telecommunications and with other network industries. The potential project of 
Kazakhtelecom for network virtualisation and crowdsourced infrastructure will 
lead to an increase in the number of new operators. These operators will 
differentiate themselves based on services. Certain operators will innovate on 
digital content; other operators will focus towards infrastructure development. 
Thus, the research will cause a measurable effect on competition, innovation 
and the level of investments attracted. It also impacts on overall efficiency 
(savings on duplicated investments and CAPEX, optimised consumer tariffs, 
preserved scarce national resources) and effectiveness (improved quality of 
services, additional taxes collected, positive environmental effects). 
 
9.3.3 Impact on Society 
The research impact on society is viewed through the lenses of the overall 
competitiveness of a nation. It is a much broader concept than the economic 
effect of an initiative. If the impact on the economy focuses more on quantitative 
metrics, the impact on society is also taking into consideration the qualitative 
effects. The paradigm of IS is addressing the health, environmental and 
aesthetic concerns of modern society. IS leads to less usage of common 
resources, e.g. less public space occupied, fewer natural resources consumed, 
less disruption from civil works. IS is playing a key role in bridging the digital 
divide, i.e. bringing digital communication to places where it is not economically 
viable. It contributes to the digital transformation of a society which in turn 
affects the whole life of individuals. The exact contribution of this research for 
society can be assessed in the mid- and long-term (3-7 years). The impact will 
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be assessed by applying a methodology of comparing results with and without 
IS in a selected country. 
 
9.3.4 Impact on Individuals 
With the development of personal gadgets, social networks and electronic 
services, individuals are moving toward creating and maintaining their digital 
identity. Individuals are members of various groups in social networks, 
consumers of digital media, and participants in commercial and government 
transactions over the Internet. They expect a continuous online experience from 
telecom companies. The topic of IS, and this research in particular, serves the 
needs of individuals for infrastructure availability virtually everywhere. It affects 
individuals as IS increases their ability to work from home. The impact can be 
measured by the amount of avoided physical mobility costs and wasted time. It 
creates new career opportunities both in terms of people connected and new 
types of professions. The research contributes to increased use of infotainment 
and growth of knowledge. In this case the impact can be measured by the 
increased amount of Internet traffic type of digital media per individual.  
This study creates opportunities for scholars for further research on IS (impact 
is measured in number of additional research studies). Potential users of the 
software model will acquire and apply new skills in ABM, Java programming 
and model simulation; this also creates new career opportunities for those 
users. 
 
9.4 Summary 
The ESRC determines that the impact of a research can include (i) 
instrumental, (ii) conceptual, and (iii) capacity building2. The instrumental impact 
is measured by how much current policies, business or organisational practices, 
                                            
2
 http://www.esrc.ac.uk/research/impact-toolkit/what-is-impact/ 
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strategies or behaviour of stakeholders have changed as a result of a research. 
The conceptual impact is dealing with understanding of policy issues, 
supporting a position in a professional discussion, or formulating new 
approaches to solving a phenomenon. Capacity building views research impact 
through the acquisition of new applied and personal skills. This report provided 
evidence of engagement with various research beneficiaries, summarised 
lessons learned during four years of academic studies, outlined plans for further 
dissemination and exploitation, and explained the evaluation of actual and 
potential impact. Table 9-1 summarises impact variety in accordance with the 
ESRC classification. 
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Table 9-1 Summary of Research Impact in accordance with ESRC 
Instrumental Impact Conceptual Impact Capacity Building 
Impact 
- IS projects at 
Kazakhtelecom 
scientifically articulated 
- Debate on IS between 
Kazakhtelecom and 
regulator justified better 
- Incorporating 
philosophical position into 
problem solving 
- Internal competence on 
network development 
raised at Kazakhtelecom 
- Ofcom DPA initiative 
attracted attention by 
Kazakhstani regulator 
- Learning Java 
programming language 
- Cranfield founded basis 
for future potential 
cooperation with Ofcom 
- BO of RCC uses research 
for understanding new 
roles of operators. Raised 
awareness on modern 
forms of IS. 
- Research opens doors to 
a new career 
- Internal project on new 
forms of IS will be 
launched at 
Kazakhtelecom 
- Global IS policies may be 
affected as a result of 
research presentation at 
GSR by ITU 
- Research expands 
personal networking 
- Research contributes to 
better efficiency at 
Kazakhtelecom by 
optimising its CAPEX and 
OPEX 
- Dissemination via 
academic journals and 
practitioners’ events 
contributes to debate on 
IS practices 
- Discipline strengthened to 
deliver academic results 
- A pilot project for IS and 
outsourcing is considered 
by BO of RCC 
- Impact is generated when 
best IS practices are 
summarised and brought 
from regulatory leaders to 
followers 
- Research inspires 
colleagues to undertake 
doctoral studies 
- Potential to influence IS 
practices in Nigeria 
- IS research initiatives 
lead to consolidation and 
increased cooperation 
between operators in 
Kazakhstan and FSU 
- New skill acquired to 
prepare papers for 
publishing 
- Dissemination over social 
networks, in the form of 
online courses and 
professional channels, 
contributes to practice 
- Research showed 
potential of complex 
systems to understanding 
regulatory issues 
- Teaching will be launched 
at internal Academy of 
Kazakhtelecom and 
Nazarbayev University 
- Use of computational 
modelling enriches 
regulatory and business 
practices 
- Research supports IS 
regulatory initiatives in 
Kazakhstan and affects 
industry efficiency and 
welfare 
- Online courses will be 
prepared on the basis of 
the research 
- Current study creates 
opportunity for further 
research on IS in other 
network industries 
- Research contributes to 
BDUK national initiative 
by analysing potential 
DPA scenarios 
- Users of software model 
will develop new skills in 
ABM and simulation 
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Instrumental Impact Conceptual Impact Capacity Building 
Impact 
- Research affects 
suppliers of telecom 
equipment and service 
providers by enforcing IS 
initiatives 
- Research will cause 
effect on competition, 
innovation and 
investments from piloting 
modern forms of IS 
- Ad hoc research team will 
be formed to utilise 
opportunities for further 
research 
- Research contributes to 
development of policies 
aimed at less usage of 
scarce resources 
- Research addresses 
health, environmental and 
aesthetic societal 
concerns of infrastructure 
development 
- The model will be 
enhanced into a product 
for consultancy or other 
researchers 
- The research topic of IS 
serves the needs of 
individuals for 
infrastructure availability 
and ability 
- Research contributes to 
bridging digital divide by 
addressing infrastructure 
development in remote 
areas 
- Individuals receive more 
opportunities to work from 
home from better 
infrastructure and 
software availability 
 
As Table 9-1 shows, this research generates actual and potential types of 
impact which are in line with requirements of the RCUK. The research 
addresses the topic of IS and contributes to global economic performance, 
effectiveness of public services and policies, and quality of life, health and work 
of individuals. The most important multi dimensional impact of the research is 
that it transforms a nation into a digital society affecting legislation, regulatory 
policies, business practices, organisational methods, efficiency and 
effectiveness of economies, and the working and life habits of individuals. It also 
creates opportunities for scholars for further multi discipline research from a 
perspective of complex systems, infrastructure development, network 
industries, and regulation. 
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10 LIMITATIONS 
The final deliverable of the research is a software tool which has been created 
using certain methodological frameworks, design concepts and approaches, 
selected data sources, and focused attention on a particular topic of IS in 
telecommunication, one of many existing software development tools. All 
elements used in the research have their embedded limitations which contribute 
to overall quality and rigour of the final deliverable. The following limitations and 
boundaries of the research must be taken into account. 
The study focused on a particular IS method, i.e. duct and pole access, of the 
telecommunication infrastructure. In a real business construct, underground 
conduits are often shared with other utilities, e.g. water and electricity. The 
decision software tool can further take into account the availability of IS with 
other network industries. 
In the software prototype, on the supply side one incumbent and one alternative 
operator with two potential business scenarios are configured. This construct 
also assumes that both operators use the same infrastructure technology which 
imposes a scenario limitation as in telecommunication broadband can be 
delivered with different technologies (fibre, cable, mobile). The decision support 
model can be enhanced by including different technologies in simulation. 
Operators’ strategies in the model are only represented by selecting between 
three infrastructure development options without taking into consideration 
market strategies of acquiring market share, generating profit, and competing 
with other operators. The presence of other players in a real market significantly 
corrects the outcomes of economic frameworks as competition affects 
consumer prices and subsequently corporate profits. 
Users’ behaviour is represented by only three states, i.e. users of Regular, 
Superfast and Ultrafast broadband. The model can further consider other 
potential states of subscribers, such as users without Internet access, users of 
Mobile only. Another limitation of the simulation is that the model does not 
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differentiate between residential and business users. This option can be further 
developed during the calibration stage. 
Decisions of users in the prototype are simple, i.e. they upgrade to better 
broadband based on infrastructure availability and depending on the price of 
broadband. The model does not consider for users the differentiation in 
broadband speed, quality, bundled packages, bandwagon effect and word-of-
mouth effect of broadband penetration. 
The simulation at the prototyping stage does not consider geographic types and 
population characteristics. The model construct is generic with the possibility to 
include more data on size and density of population, age groups, composition of 
business and residential users, territories to cover, etc. The model can be 
applied to a real region with actual demographic, geographic and economic 
data. 
Methodologically, the model was created using a wish list approach to software 
development based on limited requirements from Ofcom. Further requirements 
from Ofcom can be clarified during the calibration phase. 
The economic framework for development scenarios is limited to the calculation 
of direct costs of infrastructure erection. The economic model does not consider 
Net Present Value, Internal Rate of Return, Payback period and Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital concepts. Marketing expenditures and indirect costs 
are not included in the economic calculations. 
In general, more functionality requirements to the model would require a greater 
number of data sources than have been used in the model. 
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11 LEARNING FROM THE RESEARCH 
Doctoral research for a professional in his mid-forties who has only worked in a 
business environment is a very challenging yet absorbing learning process. This 
learning path is affected by contradicting life and professional factors. Firstly, 
having achieved a certain professional status to start again from “ground zero” 
and find a new equilibrium seriously shakes pre-existing comfort zones. 
Secondly, previous working skills, mental tools, business life hacks, managerial 
techniques (often surprisingly obsolete) have led to a serious professional 
deformation which needs to be overcome to enable the learning of academic 
concepts. Thirdly, as for the ability to learn and do research, personal skills and 
competences must be upgraded, e.g. English (especially for an international 
student) needs to be tuned to a new vocabulary, reading skill must be improved 
to enable the researcher to digest huge volumes of academic texts, writing 
requires a better proficiency in presenting academic theories and supporting 
arguments with references, and the ability to distance learning and establish a 
‘work-study-life’ balance needs to be raised. These factors are just prerequisites 
for setting up a research process which leads a doctoral student through 
learning milestones and teaches important lessons. 
 
11.1 Lesson 1: Understanding Philosophical Position is 
Genesis 
Understanding a philosophical position in any phenomenon is probably the most 
valuable lesson from the current research affecting both professional practice 
and personal life. If prior to conducting the research the world was divided into 
“us and them”, “proponents and opponents”, “right and wrong”, after learning 
the concepts of ontology and epistemology the attitude and approach towards 
analysing and solving practical issues have changed. Firstly, it was identified 
that the personal philosophical position of the researcher is based upon critical 
realism. The nature of the external phenomenon (scarcity of infrastructure 
resources) is viewed as external to a reaction (infrastructure sharing) to this 
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phenomenon. The role of the researcher in an academic context is an external 
observer and reactor rather than participant. The research deliverable in the 
form of a software model is to generate replicable results under the same 
conditions. A complex system research perspective with ABM realises 
multivariant scenarios between factors which underlines the potential nature of 
causality rather than direct correlation.  
Secondly, understanding others’ philosophical positions towards a phenomenon 
demands the comprehension of deeper roots of opponents’ views, helps to 
analyse not just the final notion but also underlying thought chains of an 
adversary, and therefore to develop a professional skill to accept a different 
opinion in an educated manner.  
Thirdly, knowing different philosophical positions significantly enriched an 
arsenal of problem solving approaches and ability to predict outcomes. Working 
for an incumbent telecommunication operator requires interaction with different 
stakeholders, i.e. regulating authorities, competitors, consumers of telecom 
services. Each stakeholder has different objectives which can be clearly 
deconstructed and analysed from a philosophical stance and addressed on a 
deeper and more effective level. 
 
11.2 Lesson 2: Changing Research Scope is Progress 
Over the course of this doctoral study, all aspects of the research have 
changed. Problem formulation has evolved from a notion of a methodological 
decision making tool for regulators to the concept of a decision support software 
tool. The positioning study originally viewed Innovation as one of research 
domains which was excluded from the scope. Research questions predictably 
changed to reflect outcomes of research deliverables and Review Panel 
suggestions. Analytic Network Process (ANP) as an MCDM method was 
excluded from the scope of the simulation model to reflect Ofcom’s 
requirements for infrastructure scenarios only. This subsequently led to 
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changes in research methods, e.g. online questionnaires were excluded from 
data collection methods. Finally, the title of the research has changed. 
Compared to professional practice with predictable execution plans and hard 
numerical goals, the research process appeared to be more an evolution of a 
living organism rather than the development plan of a product. Prior to the 
doctoral studies, academia was stereotypically perceived as conservative and 
dogmatic. An important lesson from the research is that an active researcher 
must be constantly open to suggestions, able to quickly abandon or adopt 
concepts, look for interesting opportunities, apply extant theories to analyse 
modern phenomena and at the same time challenge the theories from newer 
perspectives. 
 
11.3 Lesson 3: Learning Java Empowers Personal Practice 
Conducting research required serious upgrading of existing learning skills 
related to academic reading, writing, synthesising knowledge and presenting 
conclusions. Building the software tool also required the acquisition of a 
completely new skill, i.e. the ability to code in Java programming language. 
Although the amount of Java learnt still characterises the researcher as a 
beginner/intermediate, this significantly enriched professional practice. Firstly, 
learning a new programming language (like any new language) seriously 
stimulated brain activity and improved the overall ability to absorb new material. 
Secondly, it increased self-confidence, i.e. that learning new skills is possible at 
any age. Thirdly, it surprisingly added value to personal professional reputation 
and broadened personal networking within the organisation as the researcher 
gained more respect from colleagues, i.e. established managers and practising 
information technology professionals. 
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11.4 Lesson 4: Iterative Learning is a Source of Creativity 
One subtle observation during the studies is the nature of creativity in academic 
and business worlds. In professional practice a reflective nature of creativity 
dominates, i.e. new ideas appear as a response to external disturbing factors or 
opportunities. Ironically, the best ideas were born under time pressure and 
serious threats. In contrast, in academic practice best ideas are taken on the 
basis of existing research and identifying the gap in traditional theories. 
Reconciliation of forward looking creativity in business and past looking 
creativity in academia became somewhat of a learning barrier during the initial 
stages of the research. New ideas for research were born with difficulty as there 
was limited reflection from the external environment on these ideas. 
Over the course of the research, learning from iterative revision of articles read, 
research methods used, even own papers written became an invaluable source 
of new ideas. For example, during the EP, keywords from the SLR for searching 
electronic databases were revisited due to new conditions and new queries 
applied. The resulting set of new articles on the topic of infrastructure 
development provided new perspectives and enriched the research. The 
doctoral studies require the combination of problem solving and investigative 
skills from business and academia, i.e. quick operational issues need forward 
looking creativity, systemic and fundamental issues require thorough revisionist 
problem solving. 
 
11.5 Lesson 5: Research Opens Doors to a New Career Path 
Approaching the end of the doctoral studies raises a legitimate question on how 
to utilise the acquired knowledge and earned experience? Each professional 
with an industry background entering the academic environment faces this 
question. Should the researcher continue to do more part-time research and 
produce new academic deliverables? Or should the researcher also start 
teaching in a university and share accumulated business and academic 
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experience? Or perhaps start a consulting practice where industry experience 
and academic knowledge mining tools can generate synergetic achievements? 
The current research has planted a completely new concept of “living one more 
life”. Prior to the study, the career was viewed as a straightforward path 
upwards in primal or adjacent industry segments where personal decisions and 
achievements affect only the slope of the path. During the study a fear of 
starting a new career from scratch did not disappear but certainly became 
tenable. Closer to the end of the study, curiosity rises regarding the application 
of acquired doctorate status in a practical direction. The author of the research 
has already undertaken measures to start communicating with Nazarbayev 
University in Astana, Kazakhstan regarding a part-time teaching career. 
 
11.6 Lesson 6: Research Expands Personal Networking 
This research has significantly expanded the author’s personal networking and 
brought benefits to personal practice and his organisation. Every classmate in 
the Cranfield DBA cohort contributed practical suggestions at certain times. A 
classmate from California, US helped Kazakhtelecom to establish connections 
in Silicon Valley related to blockchain software technology. A colleague from the 
UK doing research in a marketing area consulted the CEO of Kazakhtelecom on 
certain aspects of digital marketing. A classmate from United Arab Emirates 
helped locally when a delegation from Kazakhtelecom visited Abu Dhabi. A 
classmate from Egypt helped to establish connections with the former head of 
ITU. As reciprocity, the author of the research consulted the Egyptian classmate 
on two occasions related to business fairs in Russia and Kazakhstan. A 
classmate from Nigeria helped to engage with the Nigerian telecom regulator to 
whom the current research will, potentially, be introduced. Moreover, the 
Cranfield lead supervisor and her staff helped the researcher to engage with 
academics in the UK to form the Review Panel during the SLR and engage with 
Ofcom to develop the simulation model during the Empirical Project. A particular 
lesson is that this communication over new networking channels proved to be 
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very effective for solving issues and with high quality. Best partners promote 
best results. 
 
11.7 Lesson 7: Traditional Concepts and New Phenomena Co-
Evolve 
Current research of IS in telecommunication required literature investigation on 
the historical development of infrastructures, regulation of monopolies and 
introduction of service- and facility-based competition. An interesting research 
lesson which affected both personal practice and the researcher’s organisation 
is how traditional concepts and newer trends in network industries interact, co-
evolve, challenge and fertilise each other. 
A typical example of an evolving IS method in network industries is the concept 
of Common Carriage. Foellmi and Meister (2012) define Common Carriage as 
“shared use of networks, similar to telecommunication, electricity or gas” which, 
in the context of telecommunication, is the openness of a network to users. The 
development of the Internet and digital services raised the issue of Network 
Neutrality, which is the openness of a network to content (Hogendorn, 2007). 
Noam (1994) predicted that with the development of alternative operators, e.g. 
cable and wireless, the concept of Common Carriage from a traditional area of 
regulated monopolies would erode and be replaced by “neutral interconnection”, 
a term which later became Network Neutrality. The Common Carriage provision 
was eliminated from the US wholesale and retail broadband services in 2002 
and 2005 respectively (Cherry, 2008). 
Another traditional IS method is Local Loop Unbundling (LLU), which originally 
was applied in copper telecommunication networks, and has also been applied 
and debated in relation to fibre optic networks (Cave, 2010b). This interaction of 
traditional concepts and new trends is also witnessed in Kazakhstan. The 
insights from the research help Kazakhtelecom in its communication with 
regulatory authorities. In terms of regulatory initiative to introduce facility-based 
competition, e.g. over LLU copper cables, the knowledge from the doctoral 
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study ironically empowers the researcher’s organisation to defend its historical 
incumbent status. 
 
11.8 Lesson 8: Research Shows the Future 
The current research provides an opportunity to study industry and regulatory 
trends in technologically advanced countries and provides case studies to follow 
or avoid for the followers. The study of network industries in developed 
countries provided examples of modern IS techniques, which are not witnessed 
yet in Kazakhstan, e.g. network virtualisation and crowdsourced infrastructure. 
Network virtualisation is defined as the combination of several virtual networks. 
i.e. “slices”, residing on the same physical infrastructure (Costa-Perez et al., 
2013). The debate by various authors on network virtualisation and its effect on 
the future of mobile networks (Khan et al., 2011; Zaki et al., 2011; Costa-Perez 
et al., 2013; Panchal et al., 2013) empowers the researcher in formulating future 
strategy for Kazakhtelecom’s mobile division. 
The crowdsourced infrastructure paradigm with its underlying “bring your own” 
principle, allows the organising of a particular network on demand using public 
or private resources (Doyle et al., 2014). Various separate owners of 
infrastructure elements can allocate their tangible (networks, data centres) and 
intangible (spectrum, software) assets to form a new network. Witnessing cases 
in various industries when new inventions and approaches make whole 
industries obsolete, this knowledge enables the researcher and his organisation 
to formulate preventive measures and work out defensive or collaborative 
strategy, e.g. offering its network elements on an IS basis, towards a 
crowdsourced infrastructure trend. 
 
11.9 Lesson 9: Regional Peculiarities Affect Regulation 
Studying IS and policies on a global scale suggests that various regions 
implement culturally different regulatory practices. The US introduced 
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liberalisation by opening access to incumbent infrastructures. Asia Pacific 
countries, e.g. Korea and Japan, exercised an interventionist approach and 
heavily subsidised infrastructure development. Europe implemented, to some 
degree, a blend of liberalisation and government interventions. The SLR 
revealed an interesting observation, i.e. that the nature of regulation may 
depend less on ethnicity and more on sub-regional practices. For example, 
regulation on infrastructure development in Australia and New Zealand is closer 
to Asian practices, with a higher degree of government interventions and 
subsidies. This knowledge generates a better understanding of and formulating 
organisational responses to regulatory initiatives in Kazakhstan. After 
conducting the research, the regulation in Kazakhstan is clearly identified as the 
immediate heir of former communistic cultures with administrative regulatory 
practices, explaining why it still follows the footsteps of Russia even after 20 
years of independence, and why the introduction of competition is such an 
exhausting process. 
 
11.10 Lesson 10: Motivation and Discipline are Critical Success 
Factors 
Part-time doctoral study is a long journey taking several years to complete. 
Along with learning how to manage ‘work-study-life’ balance, the research 
process provides a way to properly maintain motivation and discipline curves. 
Figure 11-1 illustrates how motivation and discipline curves changed over the 
four year period of research. The first year excitement is gradually fading away, 
especially with such deliverables as SLR and EP. An important study lesson is 
to monitor the motivation curve and compensate for it with constantly increasing 
discipline efforts. Fighting procrastination and maintaining hard discipline is vital 
to the overall success of research. Failure to align motivation with discipline 
may put a researcher off the study track and lead to risky extensions. 
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Figure 11-1 Motivation / discipline equilibrium during research 
Graphics presented in Figure 11-1 are subjective and illustrate the personal 
learning of the author. It is possible that other researchers may experience 
different fluctuations in motivation but the overall lesson to maintain constant 
growth in academic discipline over the course of research is universal. 
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12 IMPLICATIONS 
The outcomes of the research are of value for regulators, practitioners, 
representatives of telecommunication and other network industries, and 
scholars who deal with the topic of sustainable infrastructure development and 
take a complex system perspective. 
The outcomes of the research are primarily addressed to NRAs. The software 
prototype was developed under the requirements of the UK regulator, which is 
viewed as a leader to follow in international telecommunication regulation. The 
research outcomes have the potential to attract the attention of other NRAs and 
have an impact on regulatory practice globally. 
The software model allows scholars and academics who study the effects of 
mandatory network sharing on competition and infrastructure investments to 
analyse various network development scenarios from an ABM perspective. 
The research outcomes have the potential for contribution to practice. 
Prospective target audiences of research outcomes are telco operators and 
network infrastructures. IS is becoming more popular as an intra- and inter-
industry phenomenon. Consolidation of utilities leads to converged network 
operations, especially in underground settings. The software decision support 
tool can expand simulation scenarios by including sharing between utilities. A 
generic version of the software model tailored to the needs of consulting 
companies has a strong potential for commercialisation. 
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13 CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates Infrastructure Sharing (IS) in telecommunications as a 
business and regulatory strategy to enable consistent infrastructure 
development, satisfy growth in digital demand, address economic efficiencies 
and consider environmental, health and aesthetic issues of modern network 
industries. This thesis presents the results of the research dedicated to the topic 
of duct and pole access to incumbent networks and ‘bitstream’ approach. 
As Jeffrey Johnson wrote in his essay “Most of the decisions made in the 
modern world involve a combination of human beings and physical 
objects…(and decision makers want to) predict the behaviour of the physical 
subsystem, the behaviour of the human subsystem, and the emergent 
behaviour as the two interact and coevolve” (Johnson, 2001). The research 
aims to develop a decision support tool for a National Regulating Authority 
(NRA) on the basis of a software simulation representing infrastructure in use 
as complex systems consisting of agent and infrastructure networks. 
The developed simulation tool provides a solid foundation for simulating 
experiments, which allows the analysis of demand for Superfast and Ultrafast 
broadband services for different subgroups of users. This is achieved by 
running scenarios for new and alternative infrastructures, investigating 
Bitstream scenarios under different market shares, examining the influence of 
duct and pole availability and continuity on infrastructure development, and 
exploring the cost characteristics of infrastructure scenarios. 
The final deliverable of the research has been created with reference to 
particular methodological frameworks, design concepts and approaches, 
selected data sources, focused attention on a particular type of IS, and a 
particular software development tool. All these elements have their embedded 
limitations which contribute to the overall quality and rigour of the final 
deliverable. 
The software prototype, as the main outcome of the research, allows 
simulations and preliminary analysis of demand for broadband services, running 
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infrastructure development scenarios for Greenfield, Brownfield and Bitstream 
strategies, checking space availability and path continuity in ducts and poles, 
studying costs of infrastructure scenarios, visualising unsatisfied demand, and 
customising the model functionality to obtain optional results. 
The results of the study are of value for regulators, practitioners, 
representatives of telecommunication and other network industries and scholars 
who deal with the topic of sustainable infrastructure development and recognise 
the value of a complex system perspective. 
The novelty of the research is a working software simulation tool which 
combines a multi method approach and views infrastructure development on 
the supply side in connection with an agent-based user behaviour on the 
demand side. 
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169 (Solomon, 1978) Regulation 
170 (Song, Zo and Lee, 2012) Regulation 
171 (Stern, 2004) Regulation 
172 (Stylianou, 2011) Innovation 
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Ramanathan, 2012) 
Decision Making 
174 (Sweeney and Griffiths, 2002) Complex Systems 
175 (Tang, 2006) Innovation 
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No. Article Literature Domain 
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177 (Ting, Wildman and Bauer, 
2005) 
Business Models of Infrastructure Sharing 
178 (Toossi, Camci and Varga, 
2013) 
Decision Making 
179 (Tran et al., 2014) Business Models of Infrastructure Sharing 
180 (Treasury, 2013) Business Models of Infrastructure Sharing 
181 (Valletti, 2003) Regulation 
182 (Valletti and Cave, 1998) Business Models of Infrastructure Sharing 
183 (Van Cuilenburg and Slaa, 
1995) 
Innovation 
184 (Van Cuilenburg and Slaa, 
1994) 
Innovation 
185 (Van Duijn, 1981) Innovation 
186 (Varga et al., 2014) Complex Systems 
187 (Velasquez and Hester, 2013) Decision Making 
188 (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944) 
Decision Making 
189 (Von Winterfield and 
Edwards, 1986) 
Decision Making 
190 (Waldrop, 1993) Complex Systems 
191 (Waverman and Koutroumpis, 
2011) 
Regulation 
192 (Webb, 2008) Business Models of Infrastructure Sharing 
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194 (Wenders, 1990) Regulation 
195 (Wenders, 1988) Regulation 
196 (Wonglimpiyarat, 2005) Innovation 
197 (Wyman, 2007) Business Models of Infrastructure Sharing 
198 (Yang et al., 2013) Regulation 
199 (Yang, Shieh and Tzeng, 
2009) 
Decision Making 
200 (Yoon and Kinoshita, 2010) Decision Making 
201 (Ypsilanti, D., Xavier, 1998) Regulation 
202 (Zanakis, Evans and 
Vazacopoulos, 1989) 
Decision Making 
203 (Zanfei, 1993) Innovation 
204 (Zia and Koliba, 2013) Decision Making 
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Appendix B Shortlist of 61 articles selected for SLR 
after quality appraisal 
Ref No Citation details 
1 (Cave, 2008) 
2 (Wright and Cave, 2011) 
3 (Foellmi and Meister, 2012) 
4 (Saal et al., 2013) 
5 (Sawkins, 2001) 
6 (Stern, 2012) 
7 (Brunekreeft, 1997) 
8 (Growitsch and Stronzik, 2014) 
9 (Santa and Sikora, 2004) 
10 (Lassila et al., 2009) 
11 (Malmendier and Schendel, 2006) 
12 (Mogel and Gregg, 2004) 
13 (Newbery, 2005) 
14 (Pollitt, 2008) 
15 (Bartlett and Jackson, 2002) 
16 (Berkers et al., 2010) 
17 (Biggar, 2003) 
18 (Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, 2002) 
19 (Blackman, Forge and Horvitz, 2013) 
20 (Bourreau and Doǧan, 2005) 
21 (Bublin and Causevic, 2008) 
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22 (Cave, 2010b) 
23 (Cave, 2014) 
24 (Costa-Perez et al., 2013) 
25 (Crandall, 2005) 
26 (Crandall, Eisenach and Ingraham, 2013) 
27 (Day, 2002) 
28 (Doyle et al., 2014) 
29 (Falch, Henten and Tadayoni, 2009) 
30 (Frisanco et al., 2008) 
31 (Gabelmann, 2001) 
32 (Hausman and Sidak, 1999) 
33 (Hazlett, 2006) 
34 (Hogendorn, 2007) 
35 (Infante and Vallejo, 2012) 
36 (Chatzicharistou, 2010) 
37 (Khan et al., 2011) 
38 (Meddour, Rasheed and Gourhant, 2011) 
39 (Noam, 1994) 
40 (Offergelt, 2011) 
41 (Onishi and Tsuna, 2010) 
42 (Panchal, Yates and Buddhikot, 2013) 
43 (Shin and Bartolacci, 2007) 
44 (Soares and Sarmento, 2012) 
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45 (Song, Zo and Lee, 2012) 
46 (Song, Zo and Ciganek, 2014) 
47 (Wallsten and Hausladen, 2009) 
48 (Zaki et al., 2011) 
49 (Cherry, 2008) 
50 (Drew, 2009) 
51 (Hummer et al., 2006) 
52 (Levinson, 2009) 
53 (Marvin and Slater, 1997) 
54 (Morris et al., 2009) 
55 (Parsons et al., 2014) 
56 (Resor, Hickey and Trb, 2005) 
57 (Inderst and Peitz, 2012) 
58 (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2012) 
59 (Karvetski, Lambert and Linkov, 2009) 
60 (Boggia and Rocchi, 2010) 
61 (Walker, 2000) 
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Appendix C Quality appraisal form of and rationale for a 
rejected article 
 
Excluded Article 1 
Citation 
Brunner, N. and Starkl, M., (2012), “Financial and Economic Determinants of Collective 
Action: The Case of Wastewater Management”, Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp. 140–150 
Authors: (Brunner and Starkl, 2012) 
Title: Financial and Economic Determinants of Collective Action: The Case of 
Wastewater Management 
Quality Criteria Quality score 
(1 lowest to 5 
highest) 
Is the objective of the article rightly aligned with the 
objectives of my SLR?  
Specifically, does the article address regulatory decision 
making in respect of IS and joint use of public facilities? 
 
2 
Is the research question of the article clearly formulated? 
 
Is it aligned with any of this SLR questions (SubQ1, SubQ2, 
SubQ3 or MainQ) 
3 
 
2 
Is the review of relevant literature presented in the article? 
 
4 
Does the paper present a clear methodology of research, 
data collection, sampling and analysis? 
4 
Are the findings explicitly formulated? 
 
3 
Does the discussion answer the research question and 
objectives of the paper? 
3 
What is the overall quality of the paper and its contribution 3 
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to knowledge?  
What is the impact factor of the Journal? 
What is SJR ranking of the Journal? 
 
2.05 
1.22 
Total Score (the range is from 8 to 40+) 
 
27.27 
Was the paper selected (if total score more than 28) No 
Comments if not selected 
This article is about funding and specifically about cost sharing in building 
sewerage systems in developing and developed countries. Not about actual 
infrastructure sharing. 
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Appendix D Example of a Data Extraction Form 
Ref No 1 
Citation (Cave, 2008) 
Title:  Independent Review of Competition and Innovation in Water Markets: 
Final Report 
Author(s): Cave, M. 
Journal/Source: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69462/ca
ve-review-final-report.pdf 
Year:  2008 
Keywords: Water markets, Competition, Innovation 
Study Background 
Research Question / Purpose of paper: “to recommend changes to the frameworks of 
the industry to deliver benefits to customers and the environment” 
Primary Research Focus: Introduction of competition in the Water industry of England 
and Wales 
Grounding Literature: Various UK agencies reports 
Methodology 
Method: Empirical: An integrated approach to analyse costs and benefits of greater use 
of competition, the adoption of market-like instruments and the reform of monopoly 
regulation 
Data Description: Data from UK and Wales national statistics, environmental and other 
agencies 
Data Collection Instrument 
Sector: Water  
Unit of Analysis: National level of England and UK 
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Analytical approach: Analysis of current situation in water industry, collecting 
responses from stakeholders 
Type of Infrastructure Sharing: Open access, Common carriage, Rights-of-Way 
Contribution 
Key findings: Recommended reforms in water abstraction, resources, treatment, 
infrastructure, mergers regime, creation of an R&D agency 
Key propositions and arguments: Introduce reforms in England and Wales water 
industries where risk-reward ratio is the most appropriate to avoid ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach 
Limitations and Scope for further research: General overview of water industry with no 
particular focus on Infrastructure sharing methods 
Synthesis/Key contribution to review question(s): Open access and Common Carriage 
models are considered in relation to market reforms 
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Appendix E ‘Testimony from Kazakhstani Regulator’ 
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Appendix F ‘Testimony from the BO of the RCC’ 
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Appendix G ‘Electronic Version of Simulation Model’ 
 
The electronic version of the software model is exported from AnyLogic 
simulation environment into Java-based platform independent executable files 
and recorded onto DVDs (available as attachment to the hard copy of this 
Thesis from Cranfield library). 
 
